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Abstract 
 
This study uncovers the motivations of the indigenous counter-violent-extremist 
movement in Marjah, a village in southwest Afghanistan, between 2009 and 2013.  
Furthermore, it elucidates how the international and central government security 
forces allowed and enabled this grassroots anti-Taliban militia.   
The thesis submits that the fighters rose up and defeated Taliban because of self-
determination—describing the townsmen’s ultimate goal of village autonomy as well 
as their self-sufficient actions.  Self-determination acted as a centre of gravity that 
drove fighters to struggle and die to eradicate local violent extremist elements.  The 
Afghan government and outside militaries allowed this independence, unlike the 
Taliban, and thus became the militia’s welcome partners instead of enemies. 
After introducing the history of traditional Pashtun militias in southern Afghanistan 
and then in Marjah specifically, the paper tests three hypotheses: whether and how 
much the 1) need for stability, 2) antipathy towards a foreign ideology, and 3) 
protection of tribalism may have factored into the motivations for this movement.   
From interviews with over a quarter of the civilian guardians in 2011, unpublished 
unclassified and declassified reports, and notes from observers, this study assesses 
that stability, hatred of an alien ideology, and nationalism—not tribalism—were 
rallying cries for the movement.  However, self-determination, not originally 
postulated before field research, served as the central theme underpinning these other 
drivers and acting as the main master narrative. 
The findings of this single case study may be an early look at a burgeoning discipline 
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Twelve years after the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 and United States’ 
consequential invasion of Afghanistan, there has yet to be an in-depth study on the 
motivations of those civilians who revolt against violent extremists.  Even though in 
the years after the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks the United States and 
some of her partner nations found themselves mired in a war in Iraq and a menu of 
contingency, intelligence support, logistical support, foreign-internal-defence, low-
intensity, stabilization, or counterterrorism missions from the Philippines to Mali,1 
there is no academic study that investigates the drivers of indigenous movements that 
fight and kill violent extremists on their own.  
 
This case study’s research and analysis endeavour to illuminate incentives and 
goals—in the form of words and actions—of a single self-driven counter-extremist 
local militia in the village of Marjah in southwest Afghanistan between 2009 and 
2013.  However, the findings of this single case study may be a first-look at a 
burgeoning discipline in counterinsurgency studies that will help future scholars to 
identify such movements and understand what motivates and sustains them 
throughout the world.  The story of Marjah’s grassroots counter-violent-extremist 
movement offers one case study to include in wider comparative research, and the 
conclusions may elucidate themes common to and different from investigations of 
other similar militias.  Also, the methodology, which included an intensive and wide 
interview scheme with the anti-extremist fighters, may help to inform approaches of 
future similar case studies.  The conclusions, though, of this study derive only from 
Marjah in a four-year period. 
 
The findings of this single case study and future comparative investigations may also 
help policymakers identify and leverage such movements in the current constricted 
manpower environment.2  Because of U.S. military and civilian government service 
sequesters, drawdowns, and budget cuts,3 the U.S. government may look to tactics 
that leverage indigenous anti-militant activities for the foreseeable future.  Military 
commanders have already begun to publish strategy papers that call for NATO 
security forces to identify and empower local systems.4 
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Because movements and their motivations do not occur in a vacuum, this study must 
also analyse the doctrine and intentions of outside actors—such as NATO security 
services in Marjah—and what actions they took to impel or simply allow such an 
autonomous movement to begin and then flourish.  This study is therefore a story of 
both the motivations of local actors and the tradecraft, accidental or intentional, 
foreign actors employed to enable Marjah’s militia. 
 
The primary research question is what drives an indigenous counter-violent extremist 
movement?  Put another way, why would people fight and die to kill violent 
extremists?  This inquiry calls for a thorough understanding of the local and regional 
conditions, characteristics, actions, aspirations, verbal narratives, and the myriad of 
historical factors that could lead someone to voluntarily kill in the name of eradicating 
violent extremism.  Sub-questions, thus, include what were the initial conditions—
with regards to security, economy, previous interactions with violent extremists, and 
geography—for this successful grassroots kinetic movement?  Furthermore what are 
the conditions, mindset, and strategy of outside military forces—both the international 
Coalition Forces and the Afghan formal security services—to help such a movement 
rise in the first place?  What messages do the fighters and leaders espouse; what 
claimed motivations and goals characterize the movement?  In line with or in contrast 
to the verbal messages, what actions define the movement, and what motivations do 
these activities reveal?  Finally, what are the regional socio-political conditions that 
allow such a movement to continue to fight in the long-term and see success against 
its perceived enemies? 
 
This study concludes that self-determination served as this movement’s centre of 
gravity.  Autonomy aptly describes both members’ independent actions and the goal 
for which they struggled.  This anti-Taliban Pashtun militia or arbakai5 is somewhat 
unique amongst similar movements in southwest Asia—many of whom failed to live 
or act with autonomy, self-sufficiency, or resolve.  While other would-be movements 
negotiated with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) for wages, haggled for development 
projects, and made empty promises,6 Marjah’s arbakai prided itself in its self-
sufficiency and independent vision.7  Militiamen felt they alone would have to defeat 
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insurgents8—perhaps a dramatic notion but an accurate one as Marjahns knew well 
that outside security assistance would decrease or end.9  They felt their future was in 
their own hands.  Locals did not wish to count on ISAF, GIRoA, or any outside entity.  
Marjah militiamen needed no incentive, no treaty, and no special recognition.10   As 
an anti-Taliban tribal elder stated, “I don’t need a tank, I don’t need a plan, I don’t 
even need a single bullet...I will use sticks and I will use the guns my people have to 
defend my area.”11   
 
This study’s thesis is that Marjah’s militia successfully defeats violent extremists 
because of uncompromising self-determination.  Self-determination, in this study, 
comprises three related and overlapping elements:  decision by a people to determine 
their own political and social fate;12 the ability and willingness of a person or group to 
act without external influence or rule;13 and communal acts of self-reliance and self-
sufficiency.14  In essence, self-determination applies to the goal of autonomy and the 
acts, themselves, of working without outside interference.  This motivation kept the 
fighters fighting in the streets to face looming grisly retribution at the hands of the 
Taliban,15 often without money and basic policing resources.16  Autonomy—
regarding both their spoken aspirations and the independent method by which they 
fought—served as a centre of gravity and saturated their answers to the study’s 
interviews, their idealism, and their aggressive crusading spirit.17  Fortunately, for 
Coalition Forces and the Afghan government, Marjah’s drive for autonomy and self-
reliance neither contradicts ISAF goals nor GIRoA laws.18  Thus government officials 
and international security leaders were able to allow this arbakai to operate and 




Before uncovering the specific motivations of this militia, defining the terms 
“Taliban,” “violent extremists,” and “arbakai” is essential.  These sometime 
contentious terms comprise the protagonists and antagonists of the fight for Marjah.  
Although government representatives have insinuated that the Afghan Taliban are 
“terrorists”20 and dubbed its Pakistan-based sister organization Tehrik-e-Taliban 
Pakistan a formal “terrorist” group,21 this particular case study will not use the term.  
The words “terrorism” and “terrorist” are subjective—depending on the perspective of 
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those who feel they are terrorized or threatened by governments or non-governmental 
entities that may employ certain types of violence.22  Instead of abiding by 
governments’ terminology, this study will look at the Taliban holistically, to include 
its structure, strategies, ideologies, and roots and not through the eyes of 
policymakers.  The study will analyse an indigenous force that kinetically and 
rhetorically counters a local violent extremist element that the villagers refer to as 
Taliban.  
 
When researching a movement that fights violent extremists, one must first define the 
enemy—the very reason such a movement exists in the first place.  Literature 
describes three lenses through which to view the Taliban.  One lens contends the 
Taliban has a tendency towards being an independent monolithic group—or at least 
close coalition of groups—derived from a single ideology.  Another describes Taliban 
as most notably a self-claimed front of a greater war to defend all Muslim lands from 
outside invaders.  A third views the Taliban has an inclination more towards a loose 
coalition of insurgent cells with disparate motivations and beliefs sharing only a 
common anti-government narrative.23  On a linguistic note, this study will use the 
term Taliban to refer to the organization and the same derivative of the word to refer 
to a group or two or more members of the group. 
 
Within the first lens, scholars such as Scott Atran and Seth Jones contend that the 
main core Taliban comprise people who adhere to a strict version of a “true” religion 
that is incompatible with every other interpretation of God.  They consider themselves 
clearly separate from any other major political sect, school of faith, or school of law—
they recognize no other type of religion as valid.24  The Taliban do not even recognize 
other violent, political, or fundamentalist streams of Islam to include the Saudi faith 
or “bin Ladinism.”25  Such a monolithic faith—as taught in these schools—holds zero 
room for tolerance, debate, or anything that might appear on the surface to be against 
the oneness of God.  Afghanistan’s mysticism, gravesites, shrines, mujahidin warrior 
charismatics, tribal elders, and tribal land owners hold no place in the Taliban’s 
envisioned new world order of adherence to Taliban’s view above all else.26  
 
According to this school of thought, the Taliban ideology is as an interpretation of the 
original Deobandi movement.  The Deobandis—from the relatively “moderate” 
	   9	  
Hanafi school of law—originally rose up in India as a peaceful movement under 
British rule.27   By 1988, a new breed of more violent leaning 25,000 informal and 
unregistered Deobandi schools were blooming, most of which comprised teachers 
with little or no formal education and arguably little understanding of the original 
Deobandi ideology.28  These teachers, who flourished in rural areas and Afghan 
refugee camps in Pakistan, taught what they believed were literalist views of the 
Quran, even though few instructors actually studied the Quran critically.29  When the 
Taliban became relevant in southern Afghanistan in 1994, it was to this mutated 
quasi-Deobandi ideology to which founders and followers adhered.30 
 
Those Pakistani schools did more than just teach ideology to the Taliban.  They 
supplied the Taliban with fighters and leaders.31  By 1999 eight of the top Taliban 
leadership were graduates of the extremist Deobandi school in the Northwest Frontier 
Province Dar-ul-Uloom Haqqani. Whenever the Taliban needed more bodies 
throughout the late 1990s, schools would shut down and instruct students to walk or 
drive to Afghanistan to join Taliban ranks.32   
 
A second school of thought to include findings from Robert Pape and Jerrold Post 
supposes that the Taliban is most notably but one front of a greater war to defend 
lands where Muslims live against Western presence and influence.  This line of 
argument stresses that, although the Taliban’s faith and ideology are unique to any 
major strand of Islam, their regional messaging campaigns; local recruitment 
statements of fighting off Western incursion;33 acceptance of non-Deobandi local and 
foreign fighters; inclusion of younger globally focused recruits; and past rhetorical, 
militant, and monetary support of al-Qa`ida are possible evidence that effectively the 
Taliban act as but one face of global violent extremism.34  Taliban online statements 
stress that Afghanistan is but just one front in a worldwide campaign to push 
Westerners out of Muslim lands,35 a few Taliban sub-commanders claim to be part of 
al-Qa`ida central,36 and there is limited evidence to suggest that young Taliban 
recruits appear to be more interested in al-Qa`ida’s worldwide vision and reach vice 
regional Deobandi goals.37  This distinct viewpoint on the Taliban identity does not 
perceive Taliban’s contemporary Deobandi belief system as the same as other 
regional and transnational insurrections but instead emphasizes Taliban’s global 
ambitions as jibing with these other violent organizations.38   
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`  
Perhaps one reason for the idea that the Taliban are one front in a worldwide battle is 
rooted in history.  Historically, al-Qa`ida’s ideological roots may have influenced 
Taliban’s views. Shaikh Syed Abul A'ala Mawdudi’s version of Muslim Brothers 
(founded in 1941, 13 years after the birth of Egypt’s original Muslim Brotherhood 
franchise) was heavily influenced by the works and views of Egypt’s Brethren 
founder Hasan al-Banna.  Al-Banna’s views led to a growing Egyptian Brotherhood 
that, when repressed, grew extremist violent branches to include the Egyptian Islamic 
Jihad whose members later comprised much of al-Qa`ida’s top leadership save a few 
such as Saudi-born Usama bin Ladin.39  When Usama bin Ladin and his Egyptian 
inner circle searched for safe haven, the Taliban obliged ultimately leading to the U.S. 
invasion of Afghanistan in 2001.  Some experts believe the Taliban would have 
eventually excommunicated al-Qa`ida leadership on their own, and some contend that 
the relationship between al-Qa`ida and the Taliban up until 2001 was mired with 
distrust.40  Nonetheless, the Taliban successfully sheltered al-Qa`ida and often market 
and message as if they are all partners on a similar mission.41   
 
A third view, which includes contributions from Jessica Stern and Tom Coghlan, 
argues that the Taliban often have a tendency towards a loose coalition of fighting 
cells in Afghanistan that appear only to agree on opposing international security 
forces and the current government of Afghanistan. Taliban is an umbrella group that 
appears to comprise disparate goals and ideologies.42  This stream of academic 
thought often refers to dozens or hundreds of cells of violent extremists43—some that 
Taliban political centres in Pakistan control and others that local leaders control.44  
Some appear spiritual, some criminal, and some political.  Some Taliban cell leaders 
have become drug warlords,45 while others appear to use membership in the Taliban 
to continue centuries of power plays against rival clans and tribal confederations.46  
While there exist dedicated cells willing to conduct suicide attacks, there are others 
that comprise relatively moderate tribesmen from locations where non-violent-
extremist elders wish to volunteer some fighters to the Taliban as a method to appease 
Taliban militant leaders.47  Some allow schools for girls,48 while others regularly 
intimidate and assassinate teachers and oppose women’s education.49  Although some 
balk at tribalism, others provide services peacefully through the local tribal jirga50—a 
special decision making council of tribal elders—systems to be locally and culturally 
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appropriate.51  Some Taliban cells continue to cut off the heads of civilians who work 
with Coalition Forces,52 while other cells refrain from this type of brutality as per 
Mullah Omar’s recent guidance for a less violent population-focused approach to 
insurgency.53 Despite their differences, these disparate cells have one commonality: 
opposition to the current Afghan government and NATO presence.54   
This study will marry all three lenses, which, though distinct, are not mutually 
exclusive.  The intense debates in literature highlight that the Taliban is a complex 
identity demanding nuanced understanding when any researcher studies Afghanistan 
and counterinsurgency in southwest Asia.  The Taliban have their roots in a single 
Deobandi-branch ideology.  The core leadership and recruits continue to come from 
these schools with an understanding that their belief system is the only valid ideology.  
Simultaneously, the Taliban—in their marketing, attempts to recruit regionally, and 
attempts to raise money—also paint themselves as one front in a grander war against 
the West.  Such a narrative allows the Taliban to maintain its unique identity while 
selling themselves as part of a grander fight with groups that hold different ideologies 
but similar goals and tactics.  Finally, the Taliban—an ideologically independent 
identity simultaneously marketing themselves as part of a global war—also bring in 
short-term non-ideological allies in Afghanistan.  Although some scholars may not 
consider these non-ideological partners true hard-core “Taliban,” this study will apply 
the term to all fighters under the banner of “Taliban.”  As with any movement, there 
are complexities, various shades of devotion, and marriages of convenience within the 
movement.  It is paramount that scholarship be as intellectually rigorous as possible to 
accept and grapple with the distinct yet not mutually exclusive identities of the 
Taliban. 
 
Even though it embodies unique and complex qualities, the Taliban is just one group 
within a stream of fighters throughout the world that some analysts and policy makers 
dub as violent extremists.55 This term is inherently subjective and riddled with 
etymological and substantive problems.  In the eyes of Taliban, NATO troops may be 
seen as violent extremists when this coalition of foreign armies aggressively conduct 
attacks and sometimes kill civilians.  Similarly, a scholar could also apply this term to 
any number of corrupt officials, criminals, other foreign militaries, or entities that use 
violence and hold “fringe” beliefs.  So the assumption will be made that the term 
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violent extremist will be from the perspective of GIRoA, ISAF, and anti-insurgent 
Afghans. 
 
To sharpen the definition further, one must grapple with two perspectives on violent 
extremism.  A first school of thought, including M.A. Muqtedar Khan and Donald 
Holbrook,56 supposes that violent extremists incorporate not only those that actively 
conduct violence but also refer to political and philosophical leaders who may support 
fringe conservative beliefs or act possibly as some sort of stepping stone for those that 
eventually become violent extremists.  These authors suppose that political Islam, that 
is anything short of accepting modern Western and democratic “values,” can be 
associated with violent extremism.57  However, there exists little evidence that 
political Islam is the only or even a necessary road to radicalization.  In fact, most 
literature on radicalization agrees that there are likely many varied paths for people to 
become violent extremists.58  Furthermore, some experts have pealed through the 
various layers of constructionist and orthodox salafism—from “quietist” (those that 
submit to a political leader), “scientific” (non-violent believers who also investigate 
and incorporate non-religious scholarship) to non-violent “political” strains—and 
concluded independently that the “jihadi” violent extremism is actually at odds with 
the non-violent strands of conservative belief systems.59  Although these non-violent 
salafi streams may sometimes have connections and hold ideological origins for a 
particular violent extremist, salafis themselves are not necessarily violent. 
 
A second stream of literature argues that violent extremists are only those that 
actually conduct violent attacks.  This limited view, from publications from such 
authors as John Horgan,60 mostly discounts rhetorical supporters and those with 
violent-extremist-leaning views.  A violent extremist is specifically only someone 
who has actually already conducted or is in the process of conducting violence against 
him or herself or another human being for a political or ideological goal.61  This 
narrow definition does not refer to someone with “fringe” beliefs or a person that 
supports violence morally or rhetorically.  Within this stream of thought, the act of 
someone joining a violent extremist group and conducting violent operations can be 
considered “activation” or “mobilization” because the definition focuses on actions 
and not as much as the original motivation, ideology, belief, or grievance.62 
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Within this second school of thought exist two distinct approaches to study violent 
extremism and to analyse the mobilization of a person into a violent extremist group.  
The first approach calls for practitioners and scholars to focus on the actual actions of 
violent extremists and the road to violent extremism foremost with less of an 
emphasis on understanding original belief systems, related non-violent movements, 
social trends, and the greater political and ideological dispositions in which the 
violent extremist lives and acts.  This approach may assume that distinctly different 
violent extremist groups’ behaviour can be compared with little focus on possible 
ideological roots and the greater environment.63  Another approach strives to 
holistically investigate not only the actions themselves of violent extremists but also 
the political, ideological, and personal mindsets taking into account trends and 
narratives of the region and world.64 
 
Because there is no evidence violent extremists only derive from peaceful 
conservatism, this study will wholly discount the definition that includes those with 
orthodox beliefs.  Violent extremists must act violently to reach this paper’s definition 
of violent extremist.  It is also not enough for someone to hold conservative or fringe 
spiritual interpretations.  Therefore, violent extremists in Afghanistan would include 
those persons who conduct suicide bombings, execute civilians wantonly, and 
violently force locals to adhere to particular belief systems or political views—in 
Afghanistan including members of al-Qa`ida, Taliban, Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, and 
the Haqqani Network for example.65  Nevertheless, this paper will also investigate the 
political and ideological origins of violent extremists as well as the larger security and 
political picture.  It must be noted that in recent years, some violent extremists in 
southwest Asia and throughout the world have taken lighter approaches by trying to 
avoid indigenous civilian deaths.66  However, even these amongst these groups, to 
include Taliban cells throughout Helmand, violence against civilians continues to ebb 
and flow.67 
 
Fighting these violent extremists, who brought their beliefs, world-views, narratives, 
and ruthless tactics to Marjah is an arbakai.  The Pashtun militia members in Marjah 
call themselves arbakai, and this study will refer to them as arbakai.  However, the 
uprising in Marjah is by no means a traditional or normal Pashtun arbakai.  There are 
four major interpretations of what the Marjah militia actually is within the paradigms 
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of both the international counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan and within 
Pashtun history.  On a linguistic note, this study will use the term arbakai for the 
singular and plural. 
First, foreign scholars often refer to the militia by the ISAF funding source that 
conventional and Special Forces use to encourage militias to operate. In Marjah, ISAF 
sanctioned what was known as “Local Defense Forces” (September 2010), later 
known as a “Neighborhood Watch Program” (November 2010), later known as the 
“Interim Security for Critical Infrastructure” (February 2011), later known as “Afghan 
Local Police” (August 2011).68  However, as the study will show, solely calling the 
arbakai by the Western terms overlooks the unique nature of this militia which rose up 
on its own; operates on its own often without salary or outside incentive or support; 
and maintains that it will continue to function exactly as it has during and after any 
miniscule ISAF funding. 
Second, some consider the Marjah militia an arbakai only.  According to Pashtun 
tradition, an arbakai is purely a community police force that enforces jirga69 decisions 
and aims to prevent harm to the community.  These non-professional civilian soldiers 
number from ten to over 100, often negotiate instead of fight, and are often unarmed 
because of the inherent respect locals may have for the jirga.70  Like a traditional 
arbakai, Marjah’s militia was born from a traditional jirga decision, and the militia 
members continue to answer to the jirga even today.  Additionally, the militia does 
defend the village block-by-block like a traditional arbakai.  However, simply 
dubbing this militia a classic arbakai ignores the at-times offensive nature of this 
militia (stepping outside the village to hunt down Taliban) and the modest ISAF 
salaries that sometimes go to the fighters—salaries unnecessary for a classic Pashtun 
arbakai.  Also, the militia has continued to fight for so long that it does not fit easily 
into scholars’ understanding of a historical arbakai, which traditionally execute a 
single action temporarily and then disband.  If one were to consider this militia an 
arbakai, one would have to acknowledge that this is not a traditional arbakai but a 
modern version of a historical Pashtun term. 
Third, some might describe this militia as a chagha71, which refers to fighters raised 
suddenly to meet a specific set of invaders.72  Similarly, the media has referred to 
anti-Taliban militias like the one in Marjah as a qiyam or uprising.  Although these 
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terms aptly describe the initial uprising in Marjah, the terms do not holistically take 
into account the militia’s longevity.  The militia, as the study will show, not only 
helped to push the Taliban out of the village but continue to defend the village year-
after-year from future incursion. 
Finally, some research and media outlets have referred to this type of militia as a 
Pashtun lashkar.73  Some regional government officials and local media outlets 
maintain that government sanctioned anti-Taliban lashkars are only supposed to 
defend their home villages and provide regular military troops information on 
locations and dispositions of anti-government militants.74  However, most Western 
scholars on tribalism in Pashtun areas disagree with these claims.  Overwhelming 
careful research shows that traditional Pashtun lashkars are most often offensive 
forces ranging from 10 to 50,000 and can implement jihad or even offensive anti-
government activities and operations.75  Lashkars are often mobile small armies that 
travel to close in with and destroy an enemy.76  Therefore, the term lashkar would also 
fall short to wholly define Marjah’s mostly defensive militia.  The militia is mostly 
protective force with only some offensive capabilities—not the attacking tribal army 
that a lashkar normally describes. 
Although no one term correctly defines the movement in Marjah, arbakai—with the 
caveat that this is not a classic historical arbakai but instead a modern iteration with 
some offensive characteristics—is the most appropriate.  ISAF terms fail to 
acknowledge the independent and self-sufficient nature of the movement.  Chagha 
fails to account for the militia’s longevity, and lashkar fails to account for its mostly 
defensive nature.   
1.2 Literature Review 
Contemporary southern Afghanistan arbakai in the their self-driven efforts against 
violent extremists is understudied within the disciplines of counterinsurgency and 
stabilization.77  Within the burgeoning literature on stabilization theories—whether 
those that focus on direct outside intervention or those that see such processes as 
destabilizing—and historical understanding of rural Afghan resilience, there is yet no 
rigorous in-depth study on why rural Afghans would rise up against contemporary 
violent extremists specifically.  Moreover there is no study, yet, that attempts to 
research the motivations, characteristics, and conditions of a movement while that 
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uprising is underway along with the personalities, narratives, perspectives, and 
aspirations during warfare. 
 
Most historians and war studies theorists focus generally on how a local government 
or outside military can directly defeat insurrection and help to strengthen stability at 
the expense of focusing primarily on the motivations of local civilian movements 
whose goals are in consonance with the greater counterinsurgency campaign.78  
Nevertheless, authors do account for local irregular militia forces but normally as a 
corollary to outside or central government militaries recruiting and paying civilians to 
conduct basic civil-police work under formal security command.79   
On a strategic and tactical level, this literature review reveals two competing theories 
of counterinsurgency.  The first focuses on the existence and number of localized 
paramilitary forces—that are recruited by outsiders—for a counterinsurgency to 
prevail with the assumption that such civilian guardian forces are but one part of a 
larger campaign against insurrection.80  The second theme suggests a lower 
counterinsurgency footprint81 that necessarily entails enabling local resilient elements 
such as Pashtun arbakai as a main effort.  In short, there is a divide amongst experts 
between a large and more modest outside military and central government presence—
militias play an auxiliary role in the former and more central role in the latter.  This 
theoretical division played out on the ground in Marjah.  While military doctrine 
relied on the heavier approach with less emphasis on natural clans,82 the NATO 
commanders and Afghan officials in and around Marjah elected a lighter footprint 
with more investment on enabling local actors.83    
 
On the policy level debate remains on whether or not governments should work with 
clan militias at all.  Those against promoting tribalism see the phenomenon as 
destabilizing and antithetical to Western ideals of protecting and valuing the 
individual as well as weakening central government power.84   Others view working 
with clan elders as a pragmatic solution to countering violent extremists in rural areas 
where bloodline and geography tie traditional communities together.85  This second 
group believes that the alternative to not working with tribes is to face the possibility 
of clan uprising against any outside presence. 
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1.2.1 Anti-Tribalism—Policy Implications 
 
Those counterinsurgency and legal experts who emphasize the downsides of working 
with tribes, focus first on a supposed regression from liberal values inherent with 
clan-ism—of which arbakai can be an essential element for rural Pashtuns.  Robert 
Kagan and Mark Weiner maintain that Western liberal government institutions are not 
the natural state of mankind, but instead something that must be enforced to protect 
individual freedom and protection.86  Without strong central governments, tribalism 
becomes the norm.  Legal scholar Dr. Weiner, when discussing policy implications of 
bypassing tribal leadership, defines liberal institutions as those that, “…place a central 
value on individual freedom and self-development.”87  On the other hand, “rule of the 
clan…[is] oriented primarily toward kinship…” wherein “individuals are submerged 
within the essential social groups to which they belong…”88   
 
One dynamic example of the implications of tribal rule versus liberal governance is 
the difference between shame and guilt.  Under liberal governments, guilt refers to 
what an individual might feel personally.  This feeling does not necessarily lead the 
individual to become a pariah from his or her community.  In contrast, shame plays a 
central role in clan societies, as Weiner explains.  If someone does something that is 
considered against cultural norms, then that person risks bringing shame on his 
community and being punished or expelled.89  In summary, this school of thought 
believes that a liberal government values the individual while clans emphasize 
communal identity above any one member—liberal governance being the ideal. 
 
Researchers, who underline the disadvantages of promoting tribalism, also view clan-
ism as a direct challenge to the strength and viability of a central government.  They 
interpret governance as a zero-sum game in which the more power tribes have, the 
less a federal formal government has and vice versa.  Clan systems tend to emerge or 
reinstitute themselves when central states become weak—leading, in turn, perhaps to 
an even more weakened ability of the central government to be able to have the 
potential to provide individuals protections and freedoms.90  As Dr. Weiner writes: 
 
The most probable outcome of a radically diminished 
state is thus neither a collection of empowered 
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individuals liberated from the constraints of 
government nor a grand community of equality and 
solidarity.  Rather, it is a riven, fractured, unequal 
world in which both individuals and the larger public 
are sacrificed to the needs of clans of all sorts.91  
 
Clans lessen any central formal government—a single state authority that could 
otherwise protect individuals equally under one set of federal or provincial laws.92  
Promoting tribes and their militias, specifically, takes away the ability of a central 
government to monopolize laws and the methods and abilities to enforce these rules.  
Tribes have the power to punish their people according to their own interpretations of 
norms.  They also have their own laws and institutionalized disciplinary methods.93 
 
Finally, clan-ism can be destabilizing, according to some authors.  Sammuel Griffith 
and John Nagl maintain that one single government is preferable to many smaller 
governance systems—an overall situation that could lead an insurgency to take over 
lesser powers bit-by-bit as happened in Mao’s revolution in which disunity of national 
governance was one political characteristic that may have eventually allowed the 
communists success in China.94  As well, the rule of the clan can, in general, lead to 
continuous low-intensity localized instability and conflict—because the rule hinges on 
feuds or the threat of feuds.95  For example, in Pashtun rural areas, badal is valued—a 
required physical punishment for some actual or perceived slight.96  Furthermore, 
tribalism and a weakened federal state may bring about side effects of vigilantes, 
criminal organizations, cartels, and militant movements.97 
 
Concerning the first argument of tribalism as a threat to liberal Western protection of 
the individual, these authors appear to be making a value judgment on how 
humankind should evolve socially and politically.  A government’s policy could very 
well be to grow liberal governance worldwide.  On the other hand, if a government’s 
grand strategy is to protect its own Western ideals of valuing each citizen in its own 
country, then perhaps that government may wish for more pragmatic pro-tribal 
stances abroad in order to protect the institutions within its borders.  Nevertheless, 
pro-tribal policies could indeed theoretically create a dangerous precedent in the long 
term.  If the U.S. government bypasses formal governments for tribal elders, then this 
could notionally build a model by which foreign governments bypass Washington, 
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DC to deal directly with family lineages of Appalachia, native tribes on and off 
reservations, and bloodline cartels of the Ozarks (perhaps in an effort to divide 
arguably already under-served populations from federal power).  For Afghanistan, 
however, this becomes a moot point because Afghan law explicitly give tribes and 
tribal militias authorities and responsibilities.98  So, the U.S. government and ISAF 
are not bypassing officials but instead respecting formal law when dealing with 
Afghan clans. 
 
On the second argument of tribes and their militias weakening the central state, the 
second half of this literature review will reveal how in some areas governments 
actually become weaker when they become unwanted presence in clan-ruled areas.  
Anti-clan strategies in some areas may actually bring about instability if the tribes 
revolt against central government intrusion.  Even dictatorial regimes such as that 
under Saddam Hussein (during the years 1992-2003, between the post-Operation-
Desert-Storm Shi’a and Kurdish uprising and the U.S. invasion) have actually counted 
on supporting carefully selected tribes in order to keep the government alive and 
safe—offering Saddam a security buffer in desert regions.  However, to be fair, 
researchers such as Dr. Weiner and Dr. Nagl do not outright ask readers to ignore 
tribes.  Instead, they underline the need to understand tribal areas—they suggest 
acknowledging them as the United States moves towards its own goals, which they 
believe should be to lessen clan influence.99 
 
The third argument on tribalism bringing about instability has no basis.  Although 
scholars point to the civil war of the 1990s as an unstable period, this was primarily a 
civil war between non-tribal militias run by warlords that rose amidst the earlier 
Soviet anti-tribal policies.  Many scholars actually maintain that low-intensity fighting 
between and within tribes is actually a stabilizing cycle that allows for greater peace.  
Agricultural and herding cycles allow tribes to be peaceful during busy seasons when 
clans are trying to sustain themselves for the upcoming winter.  Then, during dormant 
months, inter and intra-tribal fighting is more common. This fighting and vengeance 
seeking is such a part of life that the original cause is often forgotten, and conflicts 
can still spring up years or decades after an initial spark.  Intra-tribal conflict, Louis 
Dupree writes, is most often fought over women, property rights, and inheritance.  
And all tribe and clans have a vested interest in the conflict being over or on hiatus 
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when the agricultural and herding seasons begin again each year.100  Although this 
fighting may seem unstable to Western eyes, it may very well be considered stable for 
Pashtuns living well outside the reach of Kabul.  In addition, any disruption to this 
cycle by non-tribal warring factions, invading army, or a new government—a 
disturbance that does not allow tribesmen to tend to their farms between battles—may 
spark resented instability. 
 
1.2.2 Anti-Tribalism—Strategic Implications 
 
Not working by, with, and through tribes as a primary policy has strategic and tactic 
implications.  The policy translates into an approach that, in rural Afghanistan, 
demands many weapons, funds, and troops101 to grow a new government and 
undermine tribal leadership—leading perhaps to the government fighting both an 
insurgency and tribes that are not apart of the Taliban.  According to David Galula, 
the goal of counterinsurgency is to establish legitimate authority directly over 
citizens.102  Means to establish complete power over a people, according to Galula, 
can include providing each person with a formal national identification card, entering 
each citizen into a national registry, providing booklets about the government for each 
household, instituting curfews, and disallowing some people from leaving a town for 
more than a day.103  Such a goal assumes control of a central government as taking 
precedence over tribal power—tribal power being a phenomenon that diminishes a 
federal government’s absolute power and the ability to win a zero sum game in which 
both the insurgency and the counterinsurgency vie to shore up support.  
 
With regards to militias, the more widely read Western counterinsurgency historians 
and theorists touch on the need for enough numbers of counterinsurgent forces to be 
able to successfully compete with or defeat insurgents.104  Some studies of successful 
counterinsurgency campaigns even estimate—depending on the efficacy of counter-
guerrilla forces,105 strength of enemies, and overall circumstances—roughly 20 
security personnel are necessary for every 1,000 civilians to defeat an insurgency.106  
In the case of modern Afghanistan, such a theory would mean about 660,000 security 
troops for the 33 million strong Afghan civilian population.107  Such a number would 
demand troops beyond the capacity of the official national authority.  So where would 
one go to fill the void between the current ranks of official military and police and any 
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“magic” counterinsurgency number?  Twentieth century counterinsurgency scholar 
and practitioner David Galula as well as a number of twenty-first century researchers 
to include David Kilcullen and Seth Jones looked to untrained locals not formally part 
of a central government108 to bolster security personnel with what one could define as 
indigenous paramilitary units and auxiliary local police.109  It is important to note that 
they are speaking about ancillary neighbourhood watch forces—that the government 
or outside military raises—not leveraging tribes that naturally rise up.  The very idea 
of recruiting and creating artificial militias undermines natural the systems of 
indigenous clans. 
 
Such programs in counterinsurgency—beyond just filling a security force-citizen 
ratio—offer a number of other potential benefits, even if militias are not naturally 
born from tribes.  First, typically formal government and military program managers 
intend local defence forces in counterinsurgency environments to be living biometric 
detectors capable of immediately identifying outsiders to their community. Second, 
these troops generally know their own terrain better than any urban-based national 
military or foreign team and can thus operate with greater ease.  They know the 
ingress and egress routes, tactical key terrain, best sniper vantage points, and choke 
points better than any outsider.  Third, locals may not even wish for a strong formal 
federal military presence,110 and a local police force could be more palatable for these 
types of populations.  Continual and close interactions between police on the outskirts 
of territories and locally acceptable civilian patrols inside communities were noted as 
valuable during the counterinsurgencies in Malaya and Vietnam111 (creating trust and 
informal intelligence networks).  Fourth, civilian forces theoretically have much at 
stake being defenders of their own land, family, and lives and may therefore have an 
interest in continuing the defence against an insurrection in the long run.  Researchers 
estimate that insurgencies may take anywhere from eleven to 40 or more years to 
defeat,112 so a community-led militia that sustains across generations may be able to 
continue the fight against an enemy long after foreign forces (ISAF in the case of 
Afghanistan) have left.  And finally, when an insurgency takes advantage of relatively 
un-policed borders such as across Syria during the 2003-2010 Iraq war, across 
Cambodia during U.S. involvement in Vietnam, and across Pakistan with Afghanistan 
during the 2001-2014 war, indigenous anti-insurgent tribal forces that happen to live 
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near or on national borders, may be able to help staunch an insurrection’s cross-border 
activities.113 
 
Although these theories fail to focus on the motivations and goals of grassroots anti-
insurgent efforts—a void this study intends to address—they do investigate the 
advantages of militias to counterinsurgency in general terms.  These experts study 
artificial anti-insurrection civilian movements as an important auxiliary effort to an 
overall counterinsurgency campaign.  Whether investigating the potential benefits of 
bolstering overall counterinsurgent numbers or intrinsic value of locals fighting on the 
side of the government, the theories assume a heavy outside military and national 
government effort—one that can recruit and oversee militias as one of many tactics to 
undermine insurrection.  Another stream of scholarship argues that such heavy 
approaches may actually harm a counterinsurgency, and therefore enabling 
indigenous counter-extremists should be more central.  The previous theories assumed 
Western recruited militias were an ancillary strategy.  The following make a case for 
less emphasis on government and foreign intervention with greater focus on 
empowering or simply allowing locals to fight and stave off insurgency. 
 
1.2.3 Leveraging Clans—Policy Implications 
 
Some historians and counterinsurgency experts recommend policies that place the 
main emphasis on working with clans and supporting tribalism.  Their evidence is 
based on the history of Afghanistan in which anti-tribal policies generally fail 
eventually while those that nurture indigenous rural Pashtun societal systems 
generally succeed.  Tribal areas can have a “societal immune rejection response”114 to 
outside attempts at undermining the clan system in Pashtun areas.115  Therefore 
extending the government into tribal areas—a government that will seem foreign and 
alien—is unwise.  Similarly, even a counterinsurgency that undertakes raids and 
direct attacks on or near tribal land may cause a negative reaction from rural clans that 
would otherwise not pose a challenge.116 
 
Experts such as Thomas Barfield,117 Arturo Munoz,118 and Khan Idris119 have often 
described the history of Afghanistan, through its simplest of lenses, as a contest 
between informal and traditional Pashtun systems such as arbakai and outside forces 
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such as the Taliban.120  Although scholars disagree on the current competency and 
efficacy of local mechanisms of rural security and governance, all agree on the 
existence of such systems.121  Historians and regional analysts do not speak to the 
drivers and aims of such arbakai in modern times, but such phenomena certainly help 
to answer the possible “who” of the previous authors who emphasized the importance 
of local actors doing the bidding of any counterinsurgency campaign. 
 
In rural Afghanistan—comprising over three quarters of the country’s population 
today122—live semiautonomous communities.123  Historically, successful Kabul 
regimes have allowed natural societal resiliencies to govern and secure much of rural 
Afghanistan.124  With a few exceptions such as the rule of Amir Abdur Rahman’s 
direct rule from 1880 to 1901,125 successful governments in Kabul have governed 
rural Afghanistan (those areas outside of Kabul, Mazar, Kandahar City, Herat, some 
provincial capitals and key economic municipalities, major roadways, and major 
border crossings) largely through local indigenous proxy.126  
 
Governments have at times formally recognized arbakai and elder unions as 
legitimate institutions and encouraged them to be responsible for security and 
governance in their own communities in lieu of national security forces’ enduring or 
permanent presence.127  In fact, informal militias along with local tribal councils have 
been able to exert themselves at different times since the sixth century BC Persian 
Empire when political leaders in Kabul allowed tribes relative sovereignty.128  Most 
recently, during the relative stability under the Musahibin dynasty (1929-1978), 
leaders from Kabul encouraged and supported jirga-appointed and locally run arbakai 
to keep security in rural areas.129  Kabul’s leadership in that time period believed that 
pushing central government apparatus into rural areas was ineffective and perhaps 
even counter productive as it may have encouraged distrust or revolt against the 
national government.130  The government in Kabul allowed local communities to 
address their own grievances and needs, delegating local governance matters to rural 
informal tribal and village leadership.131  Local communities, in turn, avoided 
challenging the national government and its authority.  The government’s unobtrusive 
approach created a symbiosis between formal government and local traditional 
governance based on the self-interest of both sides.  Government institutions in 
Afghanistan’s capital mostly sought to repel hostile neighbouring states, negotiate 
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terms of international trade, and interject during major civil strife.132  Kabul’s regional 
representatives focused mostly on taxation of urban areas, military recruitment for 
national crises, and countering egregious and sustained criminal activity.133  The 
approach to governing rural areas can be described as minimalist. 
 
In recent history, the Taliban as well as the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan 
(1978-1992) attempted to expand central government rule throughout contemporary 
Afghanistan and failed eventually.134  This is not to say that central governance in 
Afghanistan is impossible.  Instead governments and outside force that have leveraged 
local resiliencies have appeared to fare better in general, or at least survived longer 
than those that did not.  This conclusion points up that minimalist central government 
and foreign military strategies, that enable and do not attempt to subjugate rural 
communities, may be optimal with fewest destabilizing effects.  This finding also 
underlines difficulties perceived foreign threats, such as the Taliban, may have in 
forcing an alien ideology and ruling system on villagers.  This stream of historical 
scholarship supports those theorists that underline the benefits of minimalist strategies 
in counterinsurgency environments and Afghanistan specifically. 
 
However, some experts disagree with the contemporary efficacy of Pashtun clan and 
village traditional governance and security mechanisms.  David Phillips, Founder and 
Director of the Tribal Analysis Center and Afghanistan tribalism author and expert for 
the past forty years, and David Scott Mann, Founder and Director of The Stability 
Institute, renowned author on Afghanistan, and the creator and first commander of the 
U.S. Special Forces Village Stability Operations program in Afghanistan argue that 
many, if not most, rural southern Afghanistan societies are damaged following thirty 
years of especially destabilizing warfare.135  These experts, using over a decade of 
first-hand observations and interviews with Afghans and NATO military and 
economic development personnel in every province of southern Afghanistan, 
conclude that inoperative rural governance and weak societal capacity have been why 
the Taliban have been able to move into areas that previously would have been able to 
push out any perceived foreign invaders.136  To Mann and Phillips, natural arbakai 
may not always be a viable civilian counterinsurgency despite pre-Soviet historical 
evidence.137   
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At the same time, the central Afghan government is also not a viable substitute for 
broken traditional governance systems—many locals viewing direct control of the 
central government as impinging on their way of life138 as well as a lawful constraint 
on federal involvement in rural areas and constitutional empowerment of tribal 
systems to run day-to-day affairs.139  Mann and Phillips thus look to ISAF to help 
Pashtuns rediscover the often lost traditional ways of security and clan leadership.140  
As chapter two will describe, the Soviet invasion and then civil war indeed damaged 
the clan systems.  However, to what extent tribes were hurt or ruined and to what 
extent modern clans are able to rebound and relearn traditional systems of rural 
Pashtun governance is debatable.  One certainty, however, is that each village and 
each tribe differ greatly in its contemporary ability to govern—whether tribal elders 
returned after the U.S. invasion in 2001 or whether young clansmen took up the helm 
and recreated the informal societal processes.141  
 
Therefore, whether or not Marjah has viable informal governance could inform the 
tactics ISAF uses in that area, as will be discussed later in this study.  Now, this 
literature review will look to the strategic and operational advantages of empowering 
tribes, with the assumption that such clan systems actually exist in a given area.  
Unlike those authors who recommended outside militaries recruiting neighbourhood 
watch forces in auxiliary roles, the next section will look to leveraging already 
existing resiliencies as a central effort. 
 
1.2.4 Leveraging Clans—Strategic Implications 
 
Instead of viewing militias as either destabilizing threats to liberal society or just 
strategic auxiliary forces, another stream of literature argues for a minimalist outside 
approach that emphasizes grassroots civilian efforts.  Instead of Western recruited 
artificial militias as a thickening force to increase formal security numbers, some 
claim that local grassroots movements can and should be the first and primary step to 
a security campaign.  Once village movements are robust and resilient enough, then 
national forces can stand.  In this way, if national and formal security units falter, 
there will still be some semblance of security at the local level.  Local movements 
become the necessary base and initial effort so that larger and more formalized 
movements can then form and operate.  The will of the people is most important as a 
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first step in both insurgency and counterinsurgency.142  When they wrote and 
sometimes attempted to practice this approach, Mao Zedong and General Vo Nguyen 
Giap were speaking specifically of revolution.143  However, the strategy can be 
applied to any nationalist movement—even a nationalist movement that calls itself a 
counterinsurgency.  Likewise, Colonel T.E. Lawrence and Ian F. W. Becket viewed 
guerrilla and counter-guerrilla campaigns as hinging on popular sentiment and their 
will to defeat enemies and earn freedom before and above all outside military or 
central government efforts.144 
 
Also assessing grassroots local movements as important are Anthony Cordesman of 
the Center for Strategic & International Studies, Andrew Wilder of the U.S. Institute 
for Peace, and Paul Fishtein of Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International 
Affairs.  Each with experience on issues regarding NATO efforts in Afghanistan over 
the past decade, they argue that a wiser counterinsurgency strategy involves fewer 
U.S. forces and greater emphasis on enabling natural resilient systems to deny violent 
extremist safe haven and mitigate drivers of violent.145  However, none focus on the 
nature and motivations of indigenous counterinsurgent efforts.  Instead, they simply 
emphasize the need for the existence of such movements as an offered hypothesis to 
the strategic idea that foreign counterinsurgent forces should be minimal.146  
 
Cordesman argues the very presence and activities of outside armies can prolong 
contemporary insurgencies while a smaller footprint that leverages local resilient 
actors may be a more prudent approach to counterinsurgency.147  Supporting this 
argument, Wilder and Fishtein maintain that counterinsurgency practitioners may be 
exacerbating the very thing they are attempting to defeat.148   They argue that direct 
stabilization activities in rural Afghanistan can ironically cause instability. The 
paradox of direct stability operations—an accepted term for NATO counter-Taliban 
operations in Afghanistan149—is that they can have destabilizing side effects when 
foreign entities are the protagonists.150  
 
The very presence of foreign security forces and foreign aid organizations—even 
those claiming to conduct stabilization activities—can destabilize.  ISAF is 
destabilizing151 when ISAF units become Taliban targets and civilians are caught in 
the crossfire—both literally and with regards to allegiances.  Likewise, when Taliban 
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enter an area, they may also spur ISAF and/or ANSF incursion, possibly also causing 
civilians to be caught in the crossfire.  Beyond possible short-term security gains, 
outside party projects that are associated with stability operations can have 
destabilizing effects.152   Even when projects are aimed at attempting to mitigate 
analysed sources of instability, those projects can add to overall instability and 
insecurity.  For example some experts argue that project funding ends up in the hands 
of insurgents through illicit taxation, can aggravate perceptions of corruption when 
money goes through the hands of corrupt leaders, and can exacerbate feelings of 
disenfranchisement when distribution of stabilization projects is uneven amongst the 
population.153  They conclude that even a modest targeted counterterrorism mission 
can quickly turn into a counterinsurgency when violent extremists can leverage U.S. 
presence and operations to grow their local recruiting numbers—leaving the U.S. in a 
mission that barely resembles its initial intent.154 
 
Over the past decade a number of authors have also concluded that a low Western 
military presence in any counterinsurgency mission, beyond that of Afghanistan, is 
essential so as to avoid generating further recruits.155  For the past seven years Robert 
Pape has written articles and two books and conducted seminars throughout the world 
using a swath of data as evidence that suicide terrorism derives from occupation of 
land.156  His conclusion claims that terrorism draws occupation and occupation spurs 
terrorism.  According to Pape, this occupation-terrorism action-reaction is a 
potentially continuous cycle with effects of insecurity and instability for civilians.  
Pape’s extensive and detailed data culling—taking into account the limits of certain 
streams of information on some suicide bombings—and use of analysts who are 
native speakers of the terrorists’ homelands uncovers occupation as a driver of violent 
extremists that then drives government intervention that then drives further violent 
extremist actions.157 
 
Pape’s Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop 
It claims to analyse “every” suicide attack from 1980 to 2009 (almost 2,200).158  To 
earn a place on his database, the individual had to intend to kill others, and two or 
more independent sources must have verified the event.  Specifically, his findings 
include that foreign military forces stationed in other countries accounted for 87% of 
over 1,800 suicide plots since 2004.  U.S.-allied Pakistani force occupation of tribal 
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areas accounts for another 12 per cent.  Also, the timing of militaries’ deployment 
accounts for the instigation of each of eight large-scale suicide-bomb campaigns (Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, al-Qa`ida internationally, Israel, Lebanon, Chechnya, and Sri 
Lanka) between 1980 and 2009—96 per cent of the 2,188 cases between those 
years.159  Such attackers used the reason of foreign occupation of other lands as the 
primary reason for their attacks, and militaries in turn used the presence of violent 
extremists as justification for occupation.160 
 
Similar to Pape’s research, Rohan Gunaratna describes an action-reaction cycle 
between terror and wider societal repression.  Gunaratna states that incursion into 
Islamic territories produces extremism and produces a clash where a material military 
might meets ideological/moral resistance.  The author postulates that Usama bin 
Ladin intended to spur wide suppression to attract those that previously wanted 
nothing to do with violent extremism.161  In short, bin Ladin’s main goal was to 
mobilize violent extremists to cause government suppression in order to cause further 
radical cell recruitment and activity. 
 
Instead of focusing on the nature and drivers of grassroots anti-extremist attempts, 
these authors argue the downsides of any high-profile military presence that could 
build and lead anti-insurgent militias.  Either as a corollary stream of reasoning162 or 
as an offered hypothesis,163 these experts write generally about the necessity of 
identifying and leveraging local counterinsurgent civilian efforts without a record of 
what could drive or how to deal with or analyse such phenomena.  However, in the 
case of rural Pashtun areas of southern Afghanistan, where Marjah lies, historians 
have emphasized the resilience of arbakai specifically.  Although these previous 
authors do not attempt to analyse what local systems may be empowered as an 
alternative to a large foreign military presence, those that study the history of 
Afghanistan emphasize rural traditional Pashtun systems—of which Marjah’s militia 




Debates continue to rage in modern literature on the extent of the importance of 
localized paramilitary forces in counterinsurgency.  Some continue to maintain a 
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certain number to supplement the central formal military operations, while others 
argue such militias should be a core and preliminary step.  Publications also continue 
to abound on the various tactical and stabilizing values of civilian locals countering 
insurgency on a local level.  In policy circles, experts even contend whether to deal 
with tribes and their militias at all—clan-ism being a possible affront to liberalism, 
stability, government authority. 
 
However, literature as of yet has failed to address naturally born anti-violent extremist 
movements and their motivations.  To date scholarship has failed to analyse whether 
such self-started movements may or may not benefit a counterinsurgency effort.  
Neither has research yet wrestled with the characteristics of such grassroots 
movements; the conditions that may spark these uprisings; how a military may or may 
not affect anti-insurgent militias; and what frameworks or methodologies may help to 
identify and leverage movements. 
 
In the past decade reporters and some analysts have been able only to discuss one 
reportedly naturally born movement against violent extremism in the context of a 
counterinsurgency environment—the Anbar Awakening in Iraq from 2006 to 2007.164  
Reports suggest this self-propelled semi-autonomous movement may have been a 
turning point in ridding al-Qa`ida in Iraq from the country for several years.165  
However analyses and an unclassified military report166 comprising dozens of 
interviews of Iraqi leaders of the indigenous movement, more questions than answers 
exist on why such an uprising occurred.  Without serious research during the actual 
throes of the uprising itself,167 authors are often left to postulate as to the possible 
triggers, conditions, and characteristics of why these civilians rose up, risked their 
lives, and killed to defeat—at least temporarily—violent extremists.  Elucidating such 
matters will also add to and advance the debates and studies of counterinsurgency 
theories and policies.  If such a self-driven movement flourishes, then it could add to 
and advance the notions that government should keep a minimal footprint while 
supporting rural Pashtun systems of rule.  If this indigenous effort fails, the reasons 
may help to support and add clarification on the ideas that tribalism hurts 
counterinsurgency campaigns and could weaken governments.   
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1.3 Research Approach and Methodology 
 
To understand the drivers of an anti-extremist arbakai, an area was selected in which a 
successful movement was already underway.  Once selected, the core research 
involved interviewing the fighters and their leaders.  To supplement these interviews, 
the study draws upon an array of primary sources from testimonies of non-Afghans 
operating in the area as well as unclassified and declassified reports and analyses of 
the conditions in the area and activities of the arbakai.  Such an approach assured a 
multitude of perspectives and insights to paint a robust picture of the characteristics, 
motivations, and mindsets of the movement.   
 
1.3.1 The Choice of Marjah as a Case Study  
 
First, the study needed a selection of an area that met specific criteria.  The research 
focused on one area in Afghanistan where a counter-violent-extremist campaign was 
already underway because 1) there needed to be a manageable sample for a single 
researcher, 2) there is currently an active war in which some indigenous groups have 
the opportunity to assert themselves against violent extremists, and 3) NATO 
commands could provide ample security for a researcher and potential respondents to 
conduct a study safely. 
When deciding on which community in Afghanistan to focus, the criteria was to 
research on an area that rose up against violent extremists themselves instead of U.S. 
regular or Special Force-initiated local defence forces.  This study does not research 
and analyse the militias in which outside military units come into a village to recruit, 
inspire, train, and fund a paramilitary civilian force.  Instead, this research only 
focuses on a militia that is self-propelled without outside initial assistance, money, 
management, or coaxing.  However, this study’s criteria for choice of location would 
allow for the possibility of limited outside military assistance once the uprising 
already begins and is already underway.  The key factor is only that any possible 
support comes after an indigenous uprising began naturally because this study focuses 
on motivations, aspirations, and actions that spring only from grassroots efforts.168 
The purpose of these criteria is to contribute to literature on counterinsurgency and 
Afghan rural stability.  A body of literature already exists on recruiting local civilians 
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into foreign-military-led and funded militias as well as the techniques, tactics, and 
operational considerations of such a strategy.169  This study intends to add value to a 
fledgling discipline on self-motivated civilians that rise up to kill and die in the name 
of eradicating violent extremists.  As of yet, this stream of publications comprises 
mostly anecdotal stories and disparate unclassified reports even though it is likely to 
be an important phenomenon as Western, African, Southwest Asian, and Southeast 
Asian governments seek to find ways to undercut violent extremism with a minimum 
footprint in the decades to come.170 
After finding an area that meets this criteria, it was necessary to interview and observe 
arbakai fighters as the movement was underway.  This study intends to uncover the 
stories, messages, themes, aspirations, and motivations of the movement while in its 
throes, not through an historical lens. The study does not rely on historical accounts 
after the battles against the Taliban in this village because soon NATO will withdraw 
perhaps not allowing the appropriate security it would take for a researcher to conduct 
open interviews over an extended time person.  Also, after the movement is complete, 
some fighters may have died or moved away especially if the movement eventually 
fails to keep the Taliban out.171  Furthermore, unclassified and declassified reports 
with vital information may be lost or burned as is often the case when multiple 
military elements rotate in and out of an area.  
In 2011, during the planned field research for this study, the village of Marjah was the 
only setting in Afghanistan that met the criteria. There were no other reported 
successful or functioning naturally born anti-Taliban uprisings in Afghanistan at that 
time.172  Outside of Afghanistan, this student would not have enjoyed the ample 
security NATO provided to conduct the interviews.  While conducting pre-field-study 
research, local Afghan media and NATO began reporting that a self-initiated civilian 
militia was helping to effectively eradicate Taliban presence and influence in the 
village of Marjah.  According to separate streams of reports the Marjah arbakai were 
helping to change the village from one of Taliban’s headquarters and one of the most 
dangerous areas in Afghanistan173 into one of the safer regions of the country.174  
 
Although this is a single case study, the intent is to open debate and rigorous analysis 
of counter-violent-extremist uprisings regionally and worldwide.  This study may 
inform some themes common and some uncommon to similar uprisings around the 
	   32	  
world and help academics and policymakers to identify the conditions and 
characteristics of such grassroots civilian movements. 
1.3.2 Structure for the Study 
 
Once Marjah was selected as an acceptable area for a case study, research began on 
the composition and disposition of the village’s arbakai.  To illuminate the structure 
and tendencies of arbakai, the second chapter will focus on rural resilience in Pashtun 
lands—arbakai being a traditional and informal security apparatus of traditional local 
governance.  This section argues that, at its simplest, one may view rural history of 
southern Afghanistan as a contest between clans and armies that sometimes attempt to 
weaken tribalism.  The chapter ends with a discussion on whether the most recent 
three decades of war may or may not have undermined current governance systems to 
include Marjah’s militia. 
 
Then, in chapter three, the study focuses on Marjah, which is unique in Afghanistan 
as a Western-invented village.  The clan system within the village informs the arbakai 
structure.  The chapter then moves on to how and why both Taliban and then ISAF 
made Marjah a main effort—both sides surging into the village.  Before delving into 
the study’s body it is vital to provide the greater context and description of outside 
forces—the environment in which the arbakai would operate.  The second and third 
chapter do not attempt to answer why Marjah’s arbakai combats violent extremists but 
instead reveals historical precedent and organization of the militia. 
 
After these two chapters on the history of Pashtun lands and then contemporary 
history of Marjah, this paper offers and tests three hypotheses—one chapter for 
each—on why the militia rose and fought Taliban.  The three hypotheses derived from 
literature and primary sources on global and regional schisms between Muslim 
civilians and violent extremists.  For this study, the intent was to uncover general 
themes of opposition to violent extremism that could play out in Marjah and inform 
the study of this village arbakai.  This approach allows a theoretic starting point and 
framework against which to test and compare this particular movement and offers a 
structural base for the study.   
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In the absence of an established body of rigorous scholarship on motivations of 
autonomous indigenous counter-violent-extremism movements,175 especially in rural 
Afghanistan,176 the hypotheses emerged from an exhaustive analysis of literature and 
reports on opposition directed at regional and worldwide strands of violent extremism.  
They include criticisms derived from analyses of violent extremists’ ideological 
vulnerabilities, criticisms by recanted violent extremists, limited polling of 
populations’ views, and assumptions that ISAF made in its doctrine.  To be 
potentially applicable to the case study of Marjah, the hypotheses focus only on 
violent extremism that shares the similar tactics of Taliban in southern 
Afghanistan177—conducting suicide bombings, targeting civilians, forcing locals to 
adhere to strict laws, and enforcing some type of “true” belief system of mankind.178  
 
It should be noted that the drivers for this arbakai may very well be complex and 
comprise nuanced motivations that do not exactly fit the hypotheses.  Therefore, the 
hypotheses act as a starting point—a prelude into an investigation that may be more 
complex than just substantiating or disproving hypotheses.  One only has to look to 
the literature of why people join violent organizations to see that there may be 
multifaceted reasons.  From different approaches and methodologies on the study of 
violent extremism and counter-radicalization, psychologist John Horgan,179 retired 
CIA operations officer Marc Sageman,180 senior government intelligence analyst and 
Islam expert Quintan Wiktorowitz, and field researcher Sarah Ladbury,181 agree that 
many paths with multiple motivations lead people to violence.  Likewise, it may also 
be the case that multiple paths and motivations can lead anti-extremist fighters to 
action.  However, to structure this study, the three most prevalent themes in literature 
act as hypotheses from which conclusions can be drawn that may very well reveal 
motivations that are more nuanced or perhaps broader than what the initial hypotheses 
propose.  
 
The first hypothesis, in the fourth chapter, looks to stability as a possible goal of 
counterinsurgent civilian efforts.  This theory considers the direct instability and 
insecurity violent extremists may bring to a village along with an explanation of ISAF 
and NATO’s assumption that stability is the goal of all entities that are against 
Taliban.  This hypothesis is tested not only in the motivations for the Marjah 
uprising—as told through interviews—but also in how the arbakai address instability 
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immediately and in the long-term as recorded in multiple foreign reports.  Arbakai 
define stability as security and access to education and struggle towards this end state 
daily with resolve with data suggesting success in their pursuits. 
 
The second hypothesis considers the schisms of ideology as a possible motivation for 
revolt against violent extremists.  The existential threat to the traditional rural power 
structures—and as a corollary, the actual materialization of this threat into killing of 
indigenous leaders and other civilians—comprise one major schism between civilians 
and violent extremists in Afghanistan, south Asia, and worldwide.  The Taliban 
impose an alien belief system while directly killing off all local leadership and 
citizens who posed a threat before Marjah’s militia rose up.  The arbakai’s words and 
actions, via interviews with the fighters and the reports of NATO onlookers, will 
explain to what degree this hypothesis acted as a potential motivation. 
 
The third hypothesis investigates whether or not the protection of tribalism may have 
motivated those that rose up against violent insurrection in Marjah.  Recent reports 
and literature underline the incompatibility of clans and violent extremist groups who 
see tribal systems as potential secular threats to their ideas and ability to rule.  Also, 
military doctrine assumes that rural areas will use the protection of informal rural 
systems of governance as a rallying cry to rise up against Taliban.  The study then 
tests this hypothesis and uncovers which identities Marjahns drew as motivation to 
fight. 
 
Following the three chapters on testing hypotheses is an analysis of an underlying 
motivation that coloured each of the findings of the previous three chapters and also 
revealed itself uniquely through words and actions of the fighters.  This self-
determination was not only the common theme of all interviews and arbakai 
operations but also was the centre of strength for the anti-Taliban uprising.  The 
chapter concludes by looking to how and why local ISAF units nurtured autonomy, 
strengthening the phenomenon as a motivation, means, and goal. 
 
The conclusion provides a final analysis of the drivers and greater context of the 
motivations of the movement on which this case study focuses.  Then, this concluding 
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chapter looks to how and why this particular case study is important to future 
scholarship on similar grassroots movements.   
 
Before any conclusions could be made and after arriving at hypotheses for why a 
movement may rise to kill violent extremists, it was essential to employ a multi-
faceted methodological research approach to analyse the movement.  It was necessary 
to analyse unclassified and declassified government reports, investigate first-hand 
accounts and observations, and finally to interview Marjah guardians while they were 
serving out their duties. 
 
1.3.3 Unclassified/Declassified Reports on Marjah’s Population 
 
For greater context beyond the core interviews, this study uses unclassified data to 
attain multiple perspectives on arbakai attitudes, operations, actions, and success.  
This researcher successfully requested the declassification of documents and 
assessments for research.  It was not enough to only uncover the verbal claims of 
fighters, so a comprehensive cross-section of primary sources was necessary. 
 
To verify and expand upon information from the interviews, the intent was to collect 
information from unclassified ISAF atmospherics reports, CIA’s Open Source Center 
media translations and analyses, U.S. Department of Defense’s Human Terrain 
System reporting; unclassified ISAF-directed population surveys, and previously 
unreleased U.S. Agency for International Development Office of Democracy and 
Governance Stabilization Unit products such as analyses and data from the 
“Measuring The Impact Of Stabilization Initiatives” program.   
 
The study never relied solely on “survey data,” whether government or private, 
because many surveys in southern Helmand and Afghanistan writ large may be deeply 
flawed due to insecurity,182 lack of oversight, convenience polling only in safe areas, 
and translation challenges.183  However, some survey data may be helpful when 
looking for general trends over years as long as the survey is conducted in the same 
manner each time.184 Fortunately and uniquely, for this study’s interviews of arbakai, 
Marjah had ample security and allowed this researcher to oversee translations directly 
and conduct the queries personally. 
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1.3.4 GIRoA, NATO, and Development Organizations’ Perspectives 
 
To provide yet one more layer of greater context, the study used reports and 
testimonies on the perspectives of outside actors observing or working with Marjah’s 
arbakai.  Not only did this allow yet more perspectives on the motivations of arbakai, 
but it also allowed an inside understanding to the NATO and GIRoA actions and 
operations that affected the arbakai.  It was not enough to only study the arbakai and 
local perspectives—as any outside influence or action can affect the movement in 
Marjah.   
 
This researcher investigated the conditions and actions of the arbakai and outside 
forces through statements of NATO and Afghan officials in the fields of stability, 
development, governance, counter-narcotics, intelligence, and security.  Some of this 
information derived from open military commanders’ post-deployment lessons-
learned academic sessions; unclassified first-hand military debriefings; reports from 
local Afghan media; unclassified Special Operations Command reports; and 
declassification of reports, specifically for this study, on intelligence, stability, and 
security perspectives. 
 
These primary sources allowed this study to put Marjah’s arbakai movement in 
strategic, operational, and tactical perspective with regards to the activities of NATO, 
development groups, GIRoA, and Afghan security forces.  Furthermore, the study can 
investigate how outside militaries were able to leverage or enable the arbakai and the 
reasons for such decisions.   
 
1.3.5 Strategy for Interviews with Militia 
 
The core research comprised interviews with over one-quarter of Marjah’s arbakai to 
include its top leaders and deputies during the spring and summer of 2011.  As much 
as possible, the interview strategy applied survey standards such as random samples, 
careful translation of questions, word appropriate questions for Marjah, and a large 
sample size.  The goal was to collect professed aspirations, identities, goals, fears, 
motivations, and thoughts on the Taliban as the fighters were serving actively in the 
militia. Open questioning was therefore paramount to hear fighters’ numerous 
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competing ideas that may include themes and ideas not covered in this literature 
review or initial research. 
 
The study employed some survey best practices so that interview results would be 
representative of local perspectives.  The interviews targeted adult males, who 
voluntarily combat violent extremist elements, to find out what motivations initiate 
and sustain its members and communities.  Stratified sampling (breaking up the target 
group into separate cells such as female fighters and elderly fighters) was unnecessary 
since village militia members are male and typically between 18-35 years old. The 
oral survey included 113 militiamen out of a total of 400 civilian fighters, over 25 per 
cent of the target population—a sufficiently large number to minimize sampling error.  
To avoid judgment, convenience, or cluster sampling, the interview strategy broke the 
targeted community into 20 geographic areas and randomly surveyed fighting age 
males from each area.  In conclusion, the study used a large sample size, and each 
militia member had a reasonably equal opportunity of being selected. 
 
The interviews included the following questions: 
1) Why do you oppose violent extremism? 
2) What were the events that led up to your opposition to violent 
extremism? 
3) What are the main reasons your tribe/village opposes violent 
extremism? Why? 
4) How long are you willing to oppose violent extremism? Why? 
5) Will your sons oppose violent extremism?  Why? 
6) What is the religion of the Taliban? 
 
It must be noted that after speaking with NATO troops serving in Marjah, 
shopkeepers, linguists, and Afghan National Security forces, it was learned that the 
literal translation of “violent extremism” has no meaning to Marjah residents.  Those 
that are any element of the Taliban are dubbed “Taliban.”  And the ideology is also 
known as “Taliban.”  So the term “Taliban” replaced “violent extremism” before the 
interviews to make questions locally appropriate and comprehensible. 
 
The term “war motivation,” “counter-radicalization strategy,” “counter-extremist 
incentive,” “messaging,” or “strategic story” would unlikely translate well into Pashto 
to the target community, which comprised almost entirely illiterate residents with no 
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education.  Fighters never attended formal military training or read even the most-
well read books on war and insurgency. Colonel TE Lawrence and Sun Tzu are 
unknown to them.  So the interviewer chose to ask them why they did what they did, 
what they believed, and how they came to join and fight in a militia against the 
Taliban. 
 
In the first question, the interviews used the word “oppose” so that it would not 
assume the level of hatred, distrust, or apathy.  The strategy was to allow the 
respondent to speak freely without parameters about his feelings about the Taliban.  It 
was, however, safe to assume that respondents opposed the Taliban since they joined 
a group that primarily killed Taliban. 
 
While the first question deals with the “why,” the second question attempts to uncover 
the “how.”  The question was designed to find the actual events and practical 
mechanics behind the motivation.  Inspired by John Horgan’s research185—looking to 
events and mechanics to uncover perhaps a more accurate and richer story—the 
question might have also allowed me to uncover dissonances between the “why” and 
“how.”  However, participants did not seem to care for the difference in the wording 
between the first and second questions.  Instead most of those surveyed used the 
second question as an opportunity to expand upon or reaffirm the first question 
despite attempts to re-ask the question or emphasize words in the second question. 
 
The third question was an attempt at forcing the respondent to put personal decisions 
aside and speak about his interpretation of neighbours, colleagues, friends, leaders, 
and the entire village’s feelings.  The question was inspired by the District Stability 
Framework’s four-question Tactical Conflict Survey,186 which twice asks an 
individual to speak about the village instead of himself.  As this paper will discuss 
later, respondents appeared to be so attached to a communal identity, that the third 
question ended up acting as a check on the first question and showed consistency with 
the first two questions. 
 
The fourth question on how long a person believes he will continue his opposition and 
fighting was an attempt to detect that person’s dedication to the cause.  While not all 
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responses may have been truthful, the answers themselves on “fighting to the death” 
or “fighting forever” were important to understand the overall attitude of the militia. 
 
The fifth question on the views of their children was yet another attempt to gauge 
militia members’ projected longevity and intensity of cause.  Sons appeared to be so 
important to these men (many of the men would change their own names to be called 
the “father” of their first son) that this question attempted to spark serious thought to 
dedication.   
 
The final question brings up religion so as not to influence answers to the other 
questions.  It was found that if discussion about Islam occurred in introductory 
conversation—which sometimes lasted over an hour as is custom in Afghanistan and 
southern Helmand specifically—the respondents’ answers were always spoken in 
religious language.  These first few interviews were not included in the study, because 
the answers sounded unnecessarily tainted. 
 
Respondents rarely answered questions directly and did not tell linear stories.  
Sometimes after the last question, perhaps feeling the interview was finishing, they 
would add in rich stories and analogies pertinent to earlier questions.  What was 
recorded, per participant, was essentially one single nonlinear storyline that did not 
abide by the structure of the questions.  So when analysing the statements, use was 
made of the entire story.  The questions ended up serving at-times as signposts and 
inspiration for emotional stories, descriptions of events, and streams of consciousness 
that were master messages for each participant. 
 
1.3.6 Interview Limitations 
 
Before conducting these interviews it was essential to address a number of potential 
limitations.  One potential limitation was the possibility of a weak translator.  The 
linguists were bilingual, but none had been school trained in the extremely difficult art 
of interpretation and translation.   
 
To mitigate this limitation, I only used the most seasoned and recommended 
interpreters in southern Helmand according to Marine Corps commanders.  Normally, 
	   40	  
I would have from four to five linguists from whom to choose on each interview 
outing—the number of translators with each civil affairs attachment with whom I 
physically embedded.  Fortunately, because of their daily interactions with 
populations, civil affairs teams were able to employ only the most seasoned and 
proven interpreters according to the commanders with whom I spoke.  Furthermore, I 
had regimental commander’s personal linguist translate the questions in Pashto and 
had these translations checked and rechecked with numerous linguists.  Before going 
out, I would also have a linguist interpret something into Pashto for me, and another 
linguist re-translate the statements into English to me.  This is normal practice for 
testing interpreters’ level of expertise.  Interpreters appeared to respect me, because I 
have been a translator and interpreter (English-Arabic) before.  I would speak to each 
linguist about the intellectual challenges of translation as an extremely demanding 
discipline—each linguist seemed to respect my grasp of their daily intellectual 
struggles.  Furthermore, I would discuss the nature of my survey so that linguists 
would understand the importance of each question being asked in the same manner to 
keep the study consistent.    
 
Another potential constraint is that I look, sound, and dress “American” according to 
Marjahns.  Many locals view Americans as “money trees”—handing out money for 
projects from million-dollar roads to small business grants to battlefield repayments 
for property destroyed.  Surveys are often seen as Americans asking locals what 
projects they might need next.187  Therefore, there was potential for participants to 
veer the conversation towards their particular needs and wants—seeking out money 
from me or the commanders with whom I embedded.  To diminish this potential 
distraction, I explained that I was only a researcher and student with no access to 
funds.  The researcher, as explained, had no authority, was not an advisor, and had no 
money as a student.  
 
Another possible limitation was that participants might think that I might publish 
research with their identities.  To mitigate this potential limitation, I explained that I 
would not take down their names or locations and would keep their identities hidden.  
However, not one participant had any problem telling me their identity, home 
community, position within the community, and clan status.  Many wanted pictures 
with me as well.  They would often speak with passion and sometimes yell they felt 
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so emotional about the subject of the Taliban.  Some talked for as long as an hour 
after only one question divulging personal information against this interview’s 
extremely clear and firm protest.  It was this researcher’s job to avoid writing down 
identity information, even when they provided it and insisted it be published.  And it 
was this researcher’s duty to keep the interview moving forward after long 
impassioned speeches.  They appeared very proud of fighting the Taliban, and many 
seemed to even seek fame or recognition for their victories over Taliban cells.  Many 
were also proud of their clan identities.  So, again, it was up to this student to look 
interested out of basic courtesy but not record such information.   
 
Another challenge was instituting random sampling, as I described earlier.  First, I 
assumed that perceptions of participants would vary from one location to another so I 
conducted interviews in twenty different locations throughout the town proper chosen 
randomly—not by security constraints or areas of expected willingness to participate.  
Second, respondents occupied different positions within the militia web from fighter 
to block elder to militia deputy leaders and leaders.  I interviewed the two supreme 
commanders along with 14 commanders of smaller units.  Third, militia members 
were interviewed throughout the course of the day from dawn to dusk with no 
preference for time of day or day of the week, to include Friday when some 
militiamen were working despite being the day of prayer.   
 
Yet one more factor to consider was the total sample size.  There are the number of 
arbakai members whom the U.S. Department of Defense pay, the number of members 
that arbakai leaders claim, and the number of arbakai that NATO advisors estimate.  
The estimates of size changed several times per month in the spring and summer of 
2011.  Such changes in estimates were sometimes due to changes in NATO funding 
and programming (allowing for over 1,300 militiamen before the interviews began 
dwindling down to 800 and then 400 later in 2011); occasional accidental or natural 
deaths, assassinations, injuries, retirements; and migration by some to the formal 
Afghan government army or police.188  Additionally, this study focuses on the village 
proper of Marjah, not those militiamen in the “village” of Sistani; the desert outskirts 
to the north, south, and east; or the Afghan Local Police in Nad Ali (the formally 
recognized incorporated disctrict in which the village and unincorporated agricultural 
district of Marjah reside).  The estimated total as the final formal NATO count in 
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2011, in this study’s areas of interest, was 400.189 
 
This methodology seeks to fill a clear void in scholarship, which previously has not 
attempted first-hand to unearth data on why a self-driven movement would rise up 
against violent extremists.  The holistic research methodology that included 
interviews with Marjah’s civilian guardians, data from declassified and previously 
unclassified unpublished reports, and first hand accounts by outside observers and 
participants would prove or disprove hypotheses.  However, before delving into why 
Marjah guardians rose against Taliban, it is vital to understand the historical backdrop 
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Chapter 2 
An Introduction to Southern Rural Afghanistan 
 
Before testing hypotheses on why Marjah’s militia rose up against violent extremists, 
this chapter will present a brief overview of history of southern Afghanistan through 
the lens of Pashtun rural governance of which arbakai are a traditional security arm.  
The chapter focuses on Pashtuns because almost all Marjahns and over 95 per cent of 
Marjah’s province Helmand comprise citizens of this ethnicity.190  The history of rural 
Pashtuns in the south of the country that became Afghanistan acts as prelude to the 
structure and oral traditions of the arbakai on which this study focuses.  This chapter 
does not attempt to explain why arbakai fight Taliban but instead to describe the 
vehicle by which Marjah’s fighters gathered, planned, and rose against violent 
extremists. 
 
2.1 Pashtun Systems of Governance and Security 
 
A lens to understand rural Pashtun Afghan history is the fight for survival of local 
clans against anti-tribal policies and operations of central and outside powers. For 
centuries empires and armies have prized Afghanistan.191  The area that today 
comprises the modern country of Afghanistan was a passageway for the Silk Road 
connecting China and India to the Middle East, North Africa, and Europe.  Attempted 
occupations from Mesopotamian armies to the Soviet rulers have tried to change the 
power bases, culture, religion, politics, and ethnic landscape of much of Afghanistan.  
Foreign armies have razed municipalities and sought to upend local power structures 
and traditions to attempt to directly rule Afghans.  Outside nation states and regional 
intelligence and religious movements have exiled and killed indigenous natural 
leaders and instituted new laws to attempt to render tribalism and tribal power 
irrelevant.  Warfare and a warrior culture—sometimes descending into internal strife 
amongst the Pashtuns—became part of the fabric of life as Pashtuns fought and 
defeated stronger armies.  Local governance and security systems—even before 
Pashtun groups declared war against outsiders—was a perceived threat to any 
centralized authority that wished to rule the passageways that would help make 
outside empires stronger economically and militarily whether at the hands of the 
reportedly Pakistani-backed and influenced Taliban or the Macedonians.192  
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However, there have been interludes to anti-tribal policies from some regimes that 
elected minimalist policies to allow rural areas to govern and secure themselves most 
of the time.193  These non-authoritarian regimes believed that it was financially and 
militarily advantageous to leave the Pashtun rural south be, allowing Pashtuns to 
attempt to relearn old governance models.  The reasons include that most rural 
dwellers focus on subsistence farming and do not create wealth to provide significant 
taxes and goods for a central government.  Also, the terrain is simply too difficult to 
easily manage most of Afghanistan—from swaths of some of the world’s hottest 
deserts to almost impassable rugged mountains, it is logistically difficult and 
expensive to reach most rural villages even today.194  Furthermore, these rulers 
believed that a light central government footprint in the southern Pashtun hinterlands 
would assuage any potential tendency of the Pashtuns to bare arms against the state.195  
In summary, governing most of Afghanistan directly has been historically 
unprofitable.196  Many have tried direct rule—attempting to eradicate or weaken tribal 
power—and most of these efforts have failed quickly.  Those that appeared to succeed 
to directly rule over tribesmen and village-men and women through sheer force were 
short-lived.197    
 
These unobtrusive powers attempted to focus less of their efforts internally and face 
outwardly to the world to increase their coffers.  They saw the Pashtun tribes as 
offering little in the way of prize so they looked to negotiate international trade along 
some main roads and relatively few federally controlled border-crossing points.198  
Occasionally, however, during times of international security threats, these minimalist 
powers needed to supplement the numbers in their armies from the southern tribes.  
Additionally, when Pashtun tribal infighting became so intense as to possibly spark 
nationwide civil strife, the central government would send its troops to quell 
violence.199  Except for these times of internal regional strife or external security 
threats, these minimalist central powers saw no reason, under normal peaceful 
circumstances, to interfere in areas away from major throughways, outside major city 
marketplaces, and far from the larger irrigation plains.200  This approach to governing 
rural areas can be described as minimalist and historically has been successful.  
Relatively successful governments have recognized and used rural resilient systems to 
their advantage.   
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Without centrally controlled sub-road networks, religious centres, and government-
run markets, the Pashtuns were left to their devices to band together or fight over 
resources, honour, and control.  These regimes have allowed local communities to 
address their own grievances and needs, delegating local governance and security 
matters to rural informal tribal and village leadership.  Local communities with these 
authorities, in turn, avoided challenging the national government or its authority.  
These governments’ unobtrusive approach created a symbiosis between the formal 
central government and local traditional governance based on the self-interest of both 
sides.201  
 
Thriving during minimalist rule and suffering at the hands of more direct-rule 
totalitarian-like regimes are qawm, of which arbakai are a security apparatus of a 
special elders’ meeting known as a jirga.  Qawm are one of the primary identities of 
Pashtuns, and an identity and institution that suffered onslaughts from outside 
empires, invading armies, despotic regimes, and warlords.  Qawm describes either a 
bloodline or territorially based group.  In some areas of Afghanistan, a qawm is a clan 
held together by common ancestors.  In other areas, displaced individuals from 
different bloodline tribes may bind together in a community over shared interests in 
protecting land and living and farming with stability.  One can view southern rural 
Afghan Pashtun history through the lens of the qawm—a community that persisted in 
name throughout history as nontribal actors strove to kill, subjugate, or otherwise 
simply ignore qawm leadership and governance and security systems.202  
Historians and outside armies alike have had difficulty finding commonalities 
between Pashtun qawm.  Each—such as the qawm that comprise Marjah village’s 
community—has unique features.  The governing structures, values, and number vary 
from village to village and from tribal area to tribal area.203  Oftentimes even each 
individual qawm changes in number, structure, and allegiance depending on outside 
threats.  From the Mongols to the Russians to the Taliban, outsiders have often 
struggled to learn that no two qawm are exactly alike even in their arbakai’s martial 
tactics.204  The egalitarian nature205 of qawm cause even the internal governance and 
security systems to be replaced as needed to those who display the most persuasive 
leadership and seems to address the needs of the people.206    
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The differing and changing nature of qawm, both through their natural internal 
morphing and due to the possible shock of outside forces over the centuries gives the 
appearance to some outsiders that Afghanistan even today is a land of hundreds of 
small nations.  Nevertheless some historians and anthropologists have attempted to 
find common themes across rural Pashtun societies.207  Western scholars often attempt 
to summarize a code of the qawm in the majority Pashtun populations in 
Afghanistan—the ethnicity of most Afghans in the south and east as well as pockets 
in the north and west.  Historians and anthropologists discuss the importance of 
protecting females, hospitality, revenge,208 and honour, though such broad 
generalizations can never apply to every qawm at every point in history as each 
community contains unique narratives and values.209  
It must be noted that qawm is certainly not the only Pashtun identity, but it is one that 
most Pashtuns use for justice, security, governance, and stability.  Sociologists, 
anthropologists, and historians have identified other Pashtun identities from the 
household or koronay to regional tribal confederations.  Another example is the kuli 
that describes a small settlement of farmers while an avra indicates a formal 
governmental zone.210  However, for resolving issues such as warfare amongst 
cousins and disagreements over inheritance, Pashtuns generally seek their qawm 
elders for counsel and resolution.211  Though these qawm systems’ strength has likely 
ebbed and surged throughout history, the idea or the memory of this cohesive identity 
led to the qawm system that exists in contemporary Marjah. 
 
2.2 An Overview of Afghan Pashtun History 
 
Before the 18th century, Afghan rural societies were victim to numerous organized 
armies who sought to destroy or simply erase the traditional systems in part or in 
whole.  Approximately 330 BC Alexander III of Macedon invaded and ruled 
Afghanistan.  Then came the Hindu Mauryan Empire, Parthians, Greeks, Persians, 
and Turks, all of whom saw any semblance of qawm elders and security apparatus as 
potential threat to a central power212 no matter who short-lived that power was.  In the 
7th century AD the Arab Empire brought Islam, which Afghan’s rural populations 
adopted often wedding this new belief system with rural culture changing not only the 
individual way of life but also the qawm systems wholly as now those with religious 
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authority and knowledge began to hold sway within communities.213  To this day 
pilgrims from around the world visit sites of religious interest making south Afghan 
territories—previously of little value to traders—an area exposed to goods and ideas 
from around the world.  Clans then met arguably their greatest threat. In 1219, his 
Mongolian army burned cities to the ground and laid waste to some, but not all, 
agricultural land—even rural land that was not particularly bountiful and previously 
just sustained communities—when some Afghan tribes stood up to the Mongol 
Khans.  In 1504, a Ghangis Khan descendent founded the Mogul Empire in Kabul—
with little respect, knowledge, or interest in local Pashtun rural governance 
systems.214 
By the early 18th century, centralized government collapsed allowing the tribes and 
villages to rule themselves without outside threat.  Rising and falling confederations 
of qawm defined the times.  In moments of confrontation or tribal war, clans would 
ally themselves with other clans and tribal confederations with other tribal 
confederations.  Fluidity and continuously changing allegiances allowed balances of 
power and helped ensure that despite disputes, Afghans could call temporary truces to 
tend to their fields during planting, growing, and harvest seasons.  Village and tribal 
shuras comprised elders to make regular decisions and conduct week-to-week 
business.  Village and tribes called for jirgas, when elders needed to make a non-
regular decision such as unified action following a devastating flood. Rural areas 
stabilized themselves with the one enduring identity: the qawm.215 
 
Out of this period of tribal alliances came two strong confederations: the Durranis and 
the Gilzai.  Through his tribal super confederation and other allegiances, Ahmad Shah 
Durrani founded a nation in 1747 allowing the Gilzai to comprise much of the army 
of this state—stretching through the area that comprises today’s Pakistan into India 
and even parts of Iran.  The Durrani tribal confederation ruled through the clan 
systems minimally from Kabul from 1747-1838 during which only close relatives—
most of whom lived far from Kabul—were potential political rivals while the rulers 
allowed rural areas generous autonomy.216   
 
This time of relative autonomy for Pashtun qawm soon subsided to a time known by 
outside actors as “the Great Game.”217   The British and Russian both prized the 
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routes through the mountain passes that would allow both trade and land routes for 
their armies between Europe and East Asia.  Ill-prepared to face down tribal arbakai, 
lashkars, and other types of qawm militias that had just come off several generations 
of relative peace, 1842 saw Afghan tribal warriors slaughter 16,500 British troops 
along with approximately 12,000 British allied foreign soldiers and British-hired 
civilian workers.218  Tribal warriors and the ability of tribes and rural villages to unite 
and plan against an empire forced Great Britain to discard ambitions of direct control 
and seek out strategies of influence.219  Perhaps perplexing to some outsiders, such 
tribal rebellion began and continued independent of confederation rulers in Kabul; the 
tribes stood up against outsiders without an explicit goal to rule the entire country, as 
if their own autonomy was the goal of rural dwellers.220  The British learned that any 
outside army and any attempted occupation would likely unite the tribes again—an 
enemy that would demand the British shore up more guns, ammunition, soldiers, 
money, and willpower than they could stomach.  British soldiers and politicians 
accepted the power of tribal and village internal resilient systems and elected to avoid 
any strategy or tactic that would attempt to compromise the tribal organizations and 
networks in place.221   
 
Learning from the their initial campaign, British elected that future engagement in and 
near Afghanistan would have to involve non-martial influence and even perhaps 
manipulation to either weaken or change the characteristics of rural villages and clans 
to meet British goals of controlling access between the Middle East and East Asia.222   
During this time, the British were able, for over four decades, to assuage, through 
constant gardening of negotiating and undermining qawm goals of national autonomy, 
qawm elders.  However, even this approach offended Pashtun rural societies because 
often the British would attempt to pay off certain elders that undermined the 
egalitarian nature of these clans where leaders were only “first among equals” and 
held no formal hereditary status.223 
 
In  1879, the British overthrew the serving Kabul regime following the Afghan 
leader’s actions to formalize a relationship with Russia.  To replace that government, 
the British set up a Kabul government both friendly to British interests and 
uninterested in a Russian alliance.224  In 1880, Abdur Rahman, known as the “Iron 
Amir,” suddenly pushed Kabul’s central authority on all of Afghanistan and killed or 
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displaced all tribal revolts to include those that came from his own relatives 
effectively until there appeared no immediate Afghan challenge to his rule.225   
 
Eventually rural tribes rose up against successfully against central power and foreign 
influence earning independence in 1921 at the conclusion of the Third Anglo-Afghan 
war.226  However, the “Iron Amir’s” grandson King Amanullah was in power then 
and attempted Afghan nationalization and direct governance over rural lands.  His 
regime saw clan and village governance and security systems as an enemy to the 
complete monopolization of violence within the modern borders of Afghanistan.227   
 
Then, in 1929, a new government stepped in to oversee yet one more modern period 
of relative qawm autonomy.228  This Musahibin dynasty looked to history to govern 
rural lands effectively.  Leaders from Kabul encouraged and supported qawm systems 
and allowed jirga-appointed locally run arbakai to keep security when necessary.229  
The government succeeded and lasted in large-part because it respected the autonomy 
and identity of the rural qawm.  Despite a leadership assassination and an internal 
coup, the dynasty oversaw an era of relative stability—in large part due to a mutual 
respect between a minimalist central government and traditional rural resilience.230 
 
2.3 Thirty-Years War 
 
Following the period of the Musahibin dynasty was a period that some experts have 
dubbed the “Thirty Years War” in which rural community governance faced periods 
of attempted obliteration, subjugation, and disregard.231  In this period, the Soviets, 
followed by warlords, and then Taliban expended tens of thousands of lives in 
attempts to grow central regimes that sought to cut through tribal and village elders to 
connect each rural Pashtun to ruling powering in Kabul, far from the deserts of 
southern Afghanistan.  Military and militant forces killed tribal leaders, relocated 
civilians, and instilled laws to disable rural communities’ natural governance. With 
elders killed, tens of thousands civilians relocated or fleeing, and outside laws that 
applied even to the most remote Pashtun lands, the qawm identity was under crisis.  
Disorder was so much as to lead some of today’s most widely read analysts to 
conclude that many qawm may be broken beyond repair unless outside forces help to 
rebuild societal capacity amongst clans.232   
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A 1978 coup eventually led Hufizullah Amin to take over as head of state—a person 
friendly to Moscow. Amin’s socialist and anti-clan political strategies met with tribal 
insurrection in 1979 leading to the Soviet army’s invasion and occupation of the 
country.233  To ensure control, Moscow stood up a proxy regime in Kabul to create a 
version of communism that would authoritatively rule over each Afghan without any 
use or reverence for qawm leaders, laws, or arbakai.  For example, Soviet army units 
targeted wealthy landowners—traditionally comprising some of the rural Afghan 
super-elite that played a role in in some qawm systems.  Most elites immediately fled 
to Pakistan or even further.234  Soviet troops then attempted a socialist-style land 
distribution scheme in an attempt to remove maliks and khans (tribal or village 
leaders) from power.235  By 1985, some scholars estimated that about half of rural 
Afghan citizens were displaced from their original villages.  In reaction to attempted 
disruption of natural rural identities and systems, new jihad warriors—at whatever 
age—quickly ascended to governance roles in many villages.236  
 
Soon “jihad” rang its bell to the corners of the world bringing in U.S. money to bog 
down the Soviets and inviting volunteer fighters throughout the world to join the 
cause of ridding outsiders of this Muslim country.237  Afghan and foreign mujahidin 
fought, what was in their eyes, a godless and dictatorial non-Muslim power.  Qawm 
after qawm rose up and joined the movement miring the Soviets in a 
counterinsurgency that faced unique tactics of each different tribe and village.238   
 
During this time of traditional Pashtun rural governance disruption, young jihad 
warriors—who would unlikely have ascended to clan leadership under traditional 
peace-time qawm—claimed leadership for themselves.239  Some such Afghan 
warriors created untraditional trans-qawm militias that later continued to challenge 
rural systems of governance and security.  As the new breed of young tactically tested 
warriors sometimes disrupted rural governance, Mullahs rose in significance in some 
areas further upending traditional more secular tribal structures.  Providing religious 
legitimacy to the anti-Soviet jihad, Afghan villagers respected new classes of religious 
leaders because these Mullahs claimed to know more about the Quran and Hadith 
than most illiterate Afghans.240  Mullahs’ increased influence in some qawms altered 
governance processes to some degree.  In summary, disruptions to traditional 
	   51	  
peacetime qawm derived externally from the central governments and Soviet army 
and internally from young fighter-commanders and religious leaders. 
 
By 1980, the United States, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and China were providing 
arms to the mujahidin. 241  Half a decade later, mujahidin leaders met in Pakistan to 
create an alliance against Soviets, and the United States eventually provided Afghan 
fighters with stinger missiles to down Russian aircraft in 1986.242  By 1989 Soviet 
troops withdrew from Afghanistan leaving a Russian-friendly leader in place.  Even 
after the Soviets withdrew in 1989, however, the socialist government continued their 
anti-tribal policies for three more years until it fell in 1992.243   
 
Afghan militias began to turn on one another once the Russian backed Kabul regime 
fell and started to exploit populations.  In 1994, many citizens in southern areas 
welcomed the Taliban as a possible solution to the chaos and warlord-ism since the 
Soviets had left.  The Taliban were able to gain support early on because the vastly 
illiterate Pashtuns saw them as fellow Pashtun holy men from southern Kandahar 
province promising an end to corruption and a new age of justice, safe roads for 
commerce, general security, and stability.244  But support soured as the Taliban began 
to encroach on Pashtun traditional way of life.  For example, the Taliban outlawed 
secular education, film, women’s education, television, music, kite flying, and popular 
sports such as dog fighting—imposing their laws with amputations and executions 
sometimes.  The Taliban forced locals to attend prayer and provided no economic or 
development programs.245  Other governments accused the Taliban of conducting 
human rights violations to include the razing of Bamiyan province’s giant statue 
Buddas at the dawn of the following century.  The Taliban ideology—in theory and in 
practice—did not allow for the secular qawm governance systems and envisioned 
replacing secular rural justice with only Taliban’s form of religious law.246 
 
Once the Pakistani government and intelligence service began financing them, 
Taliban were able to defeat rival militias.  Amidst mass killings and humanitarian 
crimes on numerous sides, the Taliban captured the western Herat province in 
1995.247  By 1996, Taliban controlled Kabul and appointed Kandahar resident and 
self-claimed religious scholar Mullah Omar as leader.248  By 1998, Taliban effectively 
controlled 90 per cent of the country and continued to attempt to suppress tribal and 
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village leadership and customs.  Two days before the 9/11 attacks on New York and 
Washington, D.C., the Taliban assassinated the leader of the Northern Alliance—the 
most robust anti-Taliban holdout.249  In the eye of Mullah Omar, there was only room 
for Taliban’s strict interpretation of religious law and no room for tribalism, the 
Pashtun way of life, or any internal opponents. 
 
U.S. counterterrorism intelligence services increased their focus on Afghanistan in 
1996 when Mullah Omar elected to provide Usama bin Ladin and al-Qa`ida 
leadership sanctuary when Sudan expelled the international terrorist group.  
Following al-Qa`ida’s bombing of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, the 
U.S. President ordered missiles to target possible al-Qa`ida bases in Afghanistan.  
Then following the 9/11 attacks, the United States began its war against the Taliban 
who United States government thought were culpable for sheltering al-Qa`ida.250  
Following bombing raids in October 2001, U.S. Special Forces helped the Northern 
Alliance remove the Taliban from power before conventional U.S. units secured 
Kabul.  Taliban leaders fled to Pashtun areas of Pakistan to include Mullah Omar, 
who some believe could possibly reside in Quetta over what some scholars and 




Although analysts disagree over the efficacy of contemporary rural Pashtun resilience, 
given the past 30 years of warfare, one could surmise that clans had faced even 
greater opposition throughout history and were able eventually to reassemble.252  
Thus, it may still be possible that those in Marjah, specifically, may still rely on qawm 
given its propensity to serve as an identity even after anti-tribal policies of leaders like 
Ghangis Khan and the “Iron Amir.”253  However, even if qawm systems exist in 
Marjah, the village’s unique inception—an invented village by the United States 
during the Cold War—complicate how and why the militia rose up.   
 
While this chapter looked to qawm and its arbakai—and opposition to these entities—
as a consistent theme in a history of foreign intervention, with some decades of 
reprieve for rural Pashtun traditional systems, the next will look to the unique case of 
Marjah.  While the artificial creation of the town theoretically had the propensity to 
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undermine or distort traditional qawm systems, the geography actually served to 
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Chapter 3 
An Introduction to Marjah 
 
Through a historical lens, this chapter describes Marjah as a Western creation that 
inadvertently supported the potential for geographically distinct qawm.  While the last 
chapter looked to the qawm in history throughout southern Afghanistan, this section 
looks to the unique features of governance in this one village.  As with the last 
chapter, this one does not attempt to uncover why arbakai fight and die in the name of 
defeating local Taliban cells but instead depicts traditional security mechanisms in 
Marjah that allowed the movement to flourish.  This chapter helps to illuminate the 
“how” and not the “why” of this single case study. 
The village of Marjah rests in an unincorporated agricultural district by the same 
name within the Afghan government and internationally recognized Nad Ali District 
of Helmand Province in the southwest rural Pashtun desert of Afghanistan (figures 1-
4).254  Along with neighbouring Kandahar province, Helmand was the location of 
ISAF’s main effort from 2009-2013, while ISAF and international civilian agencies 
considered the fierce fighting in Afghanistan’s eastern provinces as secondary shaping 
operations.255  In 2010, the Marjah village became the centrepiece of ISAF’s surge, as 
the study will explain in forthcoming chapters.  ISAF prized this area because it was 
one Taliban stronghold, while the Taliban valued this area for its poppy fields and 
ability to tax millions of dollars of international aid and security contracts helping to 
fund its elements in throughout the south.256  
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Figure 4: Marjah comprises blocks from these crisscrossing secondary canals.260 
 
The village Marjah holds some traits similar to other settlements near the Helmand 
River.  These other agricultural communities likely grew naturally and served to 
inspire further settlers and settlements eventually leading to a series of villages along 
the Helmand River, which is Afghanistan’s longest river providing around 40 per cent 
of Afghanistan’s water.261  These settlements have endured through present day and 
help to define the Pashtun lifestyle—subsistence farming.  The area that is today the 
village of Marjah was just outside this system of agricultural communities—too far 
away from the river to naturally draw water for arable land until a twentieth century 
scheme to build canals out to Marjah.262  
Locals have nicknamed Marjah “the jungle” of the Helmand River Valley because its 
population density is the highest in Helmand with the exception only of the provincial 
capital.263  The town holds roughly 75,000 people within 56 square kilometres.264  The 
one-storied buildings help ensure an even distribution of about 375 souls per village 
block with each block taking about approximately four square kilometres.265  The 
town centre’s population density is the highest in southern Helmand province with the 
exception only of the provincial capital.266  Some analysts attribute Marjah’s high 
population density to a swift word-of-mouth information flow and exchange of goods 
faster than the surrounding areas to include sparsely populated deserts to the north, 
east, and west.  The few people that live in these deserts mostly moved there from 
elsewhere in Afghanistan to grow poppies in the 1990s.  To the south lie smaller 
villages straddling the Helmand River.267  
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“The jungle” holds a second local nickname, “the oasis,” because in the 1950s and 
1960s, the Afghan government along with foreign agencies and companies created 
this village out of crisscrossing secondary canals with the unfulfilled goal for nomads 
to settle down into agricultural life.268  Unfortunately the government failed to 
conduct soil samples, so the canals offered just barely arable land.  The end state was 
a far cry from the breadbasket this town was supposed to be but nonetheless an 
improvement from the surrounding more barren desert, more arable than many of the 
naturally born villages that straddled Afghanistan’s longest river producing around 
forty per cent of Afghanistan’s water.269  These secondary canals left perfect blocks, 
each creating clearly marked neighbourhoods and each with its own qawm and qawm 
elder.270   
 
Subsistence farming is today the way of life as it has been for other naturally born 
villages around the Helmand river since around 7,000 BC.271  As it has been for 
nearby villages, conditions in Marjah are harsh and spartan.  The heat index, which 
includes humidity, kisses 60 degrees Celsius on a typical noon in early August and 
can touch freezing temperatures in the winter evenings.  If it were not for some 
modern farming equipment, mobile phones, motorcycles, AK-47s, derelict NATO 
generators, and the occasional sports energy drink and pick-up truck, not too much 
separates the amenities of this village to other villages near the Helmand river 
millennia ago.272  Some analysts and experts have described this area’s environment 
as “biblical” referring to the overall similarities today to those of a couple thousand 
years ago.273  These are the conditions in which farmers-turned-warriors serve in 
Marjah’s arbakai. 
 
3.1 Marjah’s Informal Governance Systems 
The arbakai units serve individual qawm in Marjah. Each block has a qawm with an 
elder and a governance, justice, and security system like any other qawm in rural 
Pashtun areas of Afghanistan.  Marjahns identify the location of their qawm by giving 
the original U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) English name of 
the block.  Each row of blocks has a number from north to south, and each column of 
blocks has a letter from west to east.  For example, the block “6F” refers to an exactly 
defined block in the middle of the village.274  Some Marjahns give their block an 
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additional name by a block’s unique physical feature such as an especially large well.  
However, when a Marjahn proudly states from which block he comes, he is not just 
providing a location but describing his distinct qawm identity as if the qawm were a 
sub-village with its own governance.275   
 
It is this identity—the qawm with distinct geographic boundaries—that appeared the 
strongest identity of those in town.  Block elders held the most power and 
responsibility.276  Likewise, neighbourhood elders became arbakai sub-commanders 
unless the block elder felt too old or infirmed for this duty and subsequently appointed 
someone else from the same block, and a sub-unit of the arbakai comprised 
representatives from a single block.  Furthermore, guardians foremost were expected 
to patrol and protect their home neighbourhood.  Blocks defined the composition of 
the arbakai and the identity of any citizen.  People served, fought, and died for their 
block independent of ethnic tribe.277 
 
The block system was an invention in the desert that defined the communities of the 
very first settlers, creating a historical precedent and giving birth to the sub-village 
structure that prevails today—a structure that materialized the historical precedent of 
qawm.  Marjah was one product of the Helmand River Valley Project, which started 
as the “largest and most ambitious project ever undertaken in the history of modern 
Afghanistan”278 but ended as arguably the “largest economic failure toward the 
development of the country.”279  The international community poured hundreds of 
millions of dollars into southern Helmand to make Marjah a centerpiece of the 
breadbasket of the nation with factories and Western stylized education centres.  What 
came out the other end was a swath of desert turned into subsistence farms.  It was 
supposed to be “the beginning of a new civilization—a new way of life abounding in 
the riches of worthy endeavor” and turned out to be areas of “reasonably productive 
farms.”280  Any judgment of failure, however, refers to the project’s original intent.  
Where there once was barren desert, now there is a town.  There was nothing, and 
now there is something.   
 
The seed of the idea that would eventually lead to Marjah’s primary block-qawm 
identity began over a century ago. In 1910 Afghans and foreign governments and 
companies began attempting to construct irrigation canals to better take advantage of 
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the Helmand River.  The first wave of canal builders comprised the Afghans 
themselves, and then German and Japanese technical assistance arrived in the 1930s.  
The Japanese helped to dig canals up until 1941.  The Afghans continued 1941-
1946.281   
 
During World War II, Afghan King Mohammed Zahir Shah increased his personal 
coffers by selling food to British forces in Burma.  With this money, he eventually 
hired the American firm that built the Hoover Dam in the United States. This U.S. 
company Morrison Knudsen agreed despite that the Afghan government refused to 
conduct the normally requisite drainage and soil assessments.   Despite $63 million 
U.S. dollars (equivalent to around $600 million U.S. dollars today) going to the 
projects, the venture was unfinished by 1949 when the Afghan King’s money was 
running dry.  The soil in areas like Marjah was shallow and mostly impermissible for 
drainage—the U.S.-schooled Afghan college graduates who the King sent to help the 
projects failed to dig proper drainage ditches or implement development best 
practices.282 
 
The U.S. government then swooped in with hundreds of millions of dollars until the 
1960s to prevent the Soviets from picking up the bill and to prevent Russian incursion 
into Afghanistan.  Initially the American government project intended to continue the 
efforts to make Marjah and surrounding towns the breadbasket of the nation with 
factories, co-ed schools, modern hospitals, electricity, roads, modern markets, and 
community centres.283  The U.S. Export-Import Bank followed by the U.S. Bureau of 
Reclamation and then followed up by the U.S. Agency for International Development 
took over the Helmand River Valley Project.  The U.S. projects produced a secondary 
canal system that became the town of Marjah.  The projects brought water through 
wide canals 30 kilometres from the Helmand valley river to Marjah.  Once water 
reaches Marjah, a grid of crisscrossing secondary canals subdivides Marjah into 
blocks with clear geographic barriers previously described.284 
This relatively fertile land was originally intended for desert nomads to settle.  
However, wealthy Helmandis swooped in and claimed land.285  The landowners were 
typically regional powerbrokers who brought their closest kin and associates from any 
tribe into a block.  What ensued was a randomly splotched patch quilt of overlapping 
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bloodline tribes.  The largest village directly east, Nawa-e-Barakzai, has only three 
tribes, while ten main tribes of Marjah do not even begin to define its heterogeneity:  
Noorzai, Alikozai, Daftani, Wardak, Barakzai, Ishakzai, Alizai, Achakzai, Populzai, 
and Wardak.286  Block boundaries slice through and around ethnic tribal barriers—
sometimes a block comprises numerous bloodline tribes, and sometime numerous 
blocks contain a single hereditary clan.  Bloodline tribal affiliation took a backseat to 
the territorial qawm within the block system.   
 
The primary political identity of those in Marjah is the qawm—each taking up the 
space of a single block.287  Each block has an elder to whom residents of the block go 
to resolve disputes, approve decisions, and seek advice.288  Ask a local where he is 
from, and he will give you his block location before his bloodline tribal affiliation.  
Ask a local who his community leader is, and he will give you the name of the block 
elder.  And thus, each block has become its own mini-village.289 
 
These physically defined qawm were the mechanism by which Marjah’s arbakai rose 
against Taliban invaders.  The system allowed the village—block-by-block290—to 
quickly unite against violent extremist cells and further allowed Marjah to operate 
with a unity of action.  Furthermore, the balance of power amongst the geographic 
qawm may have ensured longevity against violent extremist threats as overall village 
structure helped to prevent the possibility of one block taking over the others. 291  In 
other words the geography of the town helped to avoid internal civil war and strife—
the arbakai were able to continuously focus on their perceived outside enemy and 
avoid descending into chaotic infighting. 
The waterways that defined the boundaries of these qawm were a prize for both 
Taliban and drug lords because they offered ample conditions for poppies—one way 
by which violent extremists and criminal elements could raise money to fund 
insurgent activities and create profit.  The following sections will investigate how the 
relative richness of Marjah’s soil turned the village into a target of those seeking cash 
and made block governance systems victim to exploitative and totalitarian alien 
actors.  
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3.2 The Taliban’s Return to Helmand 
Just a few months following the 2001 U.S. incursion, the Taliban slowly returned to 
Afghanistan or came out of hiding to take over villages, districts, and swaths of 
terrain292—retreating, returning, or moving elsewhere depending on NATO and 
Afghan security operations and presence.293   Among the many locations Taliban 
found refuge, Helmand was a particularly tempting prize with its moneymaking 
poppy fields, socially conservative Pashtuns, and illiterate and vulnerable populations.  
Many factors may have encouraged Helmandis to allow Taliban’s return in some 
areas to include anger from certain tribes’ exclusion of the post-9/11 Afghan political 
landscape, hatred of Western presence, Taliban offering protection from exploitative 
militia leaders, and sometimes direct brutal repression.294   
 
Regarding Taliban offering protection from non-insurgent drug lords to gain access to 
land, it is important to highlight the modern history of poppy-seeking militias.  
Hailing from Helmand’s northern district of Musa Qala,295 the Akhundzadas had 
fought against the Russians and Hizb-i-Islami militia in the 1980s to maneuver to a 
position of power over other tribes and the poppy trade in Helmand.296  Previously a 
regular crop just in northern Helmand, this family’s militia had forced southern 
farmers, reportedly brutally, to grow and harvest the crop.297  Akhundzada 
mercenaries apparently threatened, tortured, and executed farmers who opposed their 
opium and heroin trade.298  Their militia elected not to use traditional rural tribal 
systems in the southern parts of the province but instead operated dictatorially directly 
with farmers.299  It should be noted that some researchers have uncovered some 
evidence that the Akhundzadas employed mutually beneficial arrangements and 
patronage with some tribal elders on some occasions.300 
 
The cartel continued to victimize Helmand farmers to include those in Marjah until 
the Taliban asked Akhundzadas to surrender or join following the Soviet exit.  The 
Akhundzada leader chose, instead, to flee to Quetta until 2001.301  In Quetta, the 
original strongman’s nephew Sher Mohammad Akhundzada became close to future 
President Karzai and Karzai’s tribe.302  They became so close, that once Karzai 
ascended to interim Afghan President, Sher Mohammad immediately became 
Helmand’s governor in 2001 to resurrect his family’s former drug enterprise.303  Sher 
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Mohammad swiftly appointed Abdul Rahman Jan as Chief of Police and Dad 
Mohammad Khan as provincial Director of the Afghan National Directorate of 
Secutity.304  Each with personal informal mercenary units, they effectively killed and 
tortured their way with impunity to become the ring leaders of the post-9/11 
Helmandi drug trade.305  The militias colluded and clashed at times and attempted to 
hoodwink ISAF into supporting each’s particular efforts.306  Their ferocity and greed 
were enough to turn Helmand into the world’s top source of opium.307  Their 
unrivalled brutal influence and anti-Taliban credentials eventually even made them 
the “go-to” powerbrokers with whom the few U.S. Special Operators in Helmand in 
2002 and 2003 communicated.308  
 
Locals hated these three warlords with enough vitriol that some accepted the Taliban 
back into their villages even with the recent memory of Taliban’s harsh enforcement 
of non-Pashtun law.309  The Taliban promised Helmandis to protect lives, property, 
and stability.  Specifically, the Taliban employed a narrative that they returned to 
protect populations from the abuses of the drug lords.  The Taliban after 9/11 
employed this stream of messaging widely and tended to tread softly feigning respect 
for qawm law and way of life310—likely in an attempt to gain renewed popular 
acceptance in some areas.   
 
The Taliban also sided with clans in northern Helmand that felt politically 
disenfranchised—allowing the Taliban safe haven from where they could attack 
Marjah and then retreat when necessary.  The three Helmandi warlords, like Karzai, 
belonged to the Durrani Pashtun Zirak tribal confederation, which considered the 
northern Ishakzai tribal groups as undesirable thievish sub-citizens.  Given the open 
prejudice, the Ishakzai believed that they would not be able to share power in the 
province or have fair representation in the national legislature.  Such resentment laid 
an easy path for the Taliban to partner and takes sides against the warlords.  Some 
foreign observers even speculated that some anti-government attacks in northern 
Helmand could have been the Ishakzai trying to avenge persecution and gain more 
influence through violence—this tribe feeling they had few legitimate and peaceful 
political outlets in northern Helmand.311 
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Assessing that the three warlords were forces of instability focused on terrorizing 
residents, the British command in Helmand in 2005 insisted that Karzai fire them.312  
Karzai relented and appointed Sher Mohammad to the Senate in Kabul city—his two 
collaborators lost their positions eventually.  However, Karzai replaced the governor 
with Sher Mohammad’s nephew, and Sher Mohammad instructed his now jobless 
mercenaries to swiftly join the Taliban in an effort to strike a deal with the Taliban 
and share at least some of the drug money.313  With new fighters, the Taliban 
eventually took complete control over the drug trade in Helmand and Marjah in 
particular. 
 
3.3 Taliban Mass in Marjah 
 
In 2007 Sher Muhammad ally Abdul Rahman Jan—former provincial chief of 
police—owned roughly 6,000 acres of mostly government share-cropper-run land in 
and around Marjah for poppy cultivation.314  To enable their drug business, he bought 
off 30 police for protection, maintained a 300-strong on-call quick-reaction-force, and 
still had heavy influence over the local police writ large.  He held sway with the 
provincial government and essentially controlled the drug trade throughout Marjah 
district.  They were also paying off Taliban to include a one million dollar “grant” for 
a Taliban field hospital in Helmand.315 
 
These poppy fields met the three criteria for eradication in 2007-2008 for Afghanistan 
counter-narcotics efforts.  The unique criteria for that time in Helmand was that land 
needed to be government-owned, controlled directly or indirectly by government 
officials, and have connections to the Taliban or at least have residents that directly 
support insurgents.  ISAF orchestrated a major poppy eradication operation on this 
land in the late winter of 2008—when the poppies were high enough to cut down but 
before harvest could yield opium.  ISAF ordained one Tajik kandak (equivalent to a 
western army battalion with approximately 800 troops) “national narcotics officers” 
under the command of Muhammad Dawood Dawood, a former Northern Alliance 
regimental commander from the northern Takhar province that saw drug smuggling 
and exporting in the 1990s.  For technical expertise and to help mitigate temptations 
for bribes, 35 DynCorps International contractors advised and mentored the kandak 
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and operation.  Due to lack of resources and manpower and a wish to avoid local 
anger towards Western troops, NATO chose not to be directly involved.316 
 
The first night of the operation, when this DynCorps and Tajik force rested in a dry 
river bed, they received over 12,000 incoming rounds followed by continuous small 
arms attacks and IED detonations the following day.  With such opposition, the force 
hastened to eradicate as much poppy as possible in less than a month before 
evacuating with the help of British troops—a necessity given the security situation 
despite NATO’s original intent not to be directly involved.317   
 
Following the narcotics force’s exit, Abdul Rahman Jan felt the need to shore up 
further defense against any future attempts to undermine his drug trade.  So he sided 
even more closely with the Taliban—allowing them free reign in Marjah itself—a 
further consolidation of power between Sher Muhammad’s network and the 
Taliban.318 The 2008 poppy eradication project helped to turn the town into a Taliban 
stronghold if it had not been already.319  Marines reported approximately 1,000 
Taliban in Marjah proper by December 2009.320  Locals reportedly despised not only 
Taliban-cohort Abdul Rahman Jan and his “thuggish”321 followers, but they also 
despised the Taliban itself.322   
 
With far more and more dedicated fighters, the Taliban eventually rescinded their 
partnership with Abdul Rahman and took control from him to turn the village of 
Marjah into their southern Afghanistan headquarters. The 2008 poppy eradication 
project sparked a chain of events that turn Marjah, which had already endured some 
Taliban brutality, into arguably the strongest Taliban stronghold in Afghanistan.323  
While in town, the Taliban subjugated the populace through intimidation and 
execution.  The media and ISAF position appeared to be that up until January 2010, 
Marjah was a military, political, ideological, and economic hub for violent extremist 
Taliban.324   
 
3.4 U.S. Troops Surge on Marjah 
 
After the United States’ initial 2001 incursion into Afghanistan to militarily defeat the 
Taliban, the United States and its allies began a trajectory towards a large presence in 
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rural areas and municipalities alike.  By 2004, NATO had approximately 20,000 
uniformed troops, most with the mission to protect Kabul.  In Helmand and Marjah 
specifically, only some U.S. Special Forces and a Provincial Reconstruction Team 
headquartered in Helmand’s capital were present.325  ISAF activities increased a bit 
when British Soldiers and Royal Marines focused on attempting to secure a 
“Development Zone” around the provincial capital and select locations in northern 
Helmand with a view to an “ink blot” strategy hoping that Helmandis would hear 
about this supposed safe zone to impel those outside the secure area to want to get rid 
of Taliban and accept international security and aid.326  Simultaneously some British 
military teams fought battles against the Taliban in the deserts south of Marjah.327 
 
The seeds of surge began when NATO took over command from the United States in 
2006.  An additional 17,000 U.S. Marines, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines and 
comparatively smaller increase from other NATO country troops arrived to 
Afghanistan in 2008.  However, the U.S. military command felt this was not enough 
and surged another 30,000.  By 2009, the United States alone had over 100,000 troops 
in Afghanistan—a comparable number to Soviet Union’s footprint in the 1980s.328   
The goal of U.S. military commanders and policymakers, in part on the 
recommendation of DC’s think tanks and most seemingly reputable 
counterinsurgency theorists, was a presence robust enough to protect Afghan 
population centres while building and training the Afghan army and police to be self-
sufficient.329 
 
This thick U.S. military and civilian agency presence considered its main effort, aside 
from its training missions, to clear the Taliban from Helmand and Kandahar.  
Quickly, however, the ISAF commander chose to focus on Helmand alone instead of 
heavy Taliban presence in Kandahar and fierce battles in eastern Afghanistan, which 
was considered a lower-priority shaping mission.  The preponderance of surge forces 
went to Helmand.  Eventually, in 2010, Helmand received 30 per cent of surge forces 
translating into about 20,000 U.S. Marines and 10,000 U.K. troops along with civilian 
agency workers in development and diplomacy fields.330   
 
Within Helmand, Marjah would quickly become the primary focus—the commander 
of ISAF believing that the United States needed to show Afghans, Americans, and the 
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world that the surge was a success by first liberating the village of Marjah from 
Taliban.331  The Marjah operation would spearhead the surge and begin the defeat of 
Taliban in southern Afghanistan.332  The ISAF commander wanted the operation in 
Marjah to be a signal turning point for the surge and inspire “momentum” to roll back 
Taliban presence and influence.333 
 
After the first 100 days of Operation Moshtarak, small Taliban cells still operated in 
and around Marjah at night with relative freedom of movement—continuing its fear 
and intimidation campaign to attempt to ensure the qawm leaders would not re-
establish control.  During the day, the district governor was clandestinely gathering 
his first staff members, and a few market stores were open.334  Nevertheless the 
Taliban operated enough at night to intimidate locals to the point that only 350 
students were going to school on a regular basis with a total of eight teachers in the 
town—despite high demand of the locals for primary education—whether conducted 
under trees, in residents’ basements, or at schools.335   
 
Following the initial clearing operations of Moshtarak, U.S. Marines brought in basic 
humanitarian aid to tend especially to injured civilians, and the in fall 2010 the local 
units shifted from clearing operations to holding and building.  The Marines 
supported the quick appointment of local officials to take advantage of the Taliban’s 
typical lull in fighting during the winter season when most were busy with overseeing 
the planting of poppies outside of the village.336  In the early winter of 2011, a District 
Governor and Chief of Police were appointed in addition to elections for a district 
council of community representatives. 337  The District Community Council consists 
of 35 members, elected following an elders’ meeting in February 2011.338   After the 
Marines defended the centre of the village around the District Governor’s compound, 
they then shifted some of their focus to conducting operations against Taliban cells on 
the outside of town.339  At this relatively stable point in time, the Marine commands 
decided to simply recognize a village militia led with those that had previously been 
conducting a low-profile low-intensity insurrection against the Taliban.  The militia 
was allowed autonomy.340    
 
To reach this point of unleashing or allowing this anti-Taliban movement, that 
indigenous force required the freedom to stand, plan, and operate in the first place.  
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Militia members needed security enough to be free of Taliban intimidation and 
retribution.  They needed security “breathing” space to independently seek their goals 
without facing immediate mutilation and execution.   
 
In Marjah, Marines formally sanctioned what was known as “Local Defense Forces” 
(September 2010), later known as a “Neighborhood Watch Program” (November 
2010), later known as the “Interim Security for Critical” (February 2011), later known 
as “Afghan Local Police” (September 2011), later known as “Interim Solutions for 
Critical Infrastructure” (February 2013).341  The difference in each program was 
source of ISAF funding, salaries, and length of training, which was as much as three 
weeks.  Funding in the first two years came from the local conventional U.S. military 
Commander’s Emergency Response Program, which also goes towards such projects 
as battle payments for accidental property damage and canal refurbishments.342  The 
Afghan Ministry of the Interior is supposed to coordinate and oversee Afghan Local 
Police from the U.S. congressionally appropriated earmarked moneys—which often 
do not make it fully down to Afghan Local Police members.343  At the sub-province 
level Afghan District Chiefs of Police are supposed to coordinate and be responsible 
for village-level Afghan Local Police.344   
 
Locals were eventually able to farm licit nutritious crops and the numbers of Taliban 
attacks and threats decreased significantly in the years that followed this arbakai’s 
formation.  Locals, GIRoA officials, U.S. military commanders, and U.S. civilian 
diplomatic and development personnel, in numerous disparate reports and interviews 
over a three-year period (from 2010 through 2013) saw Marjah become stable and 
secure enough for informal governance leaders to meet in public, school attendance 
rise,345 and local fear of Taliban resurgence dwindle.346  As the following chapters 
will present, Marjah’s arbakai played an important role to this security.   
What motivated these volunteers will be investigated against prevailing hypotheses 
found from literature, military and development doctrine, and historical evidence in 
the next three chapters.  First this study will test whether or not fighters served with 
the distinct goal of bringing stability to the region translating into security and 
education for those in Marjah.  Then the study will uncover whether and perhaps how 
much of a role the Taliban ideology, and the materialization of this ideology into 
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violent attacks, acted as a motivation for the arbakai to form and fight.  Finally, a third 
hypothesis will look to whether or not tribalism—in the case of Marjah a territorial 
based clan-system—functioned as a rallying cry for the volunteer civilian fighters.  
After the investigation of these hypotheses, the study will illuminate an overarching 
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Chapter 4 
Hypothesis: Marjah Arbakai Fight For Stability 
 
One motivation for the militiamen was the need for stability—specifically an end to 
chaos and civil war and the goal of education for youth.  Every respondent during my 
interviews underlined the instability that Taliban had brought in the past to the town 
and the need for security, often with the end state of working towards viable schools 
for children.  Other evidence such as military and development reports also strongly 
suggests that the Taliban in Marjah had brought feelings of instability and insecurity 
in recent history and that the arbakai were essential in creating an atmosphere of 
stabilization.  The need for stability was not only a spoken narrative but was also a 
phenomenon for which the fighters toiled.   
 
This chapter will first explore both literature and contemporary military doctrine 
suggesting that the desire for stability could potentially drive counter-violent-
extremist movements—to underline that this is a viable hypothesis in the case of 
Marjah.  It will then investigate the village guardians’ interviews, of which all 
discussed the goal of stability buttressed by evidence of militiamen operating on this 
desire.  Specifically, the chapter will investigate the villagers’ two understandings of 
stability, which include an end to Taliban insecurity and the freedom of movement for 
children to be able to attend school.  Although the hypothesis of stability as a goal 
proved correct in the case of Marjah, this notion does not preclude other drivers or 
master themes that drove the militia to fight and die, as later chapters will discuss.  
Instead, this chapter simply presents one of several themes of both the words and 
actions of Marjah’s arbakai. 
 
First, however, a definition of the term stability is necessary.  Current military 
doctrine—as this chapter will further explore—has numerous lenses with which to 
view stability.  ISAF, NATO, U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, and USAID 
publications and doctrine most often consider three criteria in understanding stability.  
First is a normal functioning of society, second is normal governance and adherence 
to laws, and third is a normal level of violence in any given area.347  In summary, 
stability is whatever a community deems “normal,” according to prevailing military 
and economic development theories of stability operations. 
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The term “normal” in defining stability, however, will almost certainly differ in 
different areas of Afghanistan.  In addition, moments of normality may not 
necessarily translate into overall sustainable stability.  Therefore, the more nuanced 
understanding of stability for this chapter and study will include inherent adjectival 
caveats of “relative” and “enduring.”  Relative, in this case, refers to the local 
perspective.  Only the local through an indigenous optic and knowledge of local 
history and current affairs will be able to describe what relative stability is in his or 
her village.  The term enduring refers to the capacity of the village to be able to 
maintain the norm and overcome future problems before such problems destabilize 
the area.  Therefore stability, in this study, will focus on what those in Marjah 
consider to be a normal way of life—referring to a locally acceptable level of 
violence, adherence to law, and way of life—as well as the capacity of the village to 
maintain their normalcy in the future.  In short, stability is relative and enduring 
normal life according to the views of the locals.    
 
Outside forces will unlikely completely understand what stability is.  Stability is in the 
eyes of the local.  The only stability definition that matters is what locals perceive.  In 
rural and tribal lands throughout Southwest Asia, the definition of stability very often 
changes dramatically from village to village and tribe to tribe—embedded in a local 
narrative even the best foreign anthropologist or best survey service cannot fully 
grasp.348  Even if one was able to open a window into local perspectives, so many 
outside forces from environmental changes and crises to the very existence of alien 
security forces work to make definitions of stability a continually moving target.  
Many in war-torn rural areas may not even know what normal is. 
 
Complicating the analysis of stability is the myriad of outside forces in many rural 
areas.  From the perspective of most Afghans, there are many alien actors who may be 
threats or destabilizers.349  The following is not an attempt to equate outside forces or 
the moral nature of such entities, but it is an attempt at broadly and simplistically 
describing the world from the viewpoint of an Afghan—no two Afghans sharing the 
same view.  A Pashtun tribesman in Southwest Asia may view non-indigenous 
actors—such as non-local government representatives,350 foreign NGOs, United 
States, foreign civilian advisors, local militias, non-local Afghan police, new poppy 
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traders, local and foreign contracted security companies, Quetta Shura Taliban, other 
Taliban elements, Haqqani Network, Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin, al-Qa`ida Central, al-
Qa`ida branches, Pakistan’s Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Iran, 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, China, and refugees from other areas351—as 
competitors, temporary partners, fleeting sources of money, enemies, or 
destabilizers.352  For many there is no clear counterinsurgency environment.  There 
may not even be clear “legitimate” actors versus “illegitimate” actors vying for power 
over a population. 
 
As such, this understanding of stability, for this study, points up the 
counterinsurgency theories, discussed in the literature review of the first chapter, that 
emphasize leveraging clans.  Stability, being all but impossible for an outsider to 
completely comprehend, logically places weight on trusting locals to provide the 
definition of what is considered normal.  On the other hand, a heavier approach to 
counterinsurgency, in which artificial militias play an ancillary role, might focus on 
absolute government control instead of the perspectives of locals.   
 
With this understanding of stability that takes into account local perspectives and the 
capacity to maintain normal life into the future, this chapter will first look to theory 
and doctrine of the goal of stability as a potential motivation for counter-violent-
extremism movements.  One major theme in studies of the modern history of violent 
extremist groups centres on the phenomenon that insurgencies, to include violent 
extremist movements that oppose governments, are normally forces of instability.  
Twentieth century studies have even led to multiple tactical, operational, strategic, 
and policy-level doctrines that have informed and compelled NATO operations in 
Afghanistan to include in the fields of development, diplomacy, and security—all 
based on the idea that the goal of stability is a goal of civil society and all those who 
oppose violent extremists.   
 
4.1 Violent Extremists Destabilize 
 
Modern counterinsurgency and counterterrorism theories view insurgency—to 
include, in some studies, today’s violent extremist insurgencies—as inherently 
destabilizing.  David Galula’s Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice 
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begins with Clausewitz’ quotation that “[i]nsurgency is the pursuit of the policy of a 
party, inside a country, by every means” to underline that insurgency is by definition 
destabilizing—“every means possible” brings to mind possible boundless destruction 
and death to which he later implies.353   Galula states that an insurgency’s beginning is 
vague and cannot be predicted but becomes a protracted and innately destabilizing 
“struggle.”354  While a counterinsurgency may have the responsibility of bringing and 
keeping social order, the insurgency will try to create disorder to undermine the 
efficacy of the government.355  Specifically, an insurgent attempts to dissociate the 
populace from the government: “Promoting disorder is a legitimate objective for the 
insurgent...disorder—the normal state of nature—is cheap to create and very costly to 
prevent.”  The insurgent need not have one constructive social policy to win.356  
Galula’s theories, steeped in historical precedent, could, in theory, apply to the 
Taliban along with other transnational insurrections affecting Afghanistan.  However, 
Galula does not differentiate different types of insurgencies nor describes an area like 
Afghanistan comprising thousands of semi-autonomous communities with different 
types of ties to insurgency. 
 
David Kilcullen suggests that eradicating instability should be a focus of 
counterinsurgency and that the Taliban create, exacerbate, and take advantage of 
instability.  Challenging NATO units to focus on root sources of instability, he 
recommends that military units refocus their staff to understand and plan to mitigate 
causes of instability as opposed to only killing militants.357  He concludes that NATO 
should strategically organize and conduct operations to mitigate instability, as if 
instability were inherent to the Taliban identity and its actions.  Kilcullen explains that 
destabilizing factors are so great that NATO must make an effort to ensure that 
measures of success should focus almost entirely on improvements in stabilization.358   
 
Specifically, Kilcullen recommends that foreign military units in Afghanistan set and 
continually measure observable data to judge success against the Taliban such as 
unsolicited reporting from the population (since the populace would only report 
voluntarily if they feel secure), improvised explosive devices reported versus found, 
price of exotic vegetables (since low prices may mean accessible roads), 
transportation prices, the number of Taliban versus government courts, Afghan on 
Afghan violence (to judge local legitimate policing), business formation and loan 
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repayments, land ownership, civilian ability to travel,  and rate of anti-insurgent 
militia formation.359  The final metric may be an important measurement for foreign 
counterinsurgent forces in because such a militia could continue past NATO 
withdrawal.  An anti-insurgent militia risks life, limb, money, and power revealing 
deep dedication that could potentially last past foreign troop withdrawal.360 
 
Galula and Kilcullen project that insurgents are inherently destabilizing but do not 
explore whether or not instability could be a cause for civilians to take up arms 
against anti-government entities.  Nor do these theorists provide a convincing account 
of what stability might resemble to a person that lives in a unique country like 
Afghanistan—each Afghan perhaps having a different view of the world, politics, and 
the Taliban depending on his or her life experiences through the prism of a local 
community.  Nevertheless, modern war theory of countering violent extremism hinges 
on these authors’ understanding of insurgents so much so that operations in 
Afghanistan eventually focused primarily on mitigating sources of instability even as 
operators continue to also kill or capture violent extremists.361 
 
The destabilizing nature of Taliban and assumption that locals wish for stability 
informed the military and economic development doctrine of NATO in Afghanistan.  
Doctrine then birthed specific frameworks for small and large military units alike to 
follow to lessen instability as if this were the most effective method to weaken 
Taliban presence, influence, and ability to operate. 
 
4.2 Stability in Military Doctrine 
 
The idea of stability became so central to doctrine that the term formally appears in 
the name of overall NATO actions in Afghanistan and elsewhere.362  Stability 
operations are the coined term that applies to numerous environments and situations 
to include the possible destabilizing result of the death of a key leader, the aftermath 
of a natural disaster, and an insurgency.  In one way, counterinsurgency is a subset of 
stability operations.  Through this particular lens, the focus on the insurgency itself is 
but one piece of the problem set, while stabilizing areas within and outside insurgent-
rich areas is the main effort.363  
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Operations and doctrine in Afghanistan assume that the Taliban are destabilizers and 
claim that stability should be the end state.364  In the final five years of ISAF’s 
presence in Afghanistan, the term “stability operations” has most commonly been 
used to describe international military efforts and those of civilian government 
diplomatic and development counterparts.365  It is the all encompassing umbrella term 
for activities, which in theory would meet the President of the United States, U.S. 
Secretary of State, ISAF Commander, U.S. Chief of Mission, and NATO’s end state 
for Afghanistan:366 incapacitate violent Taliban elements and impel an enduring 
impermissible environment from transnational violent extremist insurrections who 
could otherwise wage attacks against the United States and/or U.S. allies.367  Stability 
operations comprise the focus of many counterterrorism missions, de-
mobilization/reintegration strategies, and counterinsurgency whether in the 
reconnaissance, shape, clear, hold, build, expand, over-watch, drawdown, or transition 
phases.368   
 
The premise is that that Taliban and other insurgent forces in Afghanistan are 
competing with traditional leaders—to include religious leaders, village leaders, 
familial leaders, and heads of clans and tribes—as well as the government to control 
or influence the population.  The population will side with whatever side offers more 
stability, according to the government publications.  The strategy does not defeat the 
Taliban itself but instead defeats its supposed core strength of popular support.369  
Such an approach can be likened to manoeuvre warfare in which the population is the 
centre of gravity370—on which the insurgency counts for safe haven, some type of 
support, and potential recruits—while the sources of instability are critical 
vulnerabilities.371  Mitigate these critical vulnerabilities, the theory supposes, and 
insurrection loses the populace and loses the war. 
 
For Afghanistan, the NATO and ISAF mandated tool to conduct stability operations 
was originally called the District Stability Framework (DSF), which is a misnomer 
because this is a doctrinal framework not just for district-level activities but tailored 
for all tactical, operational, strategic, and special operations as well as all civil affairs 
and reconstruction teams in Afghanistan. The Secretary of Defense and Commander 
of ISAF both mandated that all manoeuver, special operations, USAID, and civil 
affairs units and teams deploying to Afghanistan must receive DSF training.  Regional 
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Command East ordered for all units to conduct DSF precisely as trained, and many 
other units throughout Afghanistan also apply DSF as the primary methodology to 
conduct stability operations.372   The Marjah district governor’s staff even conducted 
thorough training on DSF during the summer of 2011 and applied this style of 
stability operations when conducting some activities in Marjah.373  By late fall 2012 
there were numerous manifestations of DSF for the U.S. Chief of Mission civilians to 
include USAID Office of Democracy and Governance’s Stabilization Unit Stability in 
Key Areas and USAID Office of Transition Initiatives’ stabilization methodologies 
which are both simply streamlined versions of the original DSF.374 
 
DSF and its more recent manifestations, using similar language and the same theories 
broadly have three sequential steps.375  They challenged operators, staff, and 
practitioners to identify sources of instability, then to analyse systemic causes of 
instability, and finally to conduct activities and measure impact of such projects.376   
 
Identify Sources of Instability: Before uncovering the sources of instability that would 
need to be eradicated or lessened, stability operations analysts are required to 
understand and assess stabilization writ large.  Contemporary doctrine considers 
numerous lenses to view stability to include:  
• normal activities of society, governance functioning, adherence to laws, 
respect for authority, and level of crime and warfare in any given area377 
• whatever a particular community believes stability is with an understanding 
that each community may have a different definition378 
• the ability of a community to overcome its own sources of instability and 
grievances379 
• the absence or effective mitigation of sources of instability380 
 
Despite numerous lenses of stability, there are defined criteria for identifying sources 
of instability.  Doctrinally, they are a type of priority grievance, which is a need that a 
majority or plurality of locals believe is the most important problem facing the entire 
community.  From a list of identified priority grievances, the commander, analyst, or 
staff assesses which meet the three criteria to be a source of instability: decrease 
support for governance, increase support for insurgency and other malign actors, and 
weaken societal capacity.381   
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Analyse Systemic Causes of Instability:  The stabilization standard frameworks then 
demand that practitioners uncover a number of systemic causes of instability for each 
source of instability by investigating how the issue came about, why it is continuing, 
and why communities have not addressed the problem themselves.  The purpose for 
analysing the root causes that allow sources of instability is they will determine 
activities to mitigate instability.382 
 
Conduct Activities and Measure Impact:  The theory is that outsiders directly 
conducting, overseeing, or paying for programs383 to address systemic causes of 
instability will resolve the source of instability.  When sources of instability are 
mitigated, then the community will be stable, according to the framework.  The 
prevailing methodologies call for outside military operators to enter rural Afghanistan 
villages and conduct activities directly or fund projects.384  While tenets of DSF offer 
options to hire local labour or partner with Afghans, the emphasis is most often on 
NATO conducting, funding, or directly overseeing those actions that would 
strengthen and measure overall stability.385 
 
The assumption behind this process is that stability will keep the Taliban at bay.   
However, there is little data to assess how well the program is working despite several 
on-going studies.386   The execution of DSF and its newer streamlined iterations is 
without serious academic, policy, or operational critical evaluation.387  Those studies 
that have begun would be hard pressed to tie successes or failures of DSF to an area 
that stabilizes or destabilizes because of the myriad of non-ISAF-related 
environmental as well as international, regional, and local events and influences that 
can affect an area’s stabilization.  DSF is an untested playbook, and DSF’s primary 
assumption that stability would undercut the Taliban is unproven.   
 
Even if stability were primary to weakening violent extremist efforts and if DSF’s 
mentality of outsiders primarily conducting stabilization operations, the doctrine holds 
inherent potential weaknesses.  For example, NATO frameworks do not offer viable 
approaches to uncover local perspectives of stability or to allow locals to build 
enduring capacity to overcome their own problems autonomously in the future. 
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The doctrine holds little room to empower local indigenous resilient actors, who have 
anti-violent-extremist sentiment such as Marjah’s arbakai.388 U.S. security and 
development publications do not address how to identity or address sources of 
stability but instead elect to focus entirely on mitigating sources of instability.389  
Within the stability operations doctrinal planning process, operators and planners are 
given labyrinthine matrices and hundreds of steps.  Amidst the myriad of steps and 14 
matrices, planners are only given one column of one matrix to even consider 
indigenous resilient systems.  Then the analyst is told to consider—as one of eight 
program principles—working with resiliencies when it is time to pay money for a 
project or activity.  At best, resiliency is a footnote in the long DSF process, which 
often demanded two weeks of training in the United States before deploying to 
Afghanistan. The framework does not offer a definition of or steps to identity a 
resiliency or more specifically traditional rural resilient governance structures.390  
Such a mindset underlines the framework’s weakness in building local enduring 
capacity to overcome future challenges.   
 
In conclusion, stabilization frameworks, without evidence of success, fall short of 
recognizing sources of stability or local resilient actors who are already attempting to 
stabilize areas or counter violent extremists with autonomy.  Nevertheless, ISAF, even 
as it moves to over-watch and withdrawal operate as if stability is the central issue in 
Afghanistan.  Even the term stability operations underline a narrative that drives ISAF 
planning and action.  Thus the focus of stability as a goal for NATO along with 
academic research on the destabilizing effects of insurgency underlines the viability 
of hypothesizing that stability could be a goal of those in Marjah. 
 
However, whether stability could be a similar driving force and narrative for 
indigenous counter-extremist fighters, such as those in Marjah, has not yet been a 
subject of serious study.  Therefore, this study will now test this hypothesis by 
investigating the words, actions, and effects of civilian guardians in this rural village 
in southern Helmand.  The following section will analyse whether, and if so in what 
way, anti-Taliban civilian fighters use stability as a rallying cry and whether and how 
these arbakai volunteers’ actions reveal the goal of stability. 
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4.3 Arbakai Fight for Stability 
 
Every interview respondent independently, without leading questions, announced the 
goal of stability as the primary reason why they rose up and fought Taliban.  The most 
common definition, to locals, of stability in Marjah includes security—specifically the 
absence of the chaos and violence that the Taliban caused—as well as access to 
education.  This ubiquitous narrative—displayed with words and actions—appeared 
to drive all fighters.  They saw the Taliban as destabilizers who brought no 
constructive contributions to the town but instead only war and in turn wished to 
single handedly end the trend of instability.  
 
The words civilian militiamen used were not of some broad idea of instability.  
Instead, each Marjah militiaman and civilian I interviewed equated the Taliban to 
fitna.  None used the word fitna, but each described its meaning without equivocation.  
Fitna refers to disorder, sedition, or civil strife.391  Historically and theologically, fitna 
refers to a period of Hobbesian-like chaos when rebellion against established order 
brings insecurity and instability to the community writ large.392  Every arbakai 
member interviewed stated that the Taliban were a materialization of fitna.  
 
All interviewees stated that the Taliban brought war and destruction.  The following 
quotations do not correspond to specific interview questions because respondents told 
stories about their reasons for fighting throughout the questioning often independent 
of a particular query.  Furthermore, interviewees most often spoke about numerous 
themes when speaking about an idea.  Thus answers often revealed holistic and 
emotional views that rarely focused on a single point.  The numbers after quotations 
refer to a specific respondent, whose full answers, numbered according, are in 
appendix A.  In this section, the answers are representative of all the interviews on 
thoughts of the Taliban bringing chaos, insecurity, and fighting: 
 
Fighting.  That’s what they brought.  That’s what the Taliban are.  We 
cannot have this in our town.  We cannot allow this.  We did not cause 
this fighting.  Instead, the Taliban came and brought it upon us.  [Their 
name] means violence.  And they bring violence right into our very 
neighbourhoods…[t]he entire town feels the same way I do.  Everyone 
here, everyone around you here, feels that the Taliban are nothing 
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more than fighting.  They are fighting.  And no one here wants this. – 
(103) 
 
The Taliban mean destruction only.  They are against the very social 
fabric of this town.  The Taliban are our direct enemy.  This is clear, of 
course.  When the Taliban are here that means that there is fighting 
here.  The Taliban are fighting.  The Taliban mean fighting.  They are 
conflict.  If they are here, there is by very definition conflict here.  The 
Taliban are not Afghan.  They do not comprise Afghans nor is their 
origin Afghan in any way.  They are from Pakistan.   And they are our 
enemies.  Pakistan is our enemy too.  [The Taliban] are against 
families.  They are against the family—my family and the idea of 
family.  I want to help people.  I want to support a constructive society 
and help my community.  I will fight on until l I make my country safe 
and build up Afghanistan.  And as long as there is Taliban, they are an 
impediment to this.  It is my duty to fight them as long as it takes and 
support development and constructive policies.  My children feel that 
education is very important.  They want education.  This is very 
important for them.  They want to go to school and earn degrees to 
work.  They have clear visions for this.  They understand what they 
want from this day forward.  And the Taliban would never allow this.  
The Taliban would never allow education or my kids to go to school, 
and my children very much understand this clearly. – (99) 
 
Such notions were reflected throughout the interviews.  Marjah guardians 
brought up similar themes of destruction, strife, and chaos when describing 
Taliban as these select notions represent: 
 
Everyday there was fighting…[they] caused strife amongst the 
community…Taliban brought fighting amongst society. – (67)  
 
The Taliban only brought strife. – (79)  
  
They essentially broke our town.  They came here and brought 
death…They did not nor could they build up anything or create any 
type of societal self-sufficiency.  They only break and destroy 
things…this is what they are—breakers and destroyers only. – (101)  
  
The Taliban do not want security or peace in Afghanistan, especially 
Marjah. – (50)   
 
The Taliban are against peace.  They do not want or allow peace.  
They are against Afghanistan improving. – (61)    
 
The Taliban bring a lot of fighting.  They cause many many [sic] 
casualties.  They broke our country. – (88)  
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They destroyed schools and bridges and did not want peace.  They only 
bring destruction and war. – (7)  
 
The Taliban do not want security.  They do not want to improve 
Afghanistan.  They offer nothing but destruction…The Taliban take 
everyone hostage. – (8)     
 
They want nothing but fighting.  They are essentially bringers of 
fighting. – (108)   
  
 The Taliban only want to fight.  I do not want this fighting. – (53)    
 
[The Taliban] want to destroy, use bombs, and hurt people only. – (55)   
  
 …Taliban only brings fighting. – (82)    
 
They only want destruction and killing. – (111)    
 
According to the views of guardians, Taliban not only bring civil war, chaos, and 
killing, but their very identity somehow inherently embodies violence and insecurity.  
Taliban’s time in Marjah and surrounding areas was a time of cruelty and battles.  
Violent extremists targeted civilians, elders, and children; they sometimes attempted 
to empower one tribe to subjugate another only to eventually turn on the tribe they 
initially empowered; and their presence inevitably brought ISAF and national security 
forces into the area with civilians and civilian households in the crossfire. 
Pigeonholing local Taliban into the category of fitna points up theories of the history 
of Islam as a continuous fight between fitna and forces for order.393  In line with this 
general and perhaps even simplistic view of Islamic history, locals seemed to see the 
world as black and white—either fitna or no fitna.  Violent extremists who kill 
civilians, spark government repression, cause foreign invasions, and start civil war 
harm Muslim society through this fitna.  
 
Others spoke to a sudden shift from stability of local friendly governance to violence 
once the Taliban took over the village.  Anti-Taliban militia volunteers felt that the 
insecurity violent extremists brought was an aberration from normalcy and perhaps 
even a worsened instability than the decades prior to the Taliban that saw civil war 
and Soviet interference:  
 
Before the Taliban, the block elder would solve all the local problems 
for the people.  But when the Taliban came, they arrested people, 
	   81	  
handed out bread, and taxed locals—to control the populace without 
any regard for the traditional leadership.  The Taliban asked me to 
join them, and I said no.  They killed people.  They destroyed a bridge.  
They destroyed my village.  So I took up my gun and fought the 
Taliban.  And I swear my opposition to the Taliban with my gun.  My 
gun is my oath.  The Taliban are against peace, and we are against the 
Taliban.  The Taliban are against peace and security.  They are the 
enemy.  They only want insecurity and conflict.  This is what they have 
brought and want to bring again.  All people here want the Taliban 
destroyed.  The locals around here want security and peace.  As long 
as the Taliban are unable or unwilling to be educated to be allowed 
back into society, then we will fight them…All people here oppose the 
Taliban to include all kids.  We are all against the Taliban—children 
and adults alike. – (6) 
 
We are peaceful here.  We did not bring this on ourselves.  We did not 
ask for the Taliban’s invasion, and the violence that they brought.  We 
were already here.  We did not go to another country and start fighting 
there.  It was brought upon us. – (100)  
 
Most interviewees also suggested that the Taliban was incapable of constructive 
governance or development.  They claim that violent extremists’ very nature is 
inherently destructive and cannot provide the security that the fighters appeared to 
seek: 
 
Taliban are destroying our country.  The Taliban really equal 
destruction and nothing constructive.  They only want to wreck my 
country.  They come from Pakistan mainly, as well as get help from 
Iran.  They also want to destroy our infrastructure.  They want us to be 
destroyed from the inside out.  From schools to roads to clinics, the 
Taliban only want conflict.  They only want war. Taliban do not allow 
people in schools, and have put IEDs in schools and clinics.  They do 
not want Afghanistan to improve.  They do not want individuals to 
improve their lives nor do they want us as a society to improve 
ourselves.  We want to fight all the Taliban because they do not have 
constructive policies.  The Taliban do not want peace.  They do not 
work for anything good or positive.  They bring conflict, and we must 
stop this.  We must stop their destruction.  We will offer peace with the 
Taliban first, and if they do not want it is a good thing for us to fight 
all of the Taliban.  As long as they stay outside society and only want 
conflict, they will be the enemies of Afghanistan.  And as long as they 
are the enemies of Afghanistan, we will fight them continuously.  There 
is no end, for me or for my children, as long as the Taliban seek only 
destruction.  – (2)  
 
The Taliban do not want Afghanistan to improve.  They come in the 
night from Pakistan and have killed some of the local elders.  This is 
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why I oppose and fight them.  I joined the militia because we help 
Afghanistan.  We bring peace to Afghanistan.  We secure the locals.  
This is why I serve in the way I do.  People don’t want the Taliban.  
Taliban do not allow peace.  They do not allow children to go to 
school.  They do not allow asphalt on the road.  They do not allow 
betterment of roads.  They do not allow clinics.  They do not allow 
school.  We will fight a long time.  If they join us then that would be 
good.  The others that do not give up we will kill and remove from 
Afghanistan.  But if they choose peace and join us then that would be 
good.  Otherwise we will kill, remove, and fight.  – (18)     
 
The Taliban do not want peace.  Also, Taliban do not want schools or 
roads or to improve Afghanistan.  They bring only war and conflict.  
They do not want us to live together peacefully.  They do not want us to 
improve as a society.  It is therefore necessary for us to fight the 
Taliban.  We must fight the Taliban.  This is necessary.  This has to 
happen.  Also, Pakistan supports the Taliban to disturb Afghanistan.  
The weapons are from Pakistan, and the Taliban are mostly outsiders 
so we can recognize them.  We know when someone is not from our 
block.  We know when someone from Pakistan is walking around 
amidst our homes. In Afghanistan there are two types of people: The 
majority who want peace, schools, and clinics.  And then there are the 
others who take the side of the Taliban.  It is this second group who is 
wedded to fighting and misery—who do not join the police, who do not 
want to be self-sufficient, who do not want to improve our 
communities.  We ought to speak with the Taliban and show them the 
positive and constructive progress of Afghanistan.  To invite them to 
join society—show them schools and clinics and the importance of 
families, children, and babies.  Perhaps they will not fight if they see 
all this.  Perhaps they could not fight after seeing this.  But if they fail 
to change then we must fight the Taliban. We must fight the Taliban for 
a long time because they are likely bent on fighting the entire Afghan 
people.  They appear, in reality, to want to fight everyone inside 
Afghanistan for quite a while.  So we will have to fight if they never 
want peace. My son and my daughter go to school.  The Taliban would 
never allow them to do this.  So it is ingrained in their mind to be 
against the Taliban at a very young age.  They hate the Taliban.  
Children want something that the Taliban would fight to deny.  – (3)  
 
These above representative oral stories illustrate the passionate anger and distrust of 
the failed policies and instability that the Taliban had previously brought Marjah.  
Such notions were far from empty words.  They jibe with a stream of evidence that 
the Taliban brought only unconstructive governance and perceived wanton 
punishment.  Mullah Omar and the teachers of the violence-allowing “informal” 
quasi-neo-Deobandi Pakistani madrassas have no specificity, acumen, or constructive 
planning or paradigm for governance.394  While the Quetta Shura Taliban leadership 
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claim that the answer to the world’s problem is Islam—and likewise an Islamic state 
under Islamic rules is the only way forward—no specific solutions are available from 
the words and websites of violent extremist talking heads.395  From 1996 to 2001, the 
Taliban governed most of the land in Afghanistan, “[b]ut destroying graves, stoning 
women, and cutting off the hands of thieves took precedence over education, usable 
roads, agricultural aid, and the common missions of any serious government.”396  
 
Unable to practice any semblance of tradition qawm governance, count on their 
village elders to provide justice and security, or live as they had since the 1960s, 
Marjahns viscerally despised Taliban.397  The Taliban fought and killed people in 
their houses and near their compounds.  Taliban would show up to family compounds 
unannounced and take food, money, and property; lob off the head of the first person 
who refused to pay taxes as an example to others;398 and turned farms into poppy 
growing machines and markets to morphine/opium/heroin emporiums.399  Any 
civilian who winced at the Taliban’s laws and authority were gruesomely punished in 
public.400  The full force of the concerted instability may have come from Taliban’s 
top ranks: Marjah became so important to Taliban central leadership in Quetta that 
they called for a “jihad” against anyone in Marjah who disobeyed or took up arms 
against violent extremists.401  Effectively violent extremists erased any qawm system 
of governance in Marjah, and surviving traditional block elders stood by silently or 
fled to Helmand’s provincial capital Lashkargah or Pakistan. 
 
It should be noted that during Taliban’s original reign in Afghanistan—to include 
being the main governing body of Helmand and the rest of the country’s south—in the 
1990s there is little evidence that the Taliban had disrupted local governance systems 
in the village to the same degree as 2005-2010.  Marjahns neither spoke about this 
earlier period nor about the initial days that the Taliban entered Marjah in 2005 to 
“protect” citizens from secular drug lords.   Possible reasons for the silence during 
these time periods include initial Taliban respect for the qawm leaders who mostly 
had been proven legendary anti-Soviet mujahidin warriors, who later returned to 
Marjah, many apparently without taking sides during the civil war.  Another 
explanation is that most of the militiamen were young—likely between 19 and 25 
years old, as this researcher observed—unlikely remembering the original Taliban 
regime in Afghanistan.  Yet one more possibility—not necessarily obviating the other 
	   84	  
reasons—was that locals may have colluded with or at least allowed Taliban rule in 
the 1990s and perhaps even at outset of their 2005 resurgence.  It seemed only when 
figures such as Mullah Dadullah Akhund, known as “the Butcher” of Helmand and 
the “Abu Musab al-Zarqawi” of areas like Marjah402 (more details on him and his 
violent cells in the subsequent chapters), along with heightened intensity of Taliban 
repression did the religious and cultural fissures and local hatred grow.  (Such a 
notion points up the possibility that locals may accept demobilized Taliban in the 
future.)    
 
Between 2005 and 2012, Military reports of insurgent numbers varied from 1,000403 
to 20,000 Taliban in Helmand.404  With this number of Taliban—who killed and 
tortured with impunity—the normal way of life was not possible.  Taliban forced 
locals to shave beards, adhere only to the local Taliban commanders on all matter of 
justice and governance.  The Taliban would even come into homes and steal food and 
supplies without asking—sometimes even reportedly disrespecting wives, mothers, 
and daughters.   Compared to the days when block elders protected and cared for their 
qawm and farmers farmed crops locals could eat, the village was far from stable.  This 
phenomenon came across emotionally in the interviews. 
 
The theme of ending fitna was not only an emotional criticism but also turned into a 
call for action.  Beyond this critique, Marjah’s indigenous forces saw themselves as a 
vanguard against an invading army of murderers who want nothing more than fighting 
and death.  According to militiamen’s words, the era of the Taliban was an age of 
fighting and cruelty, and it is they, the militiamen, who alone will bring Marjah and 
Afghanistan out of the age of fighting and cruelty. This almost mythical-sounding 
storyline that the few hundred arbakai of Marjah would singlehandedly end an era of 
fitna appears to be a grandiose and exaggerated call for local security.  The strategic 
story materializes into a measurable and realistic goal: a few hundred arbakai 
members who operate in addition to ISAF and Afghan National Security Forces could 
indeed realistically increase security in these 56 square kilometres of land.   
 
As an answer to this perceived fitna, local fighters spoke about the need to 
autonomously effect security.405  Militiamen appeared not to fight just for the sake of 
fighting.  But instead, paradoxically, they wished to fight in order to put an end to 
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warfare—to stop fitna.  This dedication became clear when they kept peace and 
security in the village neighbourhoods as well as when they conducted operations to 
run down and kill Taliban cells with hunter-killer teams outside the village proper.406  
Not one interviewee considered the arbakai’s aggressive fighting adding to civil war.  
Instead militiamen saw killing Taliban as necessary to safety for civilians:  
 
We do not want fighting.  And all the Taliban want is fighting.  That’s 
all they want.  That’s what they are—conflict.  That is what defines the 
Taliban.  The Taliban are fighting.  The Taliban are conflict.  Don’t 
you understand this?   My wives and girls did not like the Taliban.  The 
Taliban disrespected them and bought dishonour on them, which is the 
same as brining dishonour on my and on my whole community.  They 
took and did what they want with them.  This makes me unhappy.  This 
is very disrespectful—to disrespect the women of my family.  You 
surely understand this.  The Taliban would only bring fighting.  They 
could only mean conflict.  This is what the Taliban are: conflict.  I am 
dedicated to fight and kill the Taliban—all of the Taliban—for my 
entire life or until they are literally completely run out of Afghanistan.  
My children are the same as me.  They will rebel against the Taliban 
until they are entirely gone.  They will fight with dedication, passion, 
and resolve until the Taliban is erased.  Until they are deleted from 
Afghanistan. – (102) 
 
We do not like the Taliban.  They do not allow security and are against 
security, knowledge, and education…Before this arbakai, things were 
no good.  The Taliban were everywhere and destroyed everything for 
me.  They hurt my family and my brother.  They came to my family’s 
compound at night to stay in the wintertime.  More and more people 
joined the ALP so that the Taliban would not be in Marjah.  To drive 
the Taliban from Marjah.  The Taliban came to compounds at night.  
And they forced us to pay them money.  I will fight until there is peace 
in Marjah.  Until peace is in place.  My son will take over the security 
role to secure Marjah. – (57)  
 
 …safety and security is our most immediate goal. – (107)    
 
I will fight until I feel security. – (67)    
 
I will fight until I truly feel freedom and security. – (72)   
 
I fight the Taliban because I want peace.  I want a future of freedom. – 
(77)  
  
We returned to bring security. – (44)    
 
I wanted to figure out how to bring security to my area. – (45)  
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The children want security. – (112)    
 
I do not like fighting.  I do not like war.  But this is necessary because I 
want freedom. – (105)   
 
Many respondents placed special emphasis on eradicating insecurity on behalf of and 
from the entire nation.  The interviewees seem to wish for the end to instability not 
only in the village of Marjah but also for the entire country of Afghanistan—to wish 
for the strategic defeat of all Afghanistan-based Taliban: 
 
Everyone who lives here in Marjah, and all of Helmand hates the 
Taliban.  The Taliban do not want Afghanistan to improve.  The 
Taliban only want war.  They bring only fighting.  They offer nothing 
for us to improve.  We will fight the Taliban for a long, long time.  The 
Taliban have only two options.  Either they can join society, or we will 
kill them all.  My children are all against the Taliban, because my kids 
want peace.  I talk to them every day about the Taliban.  My children 
do not want fighting and seek only peace, education, and schools. – (7)  
 
Because the Taliban know that we have projects and good works they 
are against us.  They are against any of our efforts to improve 
ourselves.  They don’t want construction.  They would not allow 
development of any kind.  They only want destruction and killing.  They 
fight us.  They came and fought where we live.  We did not ask for this.  
They came to us and brought fighting.  I fight because I want security 
and education.  It is that simple.  They see the village is being 
productive.  And they do not like this.  So they bring fighting to our 
homes and to our fields.  And so we are all against their fighting.  We 
cannot allow this.  All the time that the Taliban are here in our country 
I will fight them.  If they are breathing.  If they are operating.  If they 
are physically in Afghanistan, then I will fight them to the death.  This 
is how dedicated I am.  Truthfully.  When they are older, my children, 
they will have education.  They will support and help the government.  
They will support and help the military. – (111)  
 
I think that the people here feel the same as me.  They want a safe and 
secure Afghanistan.  They feel a need—a calling—to serve Afghanistan 
and to keep it safe from the Taliban…And safety and security is our 
immediate goal. – (107)   
 
Such aspirations—bringing security to the area in which they operate—appears a 
practical fulfilment of their grander ideal of ending some sort of nation-wide age of 
fitna.  While Marjah arbakai spoken words are perhaps grandiose, members’ 
ambitions appear feasible.  At least in part, the militia’s dedicated and dangerous 
actions407 appeared to earn greater security.  The regimental commander of southern 
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Afghanistan stated in February 2012 that the Marjah arbakai were the most effective 
counterinsurgency local force in his area of operations of southern Helmand and 
perhaps Afghanistan.408  His predecessor stated that once arbakai stood up significant 
events, such as small arms fires and coordinated attacks by enemies, went from 20-30 
a day to zero or almost zero in southern Marjah proper almost overnight.  Taliban 
attacks appeared to move to outside the town centre.409  Another commander stated 
that he felt “a lot more comfortable walking around here than Baltimore after eight 
o’clock at night.”410   
 
With arbakai patrolling the town and its outskirts,411 local civilians felt safe enough to 
report insurgent movements and locations of mines and improvised explosive devices, 
causing yet more security.   Citizens felt there was ample security to hold shuras with 
the Marines and travel to the district centre for reimbursement for damaged private 
property during initial battles.  Markets opened and regularly sold drinks, snacks, and 
electronics.  Most locals were no longer cowering in fear of Taliban retribution or in 
fear of being caught in the cross fire between insurgents and ISAF.  There was little 
overall fear,  and civilians felt comfortable to have Marine civil affairs teams directly 
approach them.412  Residents appeared to turn back to pre-Taliban type farming and 
were tending to cotton and wheat crops.413  As of November 2010, reportedly 
approximately 300 young persons were attending classes.  Ten-year-old student Zaar 
Waali said, “[n]ow our people have also taken up arms not to let the Taliban prevent 
us from going to school.  I am very happy that I can study now.”414  Also the 
permissible environment reportedly allowed medical personnel to provide services to 
locals such as polio vaccinations.415  Medical worker Haji Mullah stated that he had 
been able to execute a concerted vaccination campaign “without fearing for his 
life.”416    
 
The following interview respondent spoke of this change from instability to a societal 
capacity that allowed the village to operate constructively and independently.  He 
underlined the change from brutality of a perceived alien violent extremist force to a 
current life in which security and stability pervade: 
 
I suffered a lot under Taliban rules.  The Taliban are not well 
educated.  They are in the hands of Pakistan and Iran who pay them.  
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They are cruel and no one will follow until the Taliban spreads terror.  
They used to kill one person to get taxes from everyone—making that 
one person an example.  And this becomes propaganda that spreads 
outward.  They would make an example of one person for the 
community over someone who refuses to grow poppy for or give food 
to the Taliban.  A person who loves the human race feels respect to do 
something for that place.  He will be loyal t that place.  The Taliban 
made people worse than animals.  People were uneducated.  So one 
educated person would come along—if he does something good then 
this is an opportunity.  But the next day the Taliban would kill or 
kidnap this person.   Or he would disappear or flee.  Marjah used to be 
heaven for drug lords, smugglers, killers, kidnappers.  The Taliban’s 
main income was smuggling. Shops used to only sell opium.  Any 
program where guns and bullets are involved needs money.  They 
support themselves with drugs, and use this money to kill families and 
destroy lives.  It is money for destruction.  These days are like eid 
(holiday).  Children can go to school.  You can see it on their faces.  
But it doesn’t quite feel as good as the early days.  After Operation 
Mosharak, all the shops are now busy, and the economy is booming.  
Now there are tractors and motorbikes.  This was impossible before.  
Before there was one guy with a tractor on this piece of land.  Now 
each of his cousins has a tractor. Before you couldn’t walk because of 
the dust.  Now the roads are better.  There are solar powered lights.  
Now the city is calm.  Before an old person would be beaten if the 
Taliban needed to collect food from him.  Now he can walk and drive 
and bike around.  Before the power was not given to the block elders.  
They were the most wanted by the Taliban.  It was a cat and mouse 
game…Islam is a religion of friendship and peace.  It is not a religion 
of killing someone in the middle of the street.  They talk about the 
Prophet, may God keep him.  But Islam is like water.  It can drown you 
or save your life.  If someone is already a bad guy then he will twist the 
truth.  Before a woman could not go to bazaar without a man.  Doesn’t 
matter if she needs medicine.  Now kids are going to school again.  It 
doesn’t matter if people are street vendors, doctors, or professors—
everyone sends their kids to school and share stories with one another 
about their kids in school.  The Taliban captured Marjah in 2009.  And 
Marjah suffered more than the rest of Afghanistan.  So now Marjah 
deserves more good things for itself. – (52) 
 
Supporting this local viewpoint was that of ISAF’s village civilian team of foreign 
diplomats and development professionals.  According to these British and U.S. 
civilians, District Community Council members would cover their faces when 
walking into meetings fearing Taliban identification and retribution in January 2011.  
In sharp contrast, by the summer of that year, councilmen walked to the District 
Governor’s office without hiding—a sign of improved security.  The Marjah District 
Stability team stated on 17 July 2011:417 
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The [District Stability Team’s Rule of Law] advisors recently referred 
to Marjah as "blossoming." 
 
AND WHY – because security allows civil society to function normally 
and GIRoA, supported by the coalition, is acting as gardener 
encouraging cooperation and growth… 
 
Security within Marjah proper has increased markedly and is being 
pushed out to the last remaining areas of enemy influence on the 
periphery. ALP training academies graduating [arbakai] members. 
DCOP's security forces have at least doubled.  
 
There have been remarkable advances on all fronts, but it wasn't six 
months ago that candidates for the DCC covered their faces when they 
entered the District Center, civilians refused to drive to Lashkar Gah, 
bazaars were quiet and Marjah was considered unsafe. The "New 
Marjah" is perceived to be safe, but the catch phrase, "fragile and 
reversible," applies. If security were to deteriorate, then the dramatic, 
remarkable advancements I comment on today would fade as quickly 
as the dream made possible by the Marines.  
 
To this day, villagers continue to support and enjoy the freedom to attend schools, 
repair derelict canals, and visit health clinic that security provides.  Locals 
overwhelming feel that the arbakai are the most effective force to provide this 
security, will continue to provide security after ISAF withdrawal, and encourage the 
government to provide arbakai further resources such as more modern weapons and 
ammunition.  Villagers believe that the arbakai, and not national soldiers and cops, 
foremost bring this freedom of movement and perceived security.418  
 
Another rough indicator of security is ISAF death count.  U.S. Marine Corps 
Regimental Command Team (RCT) 7 (May 2009 – June 2010) suffered 74 deaths, 70 
of whom were U.S. Marines.  RCT-1 (July 2010 – August 2011) suffered 32 dead of 
whom 31 were U.S. Marines, and RCT-5 (September 2011 – September 2012) had 
one death as of 5 December 2011.419  However, such numbers can be somewhat 
deceiving as many Marines and ISAF civilians in and near Marjah lost limbs—a 
possible intentional effect of Taliban anti-personnel improvised explosive 
devices420—to include a number of triple amputees.421  Nevertheless, at best the 
Taliban could launch infrequent fire-and-run attacks as squad elements.422  For 
example, the Taliban boldly laid in two IEDs within two hundred meters of the 
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District Governor’s compound in October 2011 and conducted a failed suicide-
bomber operation against the District Compound in June 2011.423  Even though 
security improved significantly once the arbakai stood up, rare incursions, 
kidnappings, and intimidation continued especially outside of the village proper.424  
Marjah’s militia likely played a role in achieving relative stability, but a lasting low 
threat from Taliban required the civilian volunteers continue to operate. 
 
Yet one more indication of Marjah arbakai actions helping to achieve relative security 
was the reaction from the top Taliban leadership in Quetta, Pakistan over the village’s 
militiamen along with similar uprisings.425  The Taliban have conducted a concerted 
three-pronged strategy.  First, Quetta Shura Taliban attempted to undermine the anti-
Taliban uprisings’ claims of independence with the ultimate goal of lessening popular 
support of such militias in Afghanistan.426   Specifically the Taliban used terms in 
radio and online forums to describe the counter-violent-extremist movements such as 
“government orchestrated,”427  “mercenar[ies] from Kabul,”428 “crusader spies” and 
the “scum of Afghan society.”429  Second, the Taliban has attempted to misinform 
GIRoA and ISAF through pushing rumours that the militias were actually related to 
the insurgency and anti-government in nature—an attempt to give ISAF and GIRoA 
leaders pause over supporting such grassroots movements.430  Third, violent extremist 
have continued a campaign to kill anti-Taliban militia leaders and have even 
published the names of some arbakai leaders in the hopes that disparate Afghan 
insurgent cells would execute said civilian commanders.431  The Quetta Shura call to 
target Marjah’s arbakai became a fatwa.432  Such words and actions are likely 
evidence that the Taliban believe Marjah’s grassroots movement as threatening to 
their intentions to control Afghanistan and reveal the potential potency of the 
movement in Marjah. 
 
In summary, ending fitna was not simply rhetoric but defined the actions and effects 
of arbakai operations.  Although the interviewee’s statements were wrapped in 
hyperbole, the militia lived out their promises at a local level.  Members fought for 
security each day with dedication and resolve.  Arbakai did not rely on outside 
support but fulfilled their vision daily with the tools, weapons, and will they already 
held.  That ISAF and GIRoA forces continue to help with security allows the arbakai 
to operate and track and kill Taliban with greater efficiency and effect.  Unlike the 
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Taliban, ISAF and GIRoA allow the town to seek its own vision for security.  ISAF 
and GIRoA goals and efforts are consonant with those of the arbakai to push out 
Taliban and Taliban influence from the village. 
 
As is the case with autonomous and resilient movements in general,433 the fighters did 
not just seek and achieve an end to fighting in their village.  They also sought 
something more.434  They operated with a view to improve their own destiny.  
Specifically, they wanted to improve the lives of their children and saw education as a 
way to not only allow their children and grandchildren to improve their livelihoods 
but also as a means for the next generations to be able to intellectually challenge the 
Taliban if violent extremists attempted a resurgence.  The fighters were well aware of 
their intellectual limitations—unable to read the Quran or any literature that would 
have allowed them to at least vocally contest the notions of religion that the Taliban 
espoused.  Thus education the second element of local’s definition of enduring 
relative stability.  
4.4 Arbakai Fight for a Stable Future 
 
The majority of militiamen looked beyond the end of fitna and a new era of security 
to a goal of intellectual progress.  Access to schools was the second locally accepted 
definition of stability for Marjah. In the mind of Marjah citizens and guardians, 
education would not only allow children a future of choice and self-determination but 
also an opportunity in which locals would be better able to ideologically stand up to 
outside belief systems.  In the minds of locals, education would undermine the 
Taliban’s ability to convince families to give up those youngest sons for free room, 
board, schooling, and perhaps inevitable extremist indoctrination attempts in 
Balochistan.435  Fighters did not seem to fight for the sake of fighting. The calls of the 
“rhythm of the AK-47” and warrior machismo436 had a clear future goal: education of 
the fighters’ children.  Although wrapped in messianic language, the fighters divulged 
during the interviews practical goals to protect and allow others to build and improve 
schools for their children.  Education appeared a means for future and sustainable 
independence and self-determination at the individual and village level. 
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A common theme of the interview responses was an intention to end an era of alleged 
jahiliyya.437  The term refers to a period of ignorance before the age of Islam.  Some 
medieval and modern scholars and political authors have used the word jahiliyya to 
describe periods in Islamic history when Muslim-majority societies purportedly 
suffered from a lack of understanding of true religious values.  These were supposedly 
times of un-enlightenment.  Such claims—describing modern eras of ignorance—are 
highly subjective and debatable.  Nonetheless, authors have used the idea to illustrate 
years of lack of knowledge and education according to the authors’ particular 
opinions.438  And likewise, any claim in Marjah that Taliban brought a period of 
jahiliyya is subjective.  This study will not make any claim as to any true 
understanding of enlightenment but will only describe the opinions and perceptions of 
those in Marjah. 
 
Over 65 per cent of those militia members interviewed described the Taliban as 
instigating and maintaining an era of ignorance—akin to jahiliyya—with most fearful 
that a return of the Taliban would mean further illiteracy, misunderstandings of Islam, 
and closed schools.  According to respondents, the Taliban—when in power—were a 
hindrance to the wants, needs, goals, and notion of stability according to Marjah 
fighters.  It should be noted that never was there a query about education, but instead 
they volunteered their thoughts on schools: 
 
The Taliban does not allow us to build schools and clinics.  They do 
not allow us to go to school, better ourselves, and receive education 
and enlightenment.  They get in the way of what we want.  We want 
schools, and they not only look down on this but they had gone out of 
their way to stop us from being educated.  They do not even allow the 
young people to be educated. – (1)  
 
[The Taliban] do not let people go to school.  They would today not let 
children go to school and be happy. – (51)  
 
The Taliban do not allow children to go to school. – (78)     
 
Under Taliban governance, there was no school. – (84) 
 
Even those without children decried Taliban’s denial of education to the village of 
Marjah.  For example:  
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They came into our land and broke into our homes and burned down 
schools.  They essentially broke our town.  They came here and 
brought death.  They came here and broke the tings in our town.  They 
did not allow education.  They did not allow teaching or learning.  
They did not allow basic school operations.  [The Marjah arbakai] 
offered me the support I needed—the support I sought—to do what I 
wanted to do.  They were a vehicle for my own ambitions—for my 
personal goals.  The government offers the weapons and ammunition.  
They offer the practical materials that I need to fight off the Taliban.  
They offer the tools for me to do what I need to do. The Taliban 
brought fighting.  And they failed, also, to bring any constructive 
policies.  They did not nor could they build up anything or create any 
type of societal self-sufficiency.  They only break and destroy things.  
And this is very easy for them—to destroy.  And that is what they are—
breakers and destroyers only.  I will fight all the time—for my entire 
life.  I am dedicated for all the years that I live on this earth. I do not 
have children. – (101) 
 
Yet worse than a simple absence of education, in the minds of Marjahns, Pakistan 
schools would influence some parents to allow their children to be educated in 
Pakistan.  Free room, board, and food were promised along with a supposedly 
respectable religious education.  Little did some parents know, initially, that some of 
these schools may attempt to recruit and mobilize these young people into Taliban 
ranks.439  There are even schools in Pakistan that reportedly attempt to turn young 
boys into suicide bombers—schools in which physical hardship such as occasional 
beating and lack of water were mixed with promises of a pleasant afterlife in the 
hopes that the children would be more willing to die for the Taliban cause.  Children 
are most often not taught to even understand the Quran at such institutions but are 
schooled on the premise that Islam is under brutal attack by Western oppressors.440  
Marjah militiamen and civilians wanted schools not only to provide young people 
with opportunities but also to undercut Taliban’s ability to try to recruit children. 
 
As local interviewees decried an education-less period under Taliban rule, they longed 
for a time when education would be a societal priority.  No interviewee—each an 
adult—discussed wanting to go back to school to better himself.  Instead, those with 
whom I spoke wished for their children and the children of neighbours to be able to 
go to school.  The logic, to them, was that they were striving to defeat the Taliban so 
that there would be ample security for their children to be educated in order to rein in 
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a period of relative enlightenment.  Education, to those interviewed, was a means to 
empower children to better be able to seek their own vocational aspirations.   
 
Schools were simultaneously a method to provide the intellectual acumen to check 
future attempts at Taliban ideological influence.  Not only did they want their children 
to lead better lives with an ability to develop society, but respondents also wished for 
their children to be able to fend off Taliban rhetoric.  The feeling was that one of the 
reasons the Taliban was able to come to Marjah and rule so brutally was local 
inability to rhetorically counter Taliban claims to a superior understanding of religion.  
According to locals, education would be one sustainable defence against future 
attempted Taliban influence.441   
 
In summary, to the fighters, offering stability enough for schools would secure a 
future of improved livelihoods, further ability of the young to follow their own goals, 
and inoculation against Taliban sway.  The following is a small sample of responses 
from 60 per cent of interviewees who gave specific future aspirations regarding 
education: 
 
My son goes to school now.  But he will fight the Taliban and help 
against the Taliban in the future.  Today we are teaching the students 
to be educated and they will learn.  And they will learn about the true 
nature of the Taliban.  I became an [arbakai] block elder and leader to 
help my country.  Why should I stay at home?  I appreciate that the 
militias were and are helping.  I am happy to help and enjoy helping.  I 
enjoy killing the Taliban and fighting the Taliban.  My father is a malik 
and was a block elder.  So I have followed in my father’s footsteps.  In 
Marjah, the Taliban caused fighting in the street.  So now I have 30 
men.  Marjah needs [arbakai]. – (54)  
 
[The Taliban] are our enemy.  The Taliban are the enemy of Marjah, 
the enemy of Afghanistan, the enemy of our children, and the enemy of 
our way of life.  That is crystal clear.  They are our enemy so I fight 
them.  So I need to fight them.  It is my duty to fight and kill Taliban to 
allow Afghanistan to become safe and secure.  We all believe what I 
believe.  The rest of the town, the rest of Marjah, is the same as me.  
Actually this is clear.  The children want security.  They all want 
peace.  I am illiterate.  And I don’t want my children to be like me.  
They want education.  They want a good future.  They do not want 
fighting.  So they are against the Taliban and will always oppose the 
Taliban.  They hate and fear the Taliban.  And as long as the Taliban 
will be again children fighting and growing and becoming educated 
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and literate, they will support any movement against the Taliban.  
Until there is a good future.  I will fight everyday for as many years as 
necessary to ensure that we have a good future—safe and secure and 
free of even the slightest presence of Taliban. – (112) 
 
My children feel that education is very important.  They want 
education.  This is very important for them.  They want to go to school 
and earn degrees to work.  They have clear visions for this.  They 
understand what they want from this day forward.  And the Taliban 
would never allow this.  The Taliban would never allow education or 
my kids to go to school, and my children very much understand this 
clearly. – (99)   
 
My children want the schools.  They want education.  And they will 
grow up to help this country.  And the Taliban would and could never 
allow helpful positive education.  The Taliban would and could never 
allow our children to grow up in an education system—to be educated.  
And this is very clear to even the youngest children. – (107)  
 
My child is in school.  Actually he’s in the 3rd grade.  When the 
Taliban came before, he couldn’t go to school.  The children want 
peace.  They want security.  They want to go to school.  They want 
education.  Things the Taliban forbade. – (70) 
 
My son goes to school, and the Taliban would never allow this.  He 
understands this. – (5) 
 
I am uneducated.  And I want my son to be able to do to school. – (51) 
 
 [My children] like education.  They want and seek education.  They 
want a better future, which the Taliban almost by definition would 
stop. – (83)  
 
 …the children need education. – (19) 
 
My children want education. – (65)  
  
[Our children] want good education and a bright future. – (75)  
 
My children like education.  They want to go to school. – (113)   
 
Such narratives often refer to restoring education not only to the children of Marjah 
but also to stopping Taliban’s ability to curb education throughout Afghanistan.  This 
message stream can be described as absolute, resolute, and cosmic—a 400-man 
uneducated militia movement bringing enlightenment to arguably one of the more 
impoverished, illiterate, and uneducated nations in Asia.  In the same stroke, though, 
this story has underpinnings of a very realistic story for the village: the militias 
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provide security.  This security allows contractors to build schools, teachers to walk 
without fear to classrooms, and students to walk to school and learn without fear of 
Taliban retribution.  In addition, local schools provide an opportunity for children 
unable to work in local shops and local farms to avoid the necessity of free education 
just over the border in Pakistan—where locals believe children are brainwashed into 
violent extremist ideology.442  This idea of a need for education gives a down-to-earth 
approach wrapped in a hyperbolized story—practical steps to provide schools in a 
village wrapped in exaggerated language to end an epoch intellectual darkness.   
 
Such sentiment echoed that of the entire village.443  People continue to want more 
schools and more money for teachers through 2013—with a special interest in seeing 
that teachers are able to earn a living wage.  Such popular rhetoric was not without 
resolve.  When there have not been enough schools for the local demand, townspeople 
have gladly turned homes during the day into working classrooms.  Students and 
parents alike did not rely solely on the government of Afghanistan and its Ministry of 
Education but instead relied on themselves to meet the great demand for education.444   
 
There was also local belief that educational centres would be a centrepiece to any 
local reintegration or counter-radicalization campaign.  Local ISAF units, along with 
district government officials, and district community council members who comprised 
the arbakai commanders asked for GIRoA and ISAF reintegration funding in the form 
of schools.445  Whether schools without coherent and tested curricula could 
successfully and sustainably help demobilize or de-radicalize former violent 
extremists is debatable.  The effort to justify school money with a goal to counter 
radicalization was double pronged.  First, community council and ISAF members 
argued that many future reintegrees, who had left the Taliban and wished to integrate 
back into culture, would likely be young school-aged fighters or young insurgency 
supporters or have young children.446  They felt that the 90-day GIRoA-led District 
Reintegration Advisory Team’s curriculum of religious, basic skills, and conflict 
resolution training would be insufficient to prevent former Taliban from re-joining an 
insurrection that funds its fighters.  Reintegrees, especially former child and young 
adult fighters would need more substantive education options to allow anyone a path 
to skills, accreditation, and economic opportunity lest former fighters re-join the 
Taliban.  They argued that any educational program that is open to all residents to 
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include former Taliban would be a platform for former fighters to assimilate as they 
gain the trust of other students—and gain a sense of community and brotherhood 
facing common academic challenges.  Furthermore, former fighters would graduate 
with recognized certificates so as to avoid residents’ perception that the former 
insurgents received special treatment.447   
 
Second, local ISAF officers and community council members felt that schools could 
offer young people a “window into a life that does not involve laying IEDs for cash or 
supporting an irreligious and immoral insurgency.”448  They argued primary education 
would boost the ability of citizens to offer positive change in and for the community 
writ large.  Local officials and ISAF representatives maintained that local schools 
could lessen the Taliban’s recruitment of young people into the free madrassas in 
Balochistan—the understanding being that this is where Taliban radicalize some 
children.449  Whether or not schools could play a role to assimilate former Taliban 
fighters and supporters into Marjah proper, locals’ campaign to justify reintegration 
funding from the Afghan Reintegration Program for schools underlines Marjah 
citizens’ belief in the power of education. 
 
In conclusion, Marjah arbakai and citizens believe in education as a road to future 
self-determination in the face of Taliban onslaught.  They believe schools can give 
their children a future of choice and defence against Taliban rhetoric and classrooms 
can help turn former extremists into constructive and peaceful citizens.  This theme 
materializes everyday as guardians patrol their blocks and hunt down Taliban fighters 
to allow their own children and all young people of the town to attend schools.  
Although the rhetoric is hyperbole—to bring in an era of stability and enlightenment 
for all of Afghanistan—militiamen’s goals are achievable and practical within Marjah 




The hypothesis of stability as a goal proved applicable for Marjah’s arbakai.  Fighters 
interviewed felt insurgents brought chaos and revealed, in words and operations, an 
aspiration to restore a secure environment.  Furthermore, the majority of respondents 
also defined stability as access to education that would in turn strengthen societal 
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capacity enough for the young to follow their own aims with an eye to undermining 
future Taliban influence.  Although the interviewees spoke with an hyperbolic style, 
the guardians acted on these goals with practical resolve through helping to improve 
the security of the village.  Underlying such verbal sentiments and combative actions 
was a sense of self-reliance.  The locals expressed a desire for security and education 
and were then willing to act on their own to this end.  Even the goal of security and 
education appeared a means of empowerment against those that had previously 
caused insecurity and denied access to schools.   
 
Although stability proved to act as a motivation and goal—along with seemingly 
hyperbolic words and a sense of self-reliance—this theme does not preclude other 
drivers and aims of the village’s anti-violent-extremist fighters.  The following 
chapter will explore the hypothesis that fighters, in addition to seeking stability and 
education, also oppose Taliban for ideological reasons potentially strengthening the 
drive for militiamen to fight and die in the name of ending Taliban presence and 
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Chapter 5 
Hypothesis: Opposition to Foreign Ideology Motivates Arbakai 
 
While the goal of peace and stability with the purpose of education was a major 
professed motivation for the rise of Marjah’s arbakai, this finding in no way obviates 
the possibility that other phenomena may have influenced arbakai’s rise and 
determination to kill Taliban and end their threat to Marjah.  It is conceivable that 
multiple rationales may impel a militiaman to continue to show up to work with full 
knowledge that such an action makes him an obvious target to violent extremists.450   
 
This chapter will first describe why opposition to ideology is a valid hypothesis.  
Specifically it will unveil schisms between contemporary violent extremists and 
mainstream Muslims over ideology and the meaning of “jihad,” the potential for an 
ideological and cultural fault line between Marjahns and ideological Taliban, and 
public outcries over radical implementations of ideology.  This chapter looks to 
literature and some reports of splits between civilians and Taliban over both Taliban’s 
beliefs and their willingness to kill in the name of such extremist principles.   
 
The chapter will then describe how such divisions played out in Marjah, where the 
Taliban cells were uniquely ideologically devoted and exceptionally brutal towards 
civilians.  To this violent extremist cruelty from a foreign belief system, most 
militiamen painted the Taliban as religiously, nationally, and morally alien and 
inferior.  Such notions motivated the village’s civilian forces and appeared to 
embolden their resolve.   
 
5.1 Worldwide Opposition to Violent Extremist Ideology 
 
Marjah, comprising Sufi-leading and tribally based citizens, has the potential to 
showcase divisions between civilians and extremists worldwide.  Recent research 
underlines two broad groups who oppose modern violent extremism: conservative 
religious leaders and former violent radical groups.  Both groups focus on 
disagreements over the idea of physical “jihad”—a sanctioned religious struggle or 
war.451  There is anecdotal evidence in the form of military and journalist reporting of 
this debate spilling over into warfare: populations who have not agreed with violent 
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extremists’ interpretations of “jihad” have risen up kinetically against the supposed 
extremist transgressors.452 
 
The theme that violent extremists’ actions are without religious justification is a 
prominent stream in literature on terrorism and radicalization.  Theological exegeses 
reveal no consensus on the meaning of jihad453—the word that Taliban use to describe 
its own actions.  Jihad appears to have a different meaning—some slight—for each 
author, scholar, and violent extremist.   In fact there appears to never have been a 
consensus on jihad in the history of Islam.454  While some liberal-leaning academics 
like Halim Rane claim an absolute conclusion that jihad is defensive and inherently 
peaceful,455 many al-Qa`ida leaders come to an absolute conclusion that jihad is 
inherently offensive, violent, and limitless.456 
 
Conservative religious leaders have been particularly vocal in their opposition to and 
condemnation of violent extremist ideology.  As examples of different interpretations 
of jihad, Saudi Grand Mufti Abdul Aziz Ibn Abdullah and the Imam of the Grand 
Mosque of Mecca have denounced suicide bombings of innocents457 while ninth-
century scholar Muhammad al-Tabari interpreted the many verses on warfare in the 
Quran to mean that killing innocents is at certain times permissible.458  Many 
constructionist Muslim theorists today believe that violent “jihad” is permissible and 
even necessary given the right circumstances to protect the lives and livelihoods of 
innocents. For example scholar Rudolph Peters, finds textual justifications for killing 
innocents.459 In contrast, some violent extremist promoters such as deceased Anwar 
al-Awlaki, deceased Sayyid Qutb, and deceased Muhammad Abd-al-Salam Faraj 
believe that violent jihad is obligatory at all times under any circumstance.460  
Similarly Taliban’s original leadership believed it obligatory to kill civilians in its 
efforts to take over Afghanistan and implement its own version of religious law.461 
 
Top among the rich scholarship of conservative religious opposition to violence are 
studies by Jarret M. Brachman and Peter Mandaville.  Salafism—a name that 
commonly describes conservative Muslims who elect to follow the teachings of the 
Prophet literally without centuries of scholarly interpretations—being inherently a 
potential effective criticism to violent extremism is key amongst Jarret M. 
Brachman’s analyses.  His Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice provides alternative 
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salafi doctrines to those used within violent extremist ranks—religious conservatism 
without violence.  Brachman loosely (and admittedly derisively) categorizes eight 
salafist schools of thought to include “establishment,” “scientific,” and political 
Muslims—all of which fall short of condoning Taliban-type violence.462  
 
Also highlighting the different schools of salafist thought, Peter Mandaville’s Global 
Political Islam concludes that the new “jihadist” schools of thought among salafists 
interpret too liberally from the original salafist thinkers.  Nineteenth century religious 
reformers Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh, and Rashid Rida referred to 
their movement as salafiyya but were politically and socially “progressive.”  Each 
openly discussed modern political norms.463  Their intent, according to Mandaville, 
was simply to give Muslims enough confidence in their religion to go back to the 
original sources themselves.  Abu Ala Mawdudi and Sayyid Qutb (commonly 
understood as ideological forefathers to many modern violent-extremist strands) took 
Rida’s literalist views to inspire their own works to justify violence in the name of 
religion.  They distorted salafiyya, according to Mandaville.  Pure salafism, according 
to Mandaville, does not include an acceptance of violence or adherence to any human 
leader.464 
 
In addition to conservative opposition to violent extremist understandings of religious 
war are former violent extremists who now rescind their previous beliefs.  Along with 
other researchers in the de-radicalization or disengagement field, Omar Ashour holds 
that when someone walks away from violence that person in one way or another 
realizes shortcomings of the terrorist organization’s leadership and ideology.  
Ashour’s The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist 
Movements explains that factors that can lead to effective de-radicalization include 
dialogue with outside religious experts and seemingly spurious changing opinions of 
violent extremist leaders.  From these internal and external conversations come 
resolutions to amend earlier violent views—meaning that the original violent religious 
understanding was inherently wrong.  In short, these former extremists find their 
former extremist leaders as leaders and ideology erred.465  
 
Looking to a specific case study of former violent extremist disappointment Gilles 
Kepel and Mary Habeck analyze one of al-Qa`ida founding officers Abu Musab al-
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Suri’s (born Mustafa Sitt Mariam Nassar) disappointment with al-Qa`ida leadership’s 
direction up to and following 9/11.466  Kepel and Habeck separately analyze al-Suri’s 
massive texts—to include chronicles of his experiences in Afghanistan in the 1980s 
and Algeria in the 1990s and a 2004 1,600-page online book entitled Call to Global 
Islamic Resistance—presenting al-Suri as a dissenting voice against spectacular 
media-ready suicide attacks after supposed failures in Egypt, Bosnia, Algeria, 
Kashmir, and Chechnya.467   
 
In 2007, another forefather of al-Qa`ida published a full book on why violent 
extremism is now irreligious and tactically unsound.  And among the first journalists 
to analyze this godfather of contemporary violent extremism was al-Qa`ida and 
Taliban researcher and reporter Lawrence Wright. He discusses recanted terrorist 
leader, former Egyptian Islamic Jihad theologian, and al-Qa`ida forefather Sayyid 
Imam (a.k.a. Dr. Fadl).  Sayyid Imam’s new limits for jihad include practical, 
theological, and humanitarian parameters.468  Practical arguments include, but are not 
limited to, the requirement for a safe refuge, ample financial resources, identifiable 
enemy, and equal contests (do not enter war with a much stronger enemy).  
Theological and humanitarian requirements include looking after family members 
foremost; the blessing of a respected shaykh or prayer leader to enter jihad or deem 
someone an unbeliever; forbiddance from ever killing civilians, foreigner guests in a 
Muslim country, Muslims abiding by different belief systems, and people because of 
their nationality; and illegality of terrorism.  These notions were late echoed in Sayyid 
Imam’s three books in 2007, 2009, and 2010 and interviews with press.469 
 
Along with Islamic Jihad, Egypt’s Gama’a Islamiyya is also famous for its published 
recantations a decade earlier.  Among the analysts who assessed the volumes of books 
on Gama’a Islamiyya’s renunciation is Rudolph Peters and Diaa Rashwan.  According 
to these experts, Gama`a Islamiyya’s (a violent offshoot of the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood like Sayyid Imam’s Islamic Jihad) Gama`a Islamiyya laid down the 
following parameters for jihad:470 the entire Muslim community must take priority 
over individual organizations, human life is always of paramount importance, fighting 
jihad must be lawful and achievable, Muslims must respect laws protecting non-
Muslim foreigners and other protected persons, Muslims should denounce takfir of a 
regime because an institution should not be put into the category of unbelief, and the 
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Quran forbids collective punishment. The organization’s greatest surrender to the 
Egyptian regime was the consideration of jihad as only a general mobilization of a 
community—consensus represented with leaders—and not an individual or non-
representative organizational act.471  In short, Gama’a Islamiyya could not legally 
declare jihad again and publicly—whether through manipulation, an honest change in 
views, or a mix of both. 
 
5.2 Potential for Clash of Beliefs in Marjah 
 
These condemnations of violent extremist theory underline the possibility of 
opposition to ideology as a driving force behind Marjah guardians.  However, the case 
of Marjah has the potential to reveal a deeper ideological and cultural divide with 
violent extremists.  The original Taliban leaders and their original followers recognize 
no other practice of religion but its own, which holds no place for the mysticism 
practices, shrines, celebrated mujahidin warriors, and egalitarian clans based off 
leadership and not spiritualism.472  The two ways of life are incompatible.  The 
Taliban could never accept southern Afghanistan’s Pashtun reverence for monuments, 
non-religious traditional clan and village governance systems, listening to music on 
the radio, or any practice that the was not part of Taliban’s interpretation of how 
people should live.473   Thus the potential for Marjahns to view the Taliban as an alien 
ideology that conducted brutal and nonsensical (in the eyes of Marjahns) violence and 
to be victim to especially gruesome violence was high.474 
 
The Quetta Shura Taliban’s faith and ideology are unique to any major strand of 
Islam.  In their actions they are akin to regional al-Qa`ida affiliates such as al-Qa`ida 
in Iraq—willing to target Muslim civilians to include women, children, elderly, and 
handicapped.  In their public messages, they sound like they are proudly one front on 
a greater worldwide fight to defend Islam.  However, in their faith, they are like no 
other major political sect, school of faith, or school of law.  The Taliban recognizes no 
other type of Islam but its own religion as valid.475  The Taliban do not even 
recognize other political or fundamentalist streams of Islam.  South Asia’s version of 
Muslim Brotherhood “Jamaat-i-Islami”—even though it shares ant-tribalism stances 
like the Taliban—would find no audience with the Taliban.  Shaikh Syed Abul A'ala 
Mawdudi’s version of Muslim Brothers (founded in 1941, 13 years after Egypt’s 
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original Muslim Brotherhood franchise) was heavily influenced by the works and 
views of Egypt’s Brethren founder Hasan al-Banna.  Al-Banna’s views led to a 
growing Egyptian Brotherhood that, when repressed, grew extremist violent branches 
to include the Egyptian Islamic Jihad whose members later comprised most of al-
Qa`ida’s top leadership save a few such as Saudi-born Usama bin Ladin.  Despite 
similar activities—to include suicide bombings and other spectacular media-ready 
terrorism plots—the Taliban reportedly do not see themselves as an ideological 
branch of bin Ladinism.  Nor does the Taliban feel kinship with the political Islamist 
Jamaat-i-Islami.  The Taliban are the Taliban and not a branch of any other ideology 
even if leaders and members sometimes find cause to side with other violent extremist 
movement.476 
 
The Taliban do not even feel kinship with the spartan Saudi faith, known to 
Westerners as Wahabbism after the founder of that region’s thought process over faith 
and literalist interpretations of the Quran.  Though the Taliban and students of quasi-
Deobandism have some sort of respect for Wahabbism and thus enjoyed overt 
donations from the Kingdom before 11 September 2001, they do not recognize Saudi 
Arabia’s reportedly strict interprations of religion let alone the relatively liberal 
mysticism of Marjah.  Despite locals in Marjah disparaging comments that the 
Taliban are nothing but Wahabbis, the Taliban are not Wahabbis.  They are the 
Taliban only and uniquely.  They hold their own special understanding of the Quran, 
Hadith, religious laws, and history.477 
 
Taliban were even critical of al-Qa`ida.  Original Taliban leader Mullah Omar stated 
in July 2001 that—despite Usama bin Ladin’s numerous fatwas—bin Ladin was not 
credentialed to divvy out any religious edicts.  Bin Ladin had neither the scholarly 
grounding nor the minimum 12 years of Quranic training to qualify to be a mufti, 
according to Omar’s professed standards.478  Mullah Omar tried to curb bin Ladin’s 
activities in the 1990s—placing al-Qa`ida’s leader under house arrest, taking away his 
cell phone, telling him to cease speaking with the media, and forbidding him from 
issuing fatwas.479 
 
On the other hand Mullah Omar saw himself as the only true religious leader of the 
only righteous religious movement.  In 1996 declared himself Amir al-Mu’minin or 
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commander of the faithful—a term many believe to be saved just for the original 
caliphs.  Such a vain and irreligious claim, according to author Richard Bonney, was 
intended to grant Omar some form of absolute political and religious power.  He even 
held the Pashtun’s “robe of Muhammad” for 30 minutes in an attempt to give himself 
divine authority.480  In short, the Taliban saw themselves, and only themselves, as 
leaders and warriors of a true religion that did not allow others. 
 
One way to describe Taliban ideology is as a bent interpretation of the original 
Deobandi movement.  The Deobandis—from the relatively “moderate” Hanafi school 
of law—originally rose up in India as a peaceful and constructive movement with a 
view to unite and reform themselves under the British rule.481   Deobandis aimed to 
revive what they deemed to be progressive religious values and train new generations.  
In 1967 there were over 9,000 Deobandi schools throughout south Asia.  By 1971 
there were 900 madrassas in Pakistan alone, and by 1988 there were around 8,000 
such schools in Pakistan.  Along with these 8,000 schools were an additional 25,000 
informal or unregistered Deobandi schools—most of which comprised religious 
“leaders” with little or no formal education or understanding of the original Deobandi 
ideology.  These teachers, who flourished in rural areas and Afghan refugee camps in 
Pakistan, taught what they belieed were literalist views of the Quran, even though few 
instructors actually studied the Quran critically in their lives.482  When the Taliban 
came into existence in southern Afghanistan in 1994, it was to this mutated quasi-
Deobandi ideology that founders and followers adhered (the year this entity became a 
serious contender in an ongoing civil war between militias that lasted from the fall of 
the communist government until 1998, when the Taliban controlled most of 
Afghanistan but continued to fight the Northern Alliance).483 
 
Those Pakistani schools did more than just supply ideology to the Taliban.  They 
supply the Taliban with fighters, insurgents, and supporting personnel.  They are a 
direct pipeline to the Taliban.  By 1999, at least eight of the top Taliban leadership 
were graduates of the extremist Deobandi school in the Northwest Frontier Province 
Dar-ul-Uloom Haqqani.  It is no coincidence that leaders would come from such a 
school—as this center is the Yale of Deobandi extremism excellence with 400 places 
for typically over 15,000 applications.  One call to the university in 1997 by Mullah 
Omar himself led the key administrator to close down courses with an order for all 
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students to run across the border to directly link up with the Taliban in Afghanistan.  
A year later headmasters of 12 radical Deobandi madrassas in the Northwest Frontier 
Province shut down to send around 8,000 students to join Taliban ranks along with 
Jamiat-ul-Uloomi Islamiyyah—the Harvard of Deobandi extremism—in a Karachi 
suburb giving up 600 precious students.  These schools do not just graduate future 
Taliban, they actively support and man Taliban even when in session.484   
 
This mutated Pakistani Deobandi ideology is antithetical to the Sufi-leaning Hanafi 
thought, mysticism, or tribalism in much of Pashtun southern Afghanistan.485  If 
representatives of this core Taliban belief system were to have led the insurgents’ 
incursion into Marjah, there is great potential for a sharp clash of identities that could 
be cultural, spiritual, moral, and even national in nature.  Moreover core ideological 
Taliban had the potential to be especially cruel in their actions towards those the 
insurgents saw as wayward detractors of a single faith.  The possibility of brutality—
as a materialization of ideological differences—may also, itself, be a motivation for 
Marjah’s arbakai as the next section will describe.  
 
5.3 Contempt Over Violent Extremist Actions 
 
Some literature offers evidence that violent extremists wantonly executing non-
combatants may inspire popular backlash.  This schism over murdered innocents 
points up the possibility that Marjah’s arbakai may have also mobilized over 
seemingly unjust actions derived from a foreign ideology. 
 
While some researchers and journalists believe that anti-Taliban Pakistani lashkars 
form out of self-defence, Mukhtar A. Khan asserts—without survey results or targeted 
interviews with lashkar leaders—that these militias organize and mobilize out of a 
moral drive to rid the surrounding areas of militants who kidnap, kill children, and 
seem to murder indiscriminately.486   Khan’s “The Role of Tribal Lashkars in 
Winning Pakistan’s War on Terror”487 outlines the formation of several anti-Taliban 
lashkars in Pakistan.  According to Khan, the militias grew naturally, independently, 
and indigenously as a result of jirgas’ decisions to check or destroy militant power.  
Each lashkar tribesman travels with his own food, supplies, ammunition, and 
weapon—with no logistical or financial help or incentive from the government.488  
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Khan’s conclusions are not, however, based on any survey and cannot be verified as 
representative of the motives of lashkars, or other militia types such as arbakai, 
leaders and members.   
 
Similar to tribal movements in Pakistan, Iraq saw at least one major counter-extremist 
indigenous movement in 2006 and 2007.  Analysts Bill Roggio and Rega Jabar 
conclude that in addition to ambitions for increased power, the Anbar Awakening in 
Iraq was also sparked by disgust over innocents killed.489  Interviews and written 
reports from commanders, advisors, staff, and intelligence officers who were 
physically present during the uprising verified Roggio and Jabar’s claim.  For 
example, al-Qa`ida killed tribal leaders who may have posed any type of threat, and 
al-Qa`ida openly announced its intent to kill anyone to include women and children 
who appeared to roadblock its vision of an Islamic state in which Muslims are only 
subjugated to a caliph.490  In September 2006, disparate tribal elements of the uprising 
reportedly unified and announced their intentions to media.  Shaykh Abdul Sattar al-
Rishawi and his tribal allies began to form the Anbar Awakening, which was later 
renamed the Iraqi Awakening, in reaction to the widespread violence of al-Qa`ida in 
Iraq.  Sattar worked within the Iraqi and U.S. security sphere and U.S. troops to build 
into Emergency Response Units of 750 tribal volunteers each.  The summer of 2006 
saw an average of 25 attacks per day in the al-Anbar province compared to four per 
day in 2007.  Markets opened, and Hit, Haditha, and Husayba became permissible 
areas for civilians to roam.491  By summer 2007, Anbar’s al-Qa`ida in Iraq was mostly 
either defeated or not active.492  It is likely that proximity to violence and the popular 
revulsion to this violence allowed the tribes to rise up against Anbar’s al-Qa`ida in 
Iraq.   
 
A similar theme to that of Anbar seems to have also run through anti-Taliban 
movements in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.  Unlike this case study of Marjah, 
however, there was no corroborating critical study of these movements and no attempt 
at a rigorous interview scheme to verify the account of local press and U.S. military 
reports and observations.  Nonetheless, there are sufficient third-party observations to 
suggest with some confidence that these other Southwest Asia movements at least 
began at the heels of violent extremist ideology and the inter-personal violence that 
such ideology seemed to have sparked against local civilians.  
	   108	  
 
In each of the following cases there is a denunciation of violent extremist actions.  
The criticism does not appear to derive as some intellectual exercise against an alien 
ideology.  It also does not appear to be enough to simply distrust or dislike the violent 
extremists.  Instead, evidence suggests that persistent wanton violent extremist attacks 
initially propel reactive uprisings. Proximity to gratuitous extremist attacks initially 
sparks some indigenous counter-violent extremist movements.  The following are 
examples. 
 
Andar, 2012:  The Andar District of Ghazni Province reportedly suffered from severe 
Taliban suppression for three years before there was a sufficient security bubble, that 
Coalition Forces and the Afghan National Security Forces provided, to allow locals to 
rise up.493  Harsh treatment included Taliban closing and then banning schools for 
young men494 and executing some tribal elders, helping to trigger this seemingly 
spontaneous call to arms.495  Other examples of oppression included closing of some 
bazaars;496 harsh implementation of religious laws by Ghanzi-located Taliban 
leaders;497 forbidding a local Mullahs to hold appropriate religious burials for those 
the Taliban accused of having worked for GIRoA in any way in addition to the 
accused families and extended families; blocking humanitarian aid; burning 
humanitarian aid that slipped through Taliban blockades; ceasing road construction; 
killing cell phone service from sundown to sunup; and locking down access to the 
central areas of the village to include the district center.498  Andar’s criticisms of 
Taliban were not theoretic but instead informed by day-to-day violence and 
oppression, which personally affected civilians and those that would comprise the 
uprising’s militia. 
 
Underlining a repulsion of the Taliban and their repression may also have been a 
perception that Pakistani Taliban elements and other foreign fighters were 
increasingly taking over in the district.499   And these outsiders were forcing harsher 
laws500 than were customary.501  Such a popular notion is not surprising especially as 
rumors that the Taliban in Pakistan had incarcerated influential Ghazni resident 
Mullah Ismail, who had previously been a respected local commander.  There are also 
reports that the uprising may have begun with local Taliban elements that no longer 
stood with Pakistani leadership—an uprising that began as internal divisions between 
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Taliban elements.502  Unwanted outside influence503 may have been a driver behind 
the Andar awakening in addition to a perception of wanton destruction and 
violence.504  Today locals claim the anti-Taliban resistance targets “…terrorists who 
have closed schools and destroyed clinics, roads, and other public facilities” and 
“…foreigners from Punjab...”505  
 
Bad Pakh, 2012:  In July 2012, an Afghan online news service claimed that locals in 
Laghman Province’s Bad Pakh area killed five members of a supposed Taliban cell 
when that cell was apparently planning attacks.506  Local villages joined this 
movement defeating Taliban elements in the area by August 2012.507  According to an 
American news service, Laghman’s uprising began largely at the heels of the Taliban 
shutting down educational institutions for children.  “They wanted to make our 
children illiterate and miserable,” stated a Laghman district elder Malik Ghulam 
Rusal.508  In addition to fears of illiterate youth, Laghman civilians were also upset 
over heavy-handed suppression from the Taliban.509  Examples were threats to the 
families of young men that joined Afghan Security Forces.510  Apparently fearful of 
innocent Afghan civilian victims of insurgency, the same district elder exclaimed, 
“’We told them that if you want to wage jihad, go and fight the foreigners, not 
ordinary people.”   
 
Yet another driver appears to be that the Taliban in their area were Pakistani led.511  
According to press reports, hatred again Taliban was specifically focused, at times, on 
their alien “extreme” spiritual convictions and harsh enforcement of non-locally 
appropriate rules.512 
 
Dir, Pakistan, 2009:  Visceral humanitarian disgust over mass killing may have been 
a major driver of those in the district of Dir in northern Pakistan. Taliban militants 
reportedly began building up there since 2005.  The commander of these 200-400 
violent extremists was, according to the Pakistani government, linked to al-Qa`ida.513 
 
Only four of 25 villages offered shelter to the militants while village elders tried for 
months in 2009 to persuade—peacefully—the Taliban to abandon the region.  But 
then in June 2009, in an apparent attempt to intimidate and mollify the population, an 
insurgent suicide bomber detonated at a mosque prayer killing at least 30 
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noncombatants.  This attack, instead of pacifying the population, ignited locals to 
build an over 1,000-strong militia to hunt down and kill Taliban and rid the area of 
militants and their influence.  The end result was the Taliban cornered and then 
encircled in a valley and three Taliban commanders dead.514 
 
During this time, reportedly some felt the Taliban irreligious and an enemy of the 
faith.  Said an area man providing medical aid to wounded militia members, “[t]his 
bomb blast proved the last straw.  This made the people violent…We are not quitting 
the area until we destroy them.  We know this is not Islam.  These are criminals.”515 
 
Matta, Pakistan, 2009:  Leadership messaging focused on perceived humanitarian 
crimes at the hand of the Taliban.  Lashkar leaders to include operational commander 
Brigadier General Jamal Abdul Nasir and tribal elders stated to recruits that they had 
lived under oppression for three years.516   Their stories focused on violent extremists’ 
atrocities to include children being killed in front of their parents and training of child 
suicide bombers.  The environment was described as “barbaric.”517   Much of this 
messaging could be rhetorical, but leaders deemed their criticisms important to 
recruiting new fighters.  
 
Taking a more holistic view to these examples of uprisings against Taliban violence—
or violent reactions of victims or persistent wanton interpersonal violence—are a 
number of scholars who have studied entire populations’ disgust and perhaps even 
mobilization at the heels of violent extremist actions.  One of these works is Gilles 
Kepel’s Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam focusing on Egypt and Algeria in the 
1990s.  According to Kepel, the populations simply had enough and stopped 
supporting terrorist groups allowing the governments to conduct wide and harsh 
crackdowns.518  This appears to be a popular notion in contemporary literature but 
offers no evidence that civilians would take up arms against violent extremists 
because of militants’ violence.519  
 
Those that study disengagement and de-radicalization also underline criticisms of 
violent extremists’ wanton murder of innocents.  With case studies, disengagement 
specialists Michael Jacobson and Audrey Kurth Cronin reveal that killing innocents is 
another reason people walk away from terrorism. Michael Jacobson’s “Terrorist 
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Drop-outs: One Way of Promoting a Counter-Narrative” provides two examples of 
terrorists who left organizations because of innocents killed—egregiously hypocritical 
since violent extremists claim to protect innocent Muslims.  Usama bin Ladin’s fourth 
son, after five years in an Afghan training camp left al-Qa`ida after 9/11 believing that 
al-Qa`ida’s tactics verged on insanity because of the killing of so many innocents.  
Likewise, former Indonesian Jama`a Islamiyya leader Nasir Abas apparently left 
primarily because so many innocents were targeted.520  There is, however, no 
independent verification of Abas’ primary motivation.   
 
Along with Jacobson, Cronin maintains that innocent deaths have been one of the 
causes for terrorists to stop.  Her article “How terrorist campaigns end” provides data 
on terrorist movements that have ended.  In her analysis, she states that the Red 
Brigades, Second of June Movement, Weather Underground, Red Army Faction, The 
Order, and the Aryan Resistance Army all stopped due to a lack of generational 
transition.  She also finds that the Real Irish Republican Army, ETA, and 17 
November Revolutionary Organization all ceased due to a loss of public support.  In 
all cases, killing of innocents may have played a key role.521  In Cronin’s How 
Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns, she 
concludes that one primary fissure inside al-Qa`ida is over killing too many 
innocents.522 
 
Buttressing the distress over innocent Muslim deaths as a possible anti-extremist 
motivation is a number of recent polls.  Christian Leuprecht, Todd Hataley, Sophia 
Moskalenko, and Clark McCauley’s “Winning the Battle but Losing the War?  
Narrative and Counter-Narratives Strategy” provides polling data that most Muslims 
are against the killing of innocents, even if the same persons believe that Muslims are 
under attack from the West.  In the aftermath of 9/11, two-thirds of those polled in 
Muslim-majority countries felt that killing civilians was forbidden in Islam.  
Majorities in the survey felt that bombings and assassinations are “not justified at 
all.”523  From this data, the authors hypothesize that one way to keep people from 
supporting terrorisms should underline that attacks on Western or Muslim civilians 
are not legitimate acts of war.524   
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With this vast literature of divisions between populations and violent extremist over 
beliefs and actions, it can be hypothesized that such sentiments could conceivably 
help to mobilize anti-extremist civilian movements.  However, doubts over violent 
extremist ideology and violence does not necessarily translate into motivation for 
civilians to act in all circumstances.  Therefore, this study will now test the hypothesis 
of opposition to beliefs as a driving force in the case of Marjah militiamen’s fight 
against Taliban. 
 
5.4 Opposition to Foreign Ideology Motivates Arbakai 
 
Both opposition to innocent deaths and opposition to Taliban’s belief system were 
common motivators for fighting Taliban.  Within Marjah, Taliban’s religious beliefs, 
governance, and actions were without compromise.  There could be no more ideal of a 
location to test the hypothesis that opposition to ideology and violent actions drive 
grassroots movements than Marjah—the location of locals who followed a 
spiritualism that was the antithesis of Taliban’s ideology.  The full force of the 
interpersonal violence may have come from Taliban’s top ideological ranks. Marjah 
became so important to Taliban central that in February 2011, according to media 
reports, a recording circulated around Taliban-strong-hold Quetta, Pakistan calling for 
a “jihad” against those taking up arms against extremists in Marjah.525  Not only was 
it a poppy centre for a province that provides 70-80 per cent of the world’s opium,526 
but it was also a moral defeat for the Taliban that once squarely held the town.   
 
In Marjah, locals faced some of the most brutal destabilization from the Taliban. 
Some foreign government officials claimed that half were from Pakistani madrassas 
with a regional view.  Other reports claimed that some fighters believed they were 
fighting for al-Qa`ida in order to eventually take over the world.  Some reports even 
claimed that there were many foreign fighters from beyond Pakistan to include 
Arabs.527  
 
Also unique to Afghanistan, Marjah’s residents also faced arguably the Taliban’s 
most violent and ideological lieutenant in history.  Mullah Dadullah Akhund led 
Taliban’s southern offensive with a brutal reputation and with an inclination to 
personally behead people.  “The Butcher,” as locals and the Taliban called him, 
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loudly supported al-Qa`ida and appointed himself as the leader of Taliban’s supposed 
“al-Qa`ida wing.”  He openly called himself the “Abu Musab al-Zarqawi” of 
Afghanistan in reference to the deceased violent leader of al-Qa`ida in Iraq.528  Mullah 
Dadullah’s ideological fervor won him the support and respect of those Taliban 
recruits from the quasi-Deobandi schools ensuring his ranks were overflowing with 
ideological Taliban who would fight ruthlessly and gladly give up their lives.529  
Although British Special Forces killed Mullah Dadullah Akhun in 2007, the Taliban’s 
brutal tactics in Helmand continued with similar ferocity—not seen anywhere else in 
Afghanistan to include the Taliban’s homeland of Kandahar.  The Taliban stole from 
fields and compounds and tortured and killed any local that dared oppose the Taliban 
or dared work with Westerners or the Afghan government.530 
 
Arbakai hatred of Taliban beliefs is not derived just from some theoretical danger of 
Taliban ideology but also from very real intimidation.  Close proximity to violent 
extremists showed arbakai members and leaders and the populace supporting the 
militia what they were fighting for.  They were victims with blood still fresh in the 
sand.  And this victimization helped to propel a deep-seated hatred of the Taliban, 
who the Marjah militia saw as an alien force with an alien ideology and an antithetical 
moral compass. 
 
Proximity to violence may have helped to maintain and deepen the resolve Marjah’s 
indigenous arbakai.  The Taliban fought and killed people in their houses and near 
their compounds.  Taliban would show up unannounced and take food, money, and 
property.  Taliban would lob off the head of the first person who refused to pay taxes 
as an example to others.531  Taliban turned farms to poppy growing machines and 
markets to wide-open morphine/opium/heroin emporiums.532  Suicide bombers533 and 
IED layers have targeted civilians just as they targeted Afghan security forces and 
Americans.534  Anyone who winced at the Taliban’s laws and authority were 
gruesomely punished in public.  The locals felt threatened and felt the materialization 
of this threat—not some theoretical propaganda but brutal daily oppression.535 
 
With increased improvised explosive devices536 and suicide attacks that killed 
soldiers, government workers, and civilians indiscriminately, the Taliban were seen as 
corrupt robbers, criminals, and exploiters.537  Most Helmandis to include Marjahns 
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saw the Taliban as an unwanted foreign presence backed by Pakistani intelligence. 
Radios informed Helmand residents of the Taliban’s nine suicide attacks in 2005, 
almost 100 in 2006, 142 in 2007, and 148 in 2008.  Locals became aware of the 
nationwide road explosives that mostly killed civilians—from 739 in 2006 to 3,200 in 
2008.538  Of all the population centres in rural Afghanistan, Marjah arguably became 
the site of one of the most brutal Taliban efforts to kill and repress all vestiges of 
tribal law, leadership, and governance.  Many of Helmand’s most repressing and 
vicious violent extremists massed into Marjah. 
 
Such actions and stories underlined the sensibility that the Taliban were ideologically 
corrupt—both unspecific and unconditional.  Additionally, militiamen made specific 
claims of Taliban violent aggression and brutality.  Some of those with whom I spoke 
appeared even befuddled about Taliban violence.  One survey respondent laughed at 
Taliban’s idiosyncratic rules to include their punishment of “slapping” when a 
resident’s beard was not within proper Taliban-length regulations.  He exclaimed, “If 
my beard is not big enough then they would come by and slap me.  Just about my 
beard length.  They would come about something so small.  Such a tiny matter.  And 
slap me in public.”  However, most interviewees felt far more deep-seated anger at 
Taliban corruption and brutality: 
 
The Taliban are an atrocity.  They kill innocents.  The Taliban are 
dangerous.  They are a big problem.  The Taliban want to occupy this 
land.  They would bring terrorists like before.  They would be a shelter 
for terrorists.  The Taliban are cruel.  All the people know this.  All 
communities, all Afghans, and those in Marjah and Helmand know 
this.  Unless we can make Taliban like human beings, we will not allow 
them to come here.  We will fight or educate.  But either way we will 
eradicate all the Taliban—clear them from this land…For example, a 
couple days ago the Taliban shot two people—killing one and leaving 
the other injured.  We must remove the Taliban. – (12)        
 
Now I am one of the unit commanders for the arbakai.  The Taliban 
murdered my father.  They murdered my brother.  The Taliban did this 
during Ramadan—a time for holiness and introspection and family.  
This is the lowest of the low.  This is very bad.  They killed my family 
right in the mosque.  Shame.  Shame on them.  I join for the sake of the 
district.  I looked for a better way to fight the Taliban.  And the 
[arbakai is] a better way.  They are like me and give me the support I 
need to fight the Taliban.  I do not like fighting.  I do not like war.  But 
this is necessary because I want freedom.  I seek freedom.  My children 
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think like me now.  My brother and father were killed.  And they know 
this.  They will want to enter the [arbakai].  They want a better life. – 
(105) 
 
The Taliban are not educated.  They have no understanding of 
anything intellectual nor have they attended any accredited schools or 
universities.  The Taliban is the enemy of all of Afghanistan.  The 
entire land.  I am the enemy of all Taliban.  I am the enemy of each of 
them.  The Taliban put a roadside bomb in my community mosque and 
also in my compound.  The Taliban have also worn clothes of a soldier 
to trick us and not let us know his true identity.  The Taliban soldier 
tricks us to kill innocents.  To kill us when we have not done anything. 
– (1)  
 
These sample testimonies were far from rare.  The following shorter interview 
excerpts serve to underline the disgust locals had for the Taliban—growing out of 
personal experience vice hypothetical or philosophical opposition to violent 
extremism:  
 
I oppose the Taliban because the Taliban are cruel with people.  They 
kill some civilians, and that is why I have a conflict with them.  The 
Taliban do not allow schools and offer no services in Afghanistan.  
They are against all people.  They put IEDs in the roads.  This is why 
we fight and kill them…The Taliban are crazy. – (17)  
 
When [the Taliban] came I only saw fighting in the village.  I only saw 
civilians getting killed.  The Taliban put mines in the road.  They 
exploded people and killed them.  They injured civilians.  The Taliban 
came into my home. – (80)    
 
The Taliban are cruel.  They kill everyone that works for the 
government…The Taliban killed my family.  They killed them with 
undue cruelty.  The Taliban are so cruel and don’t even know the 
people that they kill. – (81)   
 
The Taliban came into my homes.  Men came right besides my home 
and brought fighting.  They kill our children.  They burned down our 
children’s schools.  They did not bring any good policies. – (76)  
 
When I want something like a school or a bridge, they destroy it. – (38)  
 
The Taliban came right into our very houses and took what they 
wanted.  They invaded our homes.  They invaded our town and brought 
nothing but fighting and destruction. – (108)  
 
 The Taliban killed my uncle and cousin. – (58)    
 
[The Taliban] killed my son with 200 bullets into his body. – (7)    
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The Taliban killed my brother.  My brother was young.  He was 
innocent. – (71)    
 
They beat me and shot me twice in the leg (the interviewee showed me 
two healed bullet wounds on his left calf).  They came into my 
compound and destroyed it.  The Taliban do not want security. – (50)  
  
The Taliban shot me with a PKR round.  When the Taliban came 
before, they lived in my block.  They cut the heads of my friends…They 
came into my home. – (80)   
 
Their bad actions include cutting off the heads of civilians.” – (84)    
 
Morally, spiritually, and nationally, the arbakai painted their enemy as distinctly 
different.  Although the question of the Taliban’s nationality was never posed, of 113 
respondents, 51 elected to provide their opinions of the Taliban’s national identity.  
All 51 painted the Taliban as foreigners with foreign belief systems.  Many referred to 
more than one nationality, noting that more than one non-Afghan entity influenced 
Taliban ideology and actions.  Of those that volunteered their opinions of the Taliban, 
the following was the breakdown of interview participants regarding nationality:  
 
• 98 per cent referred to Taliban as Pakistani or with heavy Pakistani influence 
or education—jibing with other reports on population perspectives.539  The 
view of Pakistan was especially negative.  Villagers seemingly unanimously 
felt that Pakistan harbours terrorists, are behind Afghan instability, and are the 
enemy of the Afghan government and Afghan citizens.  There is a deep 
distrust of Pakistanis, the Pakistani government, Pakistani intelligence, and the 
Pakistani military.  Villagers felt that Pakistan is behind the local Taliban 
elements that previously brutalized the village of Marjah and continue to 
attempt to make Marjah a less secure place.  Calling someone a Pakistani or 
mentioning that Pakistan has influenced someone is considered deeply 
insulting.540 
• 29 per cent Iran 
• 14 per cent Saudi Arabia 
• 4 per cent Arab nations in general 
 
Those who elected to speak about the perceived nationality of Taliban saw varied 
foreign influences.  Nonetheless, the overriding perception was that Taliban were 
Pakistani or at least derived from Pakistani ideology or influence.  Often Afghan 
citizens felt that these outsiders had designs on their independence and would bring 
unwanted policies, ideologies, and instability.541  The following are a small sample of 
arbakai verbal narratives on the foreign nature of Taliban: 
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Most of the Taliban are foreign from Pakistan.   They do not want 
security in the village.  They come into our compounds in Afghanistan.  
When I want something like a school or a bridge, they destroy it.  
Pakistan does not want security in Afghanistan.  Pakistan wants 
Afghanistan backwards…IEDs are made in Iran and Pakistan.  They 
put them under the bridges….Most of Taliban are from Pakistan and 
Iran.  Now they are pussies and can’t do anything….I will fight the 
Taliban for ten years…I will defeat them in ten years..I ask why.  Why 
the Pakistanis, ISI, and CIA comes after us.  The United States killed 
Usama bin Ladin, but the United States does not want to fight 
Pakistan….I don’t know exactly what the religion is.  There are the 
wahabi salafi influences from Pakistan, and the Akhunda (likely 
referring to Bahai’I faith of a low-ranking clergyman, normally a 
derogatory term) influence from Iran. – (38)  
 
The Taliban get their support from Pakistan.  We do not want Pakistan 
influence or Pakistan in here.  Pakistan does not want Afghanistan to 
improve.  They do not want to allow enlightenment, education, or any 
type of development.  They do not want anything positive for us.  So the 
Taliban are our enemy.  And we will fight this enemy. – (87)  
 
We must clear out the enemy because the Taliban are not from 
Afghanistan.  They are from Pakistan.  In the past, Ahmad Shah 
Masood fought against the Taliban and the tribes.  Now the Taliban 
belongs to Arab countries and Pakistan.  We are uneducated, and the 
Taliban made us drug dealers.  So we wanted to form a militia.  The 
Taliban do not want security.  We must push them back to Pakistan.  
We need security in all of Afghanistan and Helmand.  I will fight the 
Taliban until they are completely finished.  If you ask my son, he will 
say that the Taliban are our enemy.  The big enemy.  People were 
uneducated.  There are three types of Taliban.  First are the Sunnis in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan.  Then there are the wahabbi.  Then there 
are the Mahdi-an from being trained in Pakistan. – (43)  
 
The Taliban kills people.  They mess with all the people and create 
problems in the community.  They come from Pakistan.  Pakistan 
policy is not good in Afghanistan.  Every time the Pakistanis fight and 
create problems in Afghanistan.  They are not good for this country.  
The Taliban are supported by Pakistan.  Pakistan sends in the IEDs 
and ammunition.  The Taliban are uneducated.  Pakistan trains 
Afghans and has used them to put IEDs in the road.  The religious 
schools in Pakistan train kids to commit suicide.  The all have come 
from Pakistan.  All of Marjah hates the Taliban.  The Taliban does not 
belong.  They say we are spying for the government.  All of Marjah 
does not want them.  They are not good.  The decapitate people.  They 
are cruel.  They are especially against all Afghan peoples.  The 
majority of Taliban came in on motorcycles so now all the people are 
scared of motorcycles.  They are cruel, decapitate people, and tax 
locals.  All of Marjah residents hate the Taliban.  We will fight until 
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the Taliban are removed.  The Taliban come from Pakistan and Iran.  
(Yelling) WE SHOULD ERADICATE THE TALIBAN.  Their source is 
in Iran and Pakistan. – (22)  
 
Everyone of them came from Pakistan to Afghanistan to fight with the 
government.  They come from Pakistan….If the Taliban join us, then 
no problem.  If they do not join us that we fight them….Our children 
do not want fighting.  They do not want killing.  They do not want 
conflict.  They want peace.  The Taliban say “we are Muslims.”  But 
their action is not the action of Muslims.  They came from Iran and 
Pakistan to only fight.  They say they are Muslims.  But they are only 
Muslims in appearance. – (21)  
 
The Taliban are Muslim.  But I don’t know what’s what about religion.  
The Taliban’s religion is the Quran.  They say they believe in the 
Quran.  But they are taught in Pakistan and are from Pakistan. – (50)  
 
I will always oppose the Taliban because they come from Pakistan. - 
(5)  
 
There appears a deeply ingrained historical distrust over Pakistan and Pakistani 
influences among Pashtuns in southern Afghanistan to include those in Marjah.542  
With a history ripe with opposition to outside empires, it is of little surprise that 
Afghans felt distrust towards the country of Pakistan when the British created it in 
1947.  Negative perceptions of Afghanistan’s new neighbour metastasized after the 
Soviets withdrew.543  Pakistan armed certain militias and eventually supported the 
Taliban takeover and then Taliban government in the 1990s.544  The history of 
meddling in Afghan affairs likely adds to the antipathy Marjhans have towards a 
seemingly Pakistani enemy. 
 
In addition to a divide over nationality, there also appeared a schism over religion 
specifically.  Most, but not all, arbakai interviewed felt that Taliban held to a separate 
religion.  Out of the 113 interviewed, only two did not respond to the question of 
whether Taliban were Muslim.  Out of the 111 responses, just over 17 per cent 
perceived the Taliban as “non-wayward Muslims.” 
 
• 42.3 per cent answered that Taliban were not Muslims at all—7 per cent of 
these respondents said that the Taliban were not human beings 
• 25 per cent the Taliban came from another sect of Islam—different than what 
is practiced in Afghanistan. 
• 15.4 per cent the Taliban comprise wayward perverted Muslims 
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• 17.3 per cent the Taliban are Muslims, without equivocation  
 
The following highlights the notions that arbakai despised the spiritual nature of its 
Taliban enemies: 
 
The Taliban are not Muslims.  They are terrorists.  The Taliban 
defame Islam.  They are against Islam.  Islam is a good religion.  Islam 
knows good.  Islam wants peace—as most people in Marjah want 
peace and are good Muslims. – (8)  
 
The reason is that Islam does not allow Muslims to kill innocents.  And 
the Taliban kills Muslims and everyone.  Everyone is innocent.  
Everyone is neutral.  No matter your religion.  And Islam does not 
allow killing—especially killing of innocents. – (9)  
 
There is a large distrust of the Taliban.  There are some Taliban left 
but not many here.  Last week Taliban wanted to plant a mine.  When 
they were working on it they killed themselves.  So there is some 
Taliban left….I will fight as long as necessary to keep the safety of my 
family…Our children do not like the Taliban because I am militia.  I 
also teach them that the Taliban is the enemy.  They fear the Taliban 
because the Taliban has killed students.  The Taliban says that they are 
Muslims.  I think that mostly they are not from our religion.  They 
came to our village and ate our food.  The people were not happy.  The 
Taliban is incorrect and not from our religion.  They consider the 
people of Afghanistan enemies. – (30)  
 
Muslims do good deed.  They want people to be better. Islam improves 
life.  We are good Muslims here.  But the Taliban do bad deeds and so 
they are bad Muslims.  They are educated from the other side of the 
Pakistani border—in Pakistan.  The neighbour countries are similar to 
the Taliban.  They are all the enemy of Afghanistan.  Our neighbours 
provide various forms of support for the Taliban.  Specifically it is Iran 
and Pakistan.  They all do not want us to improve.  They are all 
against us.  They all want fighting.  They are our enemy—Iran, 
Pakistan, and the Taliban.  – (77)  
 
The Taliban say they are Muslims, but Muslims don’t act the way the 
Taliban do.  They don’t know Islam.  They don’t understand Islam.  
The Taliban are crazy. – (17)  
 
They do not pray, and they do not know about God.  They are 
Wahabbi.  I don’t know much about this.  Their beliefs are from 
Pakistan and Iran. – (39) 
 
Their religion is Islam, but they do not act like Muslims. – (42)  
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Most of the Taliban say that their religion is Muhammadin.  But they 
are not Muhammadin.  They kill locals.  In Islam, in the Quran, it says 
not to kill and fight. – (45) 
 
The Taliban use the Quran.  And I use the Quran.  I do.  I pray five 
times a day.  The Taliban pray five times a day.  But they also belong 
to Pakistan.  They get support from Pakistan.  They are a Pakistani 
sect. – (102)  
 
These ideas that the Taliban derive from a foreign belief system or at least mutate the 
religion which locals follow serve to exacerbate any divide between locals and the 
Taliban.  Just as with the void over nationality, the religious differences underline an 
adversarial feeling that outsiders are not guests but instead invaders with a view to 
subjugate locals.545  The division is not an intellectual one but a source of fear over 
the identity of an alien people that have plans to rule and change the local way of life. 
 
From a moral perspective, 55 per cent of those with whom I spoke amongst the 
Marjah arbakai members responded voluntarily, without any prompting, that the 
Taliban egregiously kills innocent defenceless civilians jibing with other reporting of 
local popular perspectives.546  Quotations in the previous chapter on Taliban bringing 
instability referred to the deadly and destructive nature of violent extremists and can 
be summed up from one respondent (39), who mentioned, as if in passing, he “saw 
one Talib behead 20 people.”  Again, these were not intellectual notions but instead 
often emotional outpourings of disgust over unjust actions.  Some interviewees spoke 
about Taliban’s murdering as symptom of a foreign nationality or religion, and others 
provided statements focused mostly on Taliban actions.  Either way, Marjah 
guardians felt that the Taliban were morally inferior to the citizens of their village.   
 
In summary, locals felt a moral, spiritual, and national distance to the Taliban no 
matter how much an outside analyst might argue with the absolute truth of such 
notions.  There is some evidence that, though there are many foreign fighters among 
Helmand’s Taliban, Afghans comprise much of the Taliban.547  Furthermore, some 
researchers maintain that many violent extremist recruits do not share the same 
spiritualism or ideology as Taliban.548  Finally, one could make the argument that 
Marjah’s militia can also act quite violently towards the Taliban549 making local 
notions of perceived moral superiority seem subjective.  Nonetheless, the interviewees 
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in this study, which looks to the perspectives and motivations of an anti-extremist 
group, hold a consistent belief over an ethical, religious, and national schism, giving 
rise to an “us versus them” mindset.  Such divisiveness appears to be a manifestation 
of the earlier hypothesis in this chapter that cultural differences between Pakistan-
based ideological Taliban and Marjahns could cause strife. 
 
5.5 Religious Differences Exacerbate Tensions 
 
As hypothesized, the Taliban were likely particularly brutal towards locals due to an 
incompatibility of spiritual beliefs.  Illiterate mystical Marjahns became the victims of 
a brutally ideological Taliban.  Locals have believed that Taliban ideological 
insurgents have intended to silence the voices and beliefs of local religion.550  
Marjah’s religion and the Taliban’s understanding of faith are incompatible.  The 
Taliban viewed those in Marjah as barbaric detractors of the true faith and may thus 
have repressed the locals with a visceral disgust.551  Taliban seek to get rid of any 
presence they see as foreign—even if ironically many of the Taliban are foreigners or 
at least follow foreign ideology in the eyes of locals—and then create a state 
according to their own violent extremist laws.  The Taliban have no patience and no 
room for any rural governance systems.  In fact, the very idea that a community could 
have elders that are not religious leaders is a threat to the very identity of Taliban.552   
 
Such a faith holds zero room for tolerance, debate, or anything that might appear on 
the surface to be against the oneness of God.  Idols, mysticism, gravesites, shrines, 
elevated mujahidin warrior charismatics, tribal elders, and tribal land owners hold no 
place in the Taliban’s envisioned new world order of adherence to Taliban’s view 
above all else.553  In the eyes of the Taliban, Marjah and surrounding areas along the 
Helmand River are “victim” of millennia of tribalism, feudalism, sufism, mysticism, 
and idolatry.  Marjahns pray to the moon to ward away evil spirits, travel to broken 
shrines for good luck, are unable to read Pashtun let alone classical Arabic, and are 
historically devoid of learned mullahs.  Furthermore Marjah’s Hanafi Sufism and 
ignorance has no Catholic-like religious structure to articulate singular or consistent 
views to answer to Taliban ideology.554    
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The centrality of shrines to Marjah citizens’ faith most pointedly illustrates locals’ 
spirituality in practice, and such a practice is a complete abomination to Taliban.  47 
kilometers directly south of Marjah, along the Helmand River Valley, lies the Safaar 
shrine—to which Marjah citizens travel to pray and ask for health and prosperity 
specifically.  The village elder there provided to a research team his oral history of the 
shrine—with some differences from historical accounts.  According to the elder Haji 
Sharapedin, locals built the shrine approximately 600 years ago as a grave site for 
Sheikh Hasan, someone who claimed to be in the line of descent from the Prophet 
Muhammad.  Sharapedin claimed to know the names, but not accomplishments, of 
some of Sheikh Hasan’s ancestors.  His account of the earliest known predecessor was 
Sheikh Abdul Qadir Gilani who Sharapedin claimed had a shrine in Baghdad.  The 
line of succession then moved to the Indian subcontinent, leaving two more shrines as 
the family moved northward in what is today southern Helmand province.  When 
locals built a shrine around the gravesite in the 18th century, the locals charged a 
person as “keeper of the shrine” to resurface and keep up the shrine annually—
underlining the importance of this site to southern Helmandi culture.  The shrine 
architects are buried in a smaller shrine 100 meters south of the Safar shrine further 
magnifying what the Taliban must have thought was a repulsive practice.  In the mid 
1970s the shrine was so aged and cracked that locals all decided to demolish the 
original building to build a new one.  The Soviets reportedly observed locals using 
this shrine for spiritual reasons and, thinking it was a mujahidin spiritual site, 
reportedly destroyed it.  When the Soviets left, locals expressed keen interest in 
rebuilding the shrine yet again.555  This shrine alone highlights the high level of 
importance a physical shrine has to southern Helmandis—a practice detestable to 
violent extremists who regularly level shrines as a priority order of business.556   
 
Yet another example of a manifestation of Marjah’s sufi beliefs lies 19 kilometers 
south of town along the Helmand River.  There lies the Amir Agha Shrine built in 671 
AD according to local oral tradition—a location to which Marjahns travel to pray.  
The shrine is dedicated to Amir Biland Swaheb who was the son of legendary and 
almost mythical half paternal uncle of the Prophet Muhammad.557   
 
In the spring of 2011, Marjah elders joined other Helmandi tribal and government 
leaders on the “Voices or Religious Tolerance” (VORT) trip to Jordan sponsored by 
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the U.S. Marine Corps Regimental Combat Team-1 of Task Force Leatherneck, U.S. 
Department of State embassies of Kabul and Amman, Jordanian Armed Forces of the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and nonprofit East-West Center for Human Resources 
Development in Jordan. 558  Those Marjah block elders traveling to Jordan explained 
that their most important experiences were visiting shrines to include the gravesites of 
the Prophet Muhammad’s Companions killed during the Battle of Muta’, the 
gravesites of seven Byzantine princes, and the final resting place of one of 
Muhammad’s companions Abu Ubaidah.559  Such praise towards tombs—no matter 
how important to Islamic history—is unholy according to the Taliban.560 
 
It is conceivable that the Taliban, who regularly are known to destroy shrines and 
convert mystics at gunpoint, considered Marjahns backwards and ignorant of religion.  
And such a notion could easily have led the Taliban to particular cruelty and hatred of 
the locals.  At the very least, the Marjah’s rampant illiteracy allowed the Taliban to 
feel intellectually superior to Marjahns and feel especially empowered to shell out 
punishments.  2007-2009 was an age of complete subjugation.  Virtually every single 
respondent who spoke about the period between 2005 and 2009 during my interviews 
described a period of execution, persecution, and a slave-like state.  Therefore, it is 
not surprising then that Marjahns—at the first possible instance—would want to raise 
an indigenous militia to help defeat and keep out the Taliban.  
 
Beyond respect and prayers for shrines, the warrior nature of Marjahns appeared 
perhaps to even rival or prevail above their religious identity.  During the interviews, 
for example, religious language took a back seat to warrior language.  Only a few 
interview respondents voluntarily used any religious language such as “God,” “the 
Prophet,” “Islam,” or “the Quran.”  Their views actually paralleled those of two 
military officers on the Jordanian trip some Marjah leaders attended and not the 
Jordanian religious leaders.  These two Jordanian speakers may simply share similar 
views to like-minded troops who fight an enemy that uses similar tactics.561  Or the 
speakers may have reinforced and strengthened Marjah arbakai’s messianic and 
united views over extremism, after Marjah elders returned to discuss their trip.562  
Either way, the striking similarity points up a warrior nature that is antithetical to 
Taliban belief systems that put spirituality and the oneness of God above everything 
to include martial bravado. 
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Specifically, Colonel Dr. Majed Darawsheh of Jordan’s Ifta’ Ministry563 spoke 
emphatically that killers, like al-Qa`ida or the Taliban, create disorder and damage all 
mankind.564  He exclaimed that the most important goal is to achieve secure 
autonomously and by whatever means.  Like Marjah arbakai, Colonel Darawsheh 
claimed that violent extremists brought wide fitna and that security is an admirable 
goal.565 Jordanian Colonel Ared Al-Zabin, who had served in Afghanistan’s restive 
Logar Province,566 stated to the Marjah leaders on that trip that the Taliban warp 
religion for their own personal objectives.  Then he emphasized Taliban’s efforts to 
block education, and the strong desire and need for Afghan children to attend school.  
He was effectively echoing arbakai messages of Taliban’s irreligiousness and the 
need for enlightenment as a goal (covered in a later chapter).567  On the other hand, 
the other speakers, such as a revered university professor and Mufti, spoke of violent 
extremism damaging Islam writ large.568  But none of these religious leaders and 
religious scholars’ messages appeared to echo in the mouths of Marjah’s guardians.569  
Instead, it appeared that the military officers offered the most penetrating speeches or 
at least speeches that happened to parallel those beliefs in Marjah.  These consonant 
beliefs perhaps underline a warrior ethos in Marjah that may have made locals seem 




Marjahns’ dedication to a non-Taliban approach to spiritualism—to include a warrior 
core and a respect for shrines—may very well have driven the Taliban to unusually 
brutal tactics against villagers.  Local civilians and militiamen showed no intention to 
alter or amend their belief system, practices, and warrior nature.  It is thus 
unsurprising that arbakai overwhelmingly created a distance between themselves and 
the Taliban.  There appeared a genuine disdain for Taliban amongst village volunteer 
fighters and civilians alike.  Locals celebrate at the capture and death of Taliban, no 
matter how brutal.570   
 
This criticism of Taliban identity may have served more than a motivation to fight 
Taliban cells.  This level of criticism may have also helped arbakai to target and kill 
Taliban fighters.  This national, spiritual, and moral distance could help militiamen 
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continue its brutal attacks against their enemy.  In the narrow streets of Marjah and 
even in the small surrounding desert settlements, there is little distance to the enemy.  
There is no opportunity for a Marjah guardian to kill Taliban militant 1,000 yards 
away with a sniper weapon.  There is no opportunity for a militiaman to drop an aerial 
bomb from a mile in the sky.  The killing is close.  It is intimate.  And it is against 
people that are also Pashtun.  It is against people that also call themselves Muslims.  It 
is against mostly Afghans, even if the arbakai consider them Pakistani or Pakistan 
influenced.  The killing is mechanically, geographically, ethnically, and religiously 
close.   
 
Although there is little physical distance, such as a bombardier has when dropping 
munitions on a population above cloud cover,571 the cultural, moral, and social 
distances may allow arbakai and “emotional hooding” to kill with greater ease.  
Arbakai’s criticisms of violent extremists may help to dehumanize somewhat the 
Taliban and overcome somewhat resistance to killing.572  Ultimately the victims—
through desensitization—may become subhuman in the eyes of Marjah guardians.573  
Criticisms of Taliban may help propel arbakai to continue push out Taliban incursions 
and influence for a self-determined future.    
 
Marjah arbakai’s repulsion of not only the Taliban members but also their perceived 
nationality, immorality, and antagonistic spiritualism is not necessarily a symptom of 
general insularity.  The arbakai still work with ISAF and GIRoA officials—these 
officials allowing Marjah fighters and villages to define their own future free of any 
unwanted outside influence or incursion.  Arbakai violence against the Taliban did not 
outwardly appear as retribution.  Instead, militiamen spoke only of wanting peace and 
security and ending a period of fitna and ignorance. Ultimately the movement was 
foremost one of a positive push towards producing stability by themselves as opposed 
to a negative campaign just to erase Taliban.  Nevertheless rejection of Taliban 
identity, faith, and actions may have played a role in arbakai guardians rising and 
deepening resolve.  With the Taliban’s religious justification to oppose and ultimately 
end clan structures and tribalism, the following chapter will look to the possibility that 
tribal identity may have also been a driving factor behind ant-extremist movement 
actions. 
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Chapter 6 
Hypothesis: Marjah Arbakai Fight to Protect Tribalism 
 
The previous chapter argued that a cultural schism between the Taliban and Marjah 
citizens may have helped to cause or at the very least exacerbated the willingness of 
militiamen to rise and fight.  Central to this division could be the essential nature of 
Marjah’s identity, which appears from history to be the geographic clans dictated by 
the canal system.  This chapter will investigate whether tribalism—either bloodline or 
geographically based as is common in southern Afghanistan—may have acted as a 
motivation or goal of the arbakai. 
 
First, this chapter will discuss, as a hypothesis, violent extremists’ threat to traditional 
local power in literature and recent history.  Then it will analyse military doctrine that 
bases itself off the assumption that indeed tribalism is a motivation for anti-Taliban 
civilian movements—pointing up the cogency of clan-ism as a driving narrative of 
Marjah’s arabakai.  Finally, the chapter will test this hypothesis for Marjah: whether 
protection of local identity drove arbakai to fight local violent extremists.  The data 
finds that tribalism—in the form of hereditary clan or geographic mini-community—
was not an explicit motivation or aim.  Instead, of those fighters that chose to speak 
about identity, nationalism was the prevailing sentiment.  However, the terrestrial 
clans or qawm systems, resilient after 30 years of warfare and disruption, were the 
viable vehicle by which locals rose.  Nationalism was a rallying cry and motivation--
answering the question “why” many fight—but clans were the means answering the 
“how” locals rose and warred with Taliban.  
 
6.1 Violent Extremists Target Tribes and Tribalism 
 
Worldwide violent extremist counter-tribal policies point up the possibility that 
Marjah’s militiamen may have seen protection of tribes as a main motivator.  The 
media is ripe with reports of violent extremists executing tribal leaders in southern 
Somalia, Afghanistan, western Pakistan, Yemen, and the Sahel.  Even though one of 
the Taliban’s574 and similar violent extremist tactics is to marry into tribes, speak in 
tribal language, and build strong rapport with clan leadership to initially integrate into 
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an area, they have historically eventually turned on local traditional tribal and 
territorial governance systems possibly viewing tribal law and leaders as a threat. 
 
Once some violent extremists integrate into a local tribal system,575 the tribes then 
offer layers of defence against governments and foreign counterterrorism efforts. 
Violent extremists then often turn on local clan leaders eventually if 1) those leaders 
are against violent extremists to begin with, 2) they pose a possible power struggle 
with violent extremists, 3) they work with an anti-violent-extremist government,576 4) 
or they do not disband in the long term and fail to abide by a violent extremist group’s 
idea of religious law and structure.577 
 
In Iraq, for example, the Anbar awakening was based on tribal defence in addition to 
the movement’s visceral reaction to wanton al-Qa`ida-in-Iraq’s violent.578  Al-Qa`ida 
saw tribalism as antithetical to its vision of a caliphate and would attempt to kill each 
and every tribal elder who appeared to not fully support al-Qa’ida militant leaders and 
their vision.579  Al-Qa`ida posed a threat to the very identity of tribalism in Iraq’s 
western desert.  Examples include violent extremists’ attempts to curb tribal laws and 
economic means.  Militants forbade or became obstacles to traditional inter-tribal 
trading, tribal interpretations of religion, and listening to music and women sitting in 
chairs allowable by tribes but forbidden by extremists.580  Furthermore, local tribal 
leaders saw suicide bombings as an abomination to local tribe’s morality and 
spirituality.  Although al-Qa`ida comprised mostly nationals, many of the suicide 
bombers and the most violent offenders were reportedly foreigners creating a deep “us 
versus them” or “al-Qa`ida versus tribes.”581  In the case of the Anbar Awakening, 
Iraqi tribes saw violent extremists’ assaults on the tribal identity as a blood feud.  
When an Iraqi tribe holds a blood feud against violent extremists or any organization, 
that blood feud may cut across religious or ideological lines.  In the case of some of 
Anbar tribes, such a feud could reportedly last up to six generations or more.  Tribal 
leaders explicitly communicated the endurance of this cultural phenomenon to 
Coalition Forces as these traditional clans effectively defeated violent extremists 
within their respective territories.582 
 
Likewise, as discussed in the previous chapter, in reaction to outside threats, tribes in 
Pashtun areas of southwest Asia have traditionally bound together to push out foreign 
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invaders.  Scott Atran poses that any outside occupation tends to unite Pashtun tribes 
into a formidable enemy to outsiders.583  This clan—whether territory of bloodline 
based—unification in the face of outside threat could very well apply to perceived 
Taliban invaders in areas.  However, Atran does not investigate whether tribalism as 
an identity and way of life could turn into a battle cry and reason for an anti-violent-
extremist movement to act.  
 
Like Atran, Antonio Giustozzi analyses Pashtun clans in an historical context as 
resilient and apt to defend their identity and way of life.  Additionally, Giustozzi 
proposes that the phenomenon of tribal methods of living became critical strengths 
against outsiders.  For example, outside armies have had to learn to fight each tribe 
differently because each clan—being independent of one another and running their 
people and land in their own way—will have disparate fighting styles.584  Another 
example of tribal identity—and its potential to help protect against anti-tribal 
efforts—is each differently styled Pashtun clan traditionally holding an egalitarian 
system of leadership so that the people that can best serve tribal members hold power.  
So if an outsider killed an elder, that particular tribe could very well have another 
leader in quick time.585   In short, according to this and other experts on Afghanistan, 
tribalism may not only be a rallying cry for anti-extremist movements but may also be 
a source of its potency and longevity.  
 
Tribes defending their lives and their way of life appear to have been key drivers to 
some anti-extremist movements in Pashtun areas of Pakistan.586  Farhat Taj conducted 
interviews with anti-Taliban lashkar leaders in western rural Pakistan.  Her research 
involved interviewing tribal and village leaders587 with no attempt to survey the 
fighters comprising the lashkars or maintain a baseline of consistent questioning to 
create a rigorous comparative study of anti-Taliban lashkars and their motivations.  
Her interviews find that lashkars come into existence for self-defense.588   While 
wealthier Pakistani citizens near Taliban-held areas can hire private contracted 
security services, she argues, poorer tribes have no choice but to fight out of sheer 
self-defense with whatever weapons they can conjure.  She maintains that the 
organization and mobilization of the lashkar is centuries-old traditional reaction 
primarily to outside threats.589  She underlines that clans face daily real threats of 
kidnapping and murder from the Taliban with about 600 tribal elders, deputies, and 
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representatives executed in Waziristan alone since 2001.590  Rural Pashtun clan 
systems, she maintains, is not only the vehicle for anti-extremist uprisings but is also a 
key inspiration for clans to act.  Such contemporary anecdotal evidence suggests that 
clan could hypothetically rise up against violent extremists in defense of their identity.  
However, there has been no in-depth research conducted during a rural anti-extremist 
movement as it unfolds to refute or prove. 
 
6.2 Military’s Strategy Based on this Hypothesis 
 
The designers of a policy to recruit tribesmen to be auxiliary policemen to fight 
Taliban explicitly assumed this hypothesis to be true.591  However, there is a stark 
difference between respecting and allowing clan militias to organize and operate as 
they naturally do on the one hand and directly choosing tribesmen for a western 
trained police unit on the other hand.  Although the designers of this policy 
hypothesized that tribes could rebel out of protection of the clan system,592 there were 
no studies to indicate that clans—territorial or blood-line—would actually use the 
identity as a rallying cry to begin a movement.  Furthermore, the direct recruitment of 
police by foreign troops in rural areas, instead of allowing natural qawm uprisings that 
have historical precedent, would likely undermine the possibility of tribalism as a 
driver.  The military doctrinal direct recruitment creates artificial indigenous units not 
necessarily representative or tied to an established social identity. 
 
Taking a look, now, at prevailing counterinsuency theories and doctrines, this 
particular ISAF approach resembles an anti-tribal posture or at least a stance that is 
not trustworthy of clan-ism.  As the literature review in the first chapter revealed, 
policies that ignore or weaken tribes may do so for tribes acting as anti-liberal 
institutions, potential instability of tribal warfare, and possible weakening of central 
government power.593  The United States and NATO policy seemed to at least account 
for this last argument as it gave an Afghan district chief of police ultimate 
responsibility for all that a Western-recruited Afghan Local Police (ALP) unit did or 
failed to do.  Doctrinally, this counterinsurgency method appears to jibe with those 
authors who recommend a heavy outside approach that place militias in an ancillary 
role as opposed to a main effort in the fight against violent extremists.  Especially 
with the uniformed Afghan police ultimately in charge after foreign troops have done 
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the recruitment, one could view these non-traditional militias as just part of a foreign 
troop-heavy strategy in which neighbourhood watches filled some sort of police-to-
civilian ratio.594	   
 
The United States’ attempt to recruit from tribes—though in the case of Afghanistan 
with an illogical expectation that fighters would rally around the identity from which 
they temporarily left, because Westerners recruited units that were not natural arbakai 
and did not necessary represent particular tribes—has historical precedence.  The 
current programs in Afghanistan appear somewhat to mirror efforts during the U.S. 
military campaigns in Vietnam.595  U.S. Marine Combined Action Platoons—from 
1965 through 1971—attempted, in part, to build and support “Population Forces” or 
“Self-Defense Corps,” who acted like local militias.596  In Iraq, tribes in the al-Anbar 
province, supported in a hands-off approach by the U.S. Marine Corps and Army, 
began the “Anbar Awakening” and then “Sons of Iraq” movement to target al-Qa`ida 
in Iraq elements.597  These are just two examples in a vast history of 
counterinsurgency that in part relies on leveraging local anti-insurgent informal 
forces.  The case of Afghanistan is in some ways a modern materialization of 
counterinsurgency experience. 
 
Today NATO and ISAF commanders have largely bought into this strategy of 
building paramilitary-type groups instead of allowing qawm to rise up naturally 
against Taliban.598  The current Afghan National Army and Police are unable to reach 
deeply into rural Afghanistan—where three quarters of the population resides599—and 
are further unfamiliar with terrain, weather, seasons, cultures, linguistic variations, 
histories, and customs.600  Therefore, as early as 2008, then ISAF Commander 
General Patraeus put emphasis on strengthening local forces and tribal liaison.601  
Former U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates also exclaimed, “..the only solution in 
Afghanistan is to work with the tribes and provincial leaders in  terms of trying to 
create a backlash against the Taliban.”602  However, the idea of allowing qawm to use 
their traditional governance systems to raise arbakai and lashkars was not a 
consideration.   
 
Conventional and Special Forces of NATO implemented ISAF and Washington, DC’s 
vision through local defence forces—money and firepower over an hypothesis.  As 
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disparate efforts to raise local forces were already underway, U.S. Special Forces 
began the Village Stability Operations (with Coalition Forces Special Operations 
Component Command-Afghanistan building in Kabul its Village Stability National 
Coordination Center formally in 2009603), which typically produces local police604 
from its units at Village Stability Platforms while promoting governance, 
development, and security along traditional counterinsurgency stages: reconnoitre, 
shape, clear, hold, build, expand, and transition.605  ISAF and NATO Special Forces 
specifically saw the ALP as a resilient, efficient, culturally appropriate, and locally 
accepted solution.606  U.S. Special Forces sees the ALP as the most “visible and 
effective”607 component of all the Afghan National Security Forces with a cost of only 
$270 million USD per year—cheap when compared to the relatively massive 
expenditure in Afghanistan on roads, security contracts, and trucking businesses.608    
 
Even GIRoA backed this Special Forces’ approach.  Originally 10,000 ALP were 
intended from an Afghan Presidential decree in August 2010.609  The authorized 
maximum slots allotted then skyrocketed to 30,000 then once again to 45,000.  As of 
28 January 2013, however, there were only 19,851 ALP cops so far in place.610  Part 
of the reason for Afghan government backing may very well be because of GIRoA 
control mechanisms such as District Chiefs of Police responsible and answerable for 
ALP activities in their districts and placing the Ministry of the Interior in charge of 
the ALP program writ large, even as ISAF ran the ALP programs in the field.611   It 
should be interjected that not all government officials agree with the policy of 
increased ALP.  As with other elements of ANSF, civilian Afghan officials have 
complained about occasional mistreatment of civilians and criminal activity.  For 
example, one government prosecutor in province of Kunduz exclaimed about the 
ALP, “[a]ll of them are a bunch of illiterate and uneducated bandits and thugs who go 
around harassing people.”612  Nevertheless the executive federal government in 
Afghanistan has overall supported the increasing of ALP.613 
 
The conventional U.S. Army and Marines also funded local militias dubbed Tribal 
Security Forces614, Afghan Local Police (same name as those of the Special Forces), 
Local Defense Initiative, Afghan Local Police, Community Defense Initiative, 
Afghanistan Public Protection Program, Interim Security for Critical Infrastructure, 
Interim Solutions for Critical Infrastructure (not to be confused with the latter), 
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Neighborhood Watch Program, and Afghan National Auxiliary Police.615  None 
consider the idea to simply allow, encourage, or empower qawm uprisings against 
Taliban.  All efforts programmatically ensure U.S. troops directly recruit and train 
tribesmen from rural areas.   
 
Although every environment, situation, and ISAF unit is unique,616 U.S. Marines and 
Army has accepted Village Stability Operations methodologies on training locals—
some of which derives from U.S. Special Forces Field Manual 3-05.202 and U.S. 
Special Operations Command Village Stability Operations 101 with general guidance 
on performing operations in remote areas.617  The doctrine is a materialization of the 
mindset that outside forces—even when employing local militias—are to take a 
heavy-handed approach with regards presence and control of militias.  U.S. Special 
Forces teams will establish a Village Stability Platform in a village at the request of 
one or more village elders along with the appropriate district governor.  From there, 
they “build” local defence forces.618  Likewise, conventional forces normally attempt 
to identify and work with traditional local leadership while building neighbourhood 
watch efforts.  Also both Special Forces and conventional forces appear to follow two 
general themes when trying to coax locals to revolt: one is to establish a general 
security bubble619 so that locals feels safe enough to meet and train, and the other is to 
have a robust quick reaction force on call so that locals can feel confident while 
planning and training in case the militia feels suddenly overwhelmed by the enemy.620  
This process requires direct presence and activities of U.S. and NATO personnel: 
 
• Special Forces were charged with physically living within villages along with 
attachments of other troops. 621  For example, U.S. Army and Marine Special 
Forces units team with civil affairs experts and a “Military Information 
Support Operations” intelligence cell,622 civil affairs attachments, female 
engagement teams or cultural support teams (also comprising female NATO 
troops), and psychological operations operators.  Sometimes these teams 
invited, into their platform, information operations coordinators, public affairs 
representatives, and partner agency representatives depending on the area, 
mission, and unit to conduct all operations to include partnership with 
unconventional militia police. 
• Each platform is charged with directly ensuring that they address security, 
development, and governance.623  Security, in this case, means that the NATO 
forces, themselves, ensure a security bubble for their personnel and the village 
writ large before and during the militia recruitments.  Development, in this 
case, does not translate into long-term improvement of livelihoods of an 
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already stable area but instead means spending sometimes thousands of U.S. 
dollars for locals to build structures such as bridges and canals and to conduct 
activities such as agricultural training.  And governance, under this doctrine, 
entails NATO forces and civilian partners meeting directly with both 
traditional elders and local water and agricultural experts.  The program, in 
short, calls for interjections of thousands of dollars and continuous NATO 
presence and activities. 
 
• Militias are supposed to comprise members evenly amongst bloodline tribal 
affiliations—often undermining natural inter and intra-tribal relationships and 
oftentimes ignoring completely qawm architecture in which the disposition is 
based off of territory and in which bloodline affiliation is of secondary 
importance to geography to the point of being trivial.624 
• Platforms must employ themselves, their assets, or hired Afghans to conduct 
surveys out into the villages and surrounding areas to try to understand the 
human terrain as a continuous action—further exacerbating alien presence and 
activity in the area.625 
• Leaders are supposed to ensure that tribal elders accept their plan of raising 
militias against Taliban and then in turn seek popular support.  Essentially unit 
commanders are charged with influencing elders to take on an action that 
those elders were not otherwise undertaking.626 
• The program eventually must connect the militia leaders to the district 
government and then back to the central government in Kabul, ultimately 
undermining the autonomy and visions of the local elders and rural 
governance systems.  Kabul is very much an alien entity to much of rural 
Pashtun Afghanistan in the south and interjecting the capital’s oversight and 
any level of control is unnatural to the local systems. 627 
• Commanders, staff, and non-commissioned-officers of NATO are charged 
with ensuring civilian-military relationships with regards to both NATO and 
Afghans to bring people services, security, and development.  This translates 
into flying out U.S. Agency for International Development and U.S. 
Department of Agriculture officers and contractors to areas to work with the 
NATO teams and to encourage local governance entities—with no 
responsibility or legal authority to provide any services—and representatives 
from national ministries directly into rural areas even when the Afghan 
constitution charges traditional and informal leadership in rural areas to 
provide basic services and development. 628 
In 2010, RAND analysts fully supported this approach and specifically emphasized 
the presence of ISAF quick reaction units to make the informal police recruits feel 
safe from potential overwhelming Taliban attacks; traditional institutions to include 
shuras and jirgas to be involved initially to make local police appear legitimate to 
locals; a non-offensive and small militia to ensure they do not become so powerful as 
to challenge the central government or regional stability; and eventual transfer of 
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duties to the government.629  Like the Village Stability Operations doctrine, think tank 
recommendations called for U.S. troops to directly recruit militiamen even if the 
foreign forces first paid respect to a particular elder or set of local leaders.   
 
In 2010 Regimental Combat Team-1 Commanding Officer—who would later oversee 
Marjah’s ALP programs—attended a joint Center for Strategic and International 
Studies and RAND meeting in which academics in no uncertain terms suggested that 
Local Defense Forces were the only way to reach a suggest 40:1 security force to 
civilian ratio.630  And Marjah’s counter-Taliban volunteers meet the description of this 
type of scheme using auxiliary/paramilitary troops to supplement official security 
numbers.  In this vein, the thorough study of the motivations of Marjah’s militias 
provide one case study of the myriad of local paramilitary elements of 
counterinsurgency. 
 
While conventional and Special Forces doctrine revolved on the assumption that 
tribes and tribalism could aid in the stabilizing and securing rural populations, there is 
yet to be a holistic study on the strategy’s efficacy during NATO involvement in 
Afghanistan.  Furthermore, there exists only limited anecdotal evidence that such 
militias would use the identity of clan as a rallying cry and motivation to fight and die 
trying to stave off Taliban from their communities.  The remainder of this chapter will 
test whether doctrinal assumptions of tribalism as a driver for anti-violent extremist 
movements applies to the case study of Marjah.  
 
It must be noted, also, that formal doctrine ignores grassroots self-driven anti-
extremist insurrections.  There are no rules and regulation or even suggestions on how 
to interact with an arbakai like Marjah’s that began as a natural uprising on a 
perceived alien force of violent extremists.  And even the doctrine that exists hinges 
on an assumption that tribalism is one driver for locals to desire to fight violent 
extremist suppression of rural societal systems—an unproven hypothesis.  This study 
will test this hypothesis in Marjah with a view to uncover the arbakai’s motivation 
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6.3 Tribalism Does Not Appear to Motivate Arbakai 
 
Despite a literature and military doctrine suggesting the possibility that arbakai might 
claim to fight for clan and community, not one interview respondent claimed he 
fought for his qawm.  No evidence in the Marjah case study supports the hypothesis 
that protection of tribalism or territorial clan-ism was a narrative for the anti-violent-
extremist grassroots movement.  Instead, the identity most identified during 
interviews—supported through other streams of reports on Marjah—was nationalism.   
 
Although most in Marjah could not point out Afghanistan on a world map, they said 
they were fighting for Afghanistan and were Afghans foremost.  Although most in 
Marjah appeared wedded only to their own particular block and block elder, they said 
they were fighting and dying for all of Afghanistan.  While most in Marjah fight only 
in Marjah and at times in the nearby desert outskirts, they messianically and 
exaggeratedly wished to bring security and enlightenment to all of Afghanistan. 
Militiamen neither appeared to have aspirations to leave their village nor had the 
numbers, arms, vehicles, or fuel to rid the Taliban from all of Afghanistan, but many 
spoke in hyperbolized nationalistic terms.  Their words were on a national scale while 
their actions were village-based. 
 
Out of the 113 respondents, 112 offered thoughts on the identity for which they 
fought.  Of the 112, most volunteered several identities for which they fought.  Not 
one said he fought for his qawm or clan.  Instead, most claimed they fought for the 
entire country, while many also spoke about the village and family as those they 
wished to protect. 
 
• 75 per cent of respondents mentioned that they fought for Afghanistan 
• 43 per cent Marjah 
• 35 per cent families 
• 14 per cent himself 
• Five per cent Helmand province 
• Three per cent Islam 
 
Typically arbakai would speak primarily about fighting for all of Afghanistan while 
also stating they were fighting for other identities simultaneously.  Such responses 
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often began with stories of personal or family victimization that quickly elevated to an 
impulse to fight on the behalf of all of Afghanistan, oftentimes with anti-Pakistan 
undertones: 
 
The Taliban are not good people.  They are bad people.  They came 
into my home.  They used brute force, brute strength to take what they 
want and do what they want.  They used their strength to do what they 
want.  We had no ability, no strength at the time, to fight the Taliban.  
We could not fight against the Taliban.  We have to come join the 
[arbakai].  They use their strength, so I need the strength to fight the 
Taliban.  I am compelled to defend Afghanistan.  They use bad works 
and do this wrongly in the name of Islam.  They cannot have this 
government.  And I do not what them to have governance over this 
area.  They just cannot rule us.  I will fight them all the time.  For the 
rest of my time.  I will fight until they leave completely. – (86)  
 
I am against the Taliban because the Taliban do not like Afghanistan.  
I wanted peace so I decided to combat the Taliban.  My life is now 
good.  This is how I wanted it.  Children can go to school, and there is 
security.  The Taliban are against Afghanistan and Marjah culture, 
security, and education.  I want to fight the Taliban for the rest of my 
life.  I will not leave the militia or militia’s mission.  My son is just like 
me.  He wants to remove the Taliban from all of Afghanistan.  The 
Taliban’s religion is not good.  They do not think or care about people, 
women, and children.  They are outside the religion.  They want to 
destroy, use bombs, and hurt people only. – (55)  
 
I became an [arbakai] block elder and leader to help my country.  Why 
should I stay at home?  I appreciate that the militias were and are 
helping.  I am happy to help and enjoy helping.  I enjoy killing the 
Taliban and fighting the Taliban.  My father is a malik and was a block 
elder.  So I have followed in my father’s footsteps.  In Marjah, the 
Taliban caused fighting in the street.  So now I have 30 men.  Marjah 
needs ISCIs.  I will not leave the [arbakai].  We need agriculture and 
security in Marjah.  We need security in Marjah and Afghanistan.  We 
need to have security everywhere forever. – (54)  
 
The Taliban only want to fight.  I do not want this fighting.  The 
Taliban only want suicide attacks.  I am happy with our militia and 
want to give to our country and our government.  I want there to be 
schools.  I am happy with this security.  I fought with the Russians as a 
mujahid.  I helped to solve that problem.  Before the Russians and even 
during the Russians people were educated.  But after the Russians, 
people were uneducated as it was through the Taliban rule.  The 
Marines are 100% good.  We will all fight for security for a long time 
like we did against the Russians.  I will fight for life.  Even as a boy I 
wanted to fight.  I want to fight and kill all the Taliban.  I want to help 
Marjah and help Afghanistan.  When my son is old he will be like those 
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in the militias.  He likes the arbakai.  He will be against the Taliban in 
the future.  My religion is against the Taliban.  Pakistan and Iran are 
the enemy.  Baazgul, the [arbakai] commander helped to bring me to 
the militia and will make Marjah secure. – (53)  
 
This is our homeland, our district, our country.  The Taliban are the 
enemy of our country and my family.  I now want to help my family and 
my country.  I want to have a relationship with our people and with 
Afghanistan and keep my family safe.  So I fight the Taliban and keep 
them secure.  During the 13-year war with the Taliban took everything.  
There was no peace.  There was no education.  Before in Marjah there 
were many Taliban.  Now we are stronger than the Taliban.  The ANA 
and police and our national security forces are stronger than the 
Taliban.  I will erase the Taliban from the country.  The Taliban are 
the enemy of the country. – (13)  
 
The Taliban are not good people.  They are the enemy of Afghanistan.  
The Taliban take the side of some tribes like the Alikozai.  The Taliban 
are not good for Afghanistan.  I want to protect Marjah, my village, 
and serve Afghanistan.  I am uneducated.  And I want my son to be 
able to go to school.  But the Taliban do not allow people to go to 
school.  All the people know that the Taliban are not good people.  
They do not solve problems.  Their courts are a problem.  They want 
people to fight.  The Taliban takes one side or the other.  They are not 
a good arbitrator, they do not have good judgment, and they kill 
people indiscriminately.  The Taliban say they are Muslims.  But the 
Taliban are not.  They don’t allow Islamic law.  The Taliban kills.  But 
Muslims do not want to eradicate people and don’t allow suicide.  The 
Taliban joined with the Pakistani people to make those Pakistanis go 
to religious schools. – (51)  
 
The nationalist claims, by the majority of Marjah civilian guardian, effectively served 
several purposes.  Claimed nationalism created a clear “us versus them” mentality 
against a Taliban enemy that centred on opposing a corrupt and impious government.  
Arbakai’s conscious choice to be the protectors of Afghanistan drove a wedge 
between the Taliban identity and those fighting Taliban incursion, presence, and 
influence.  Effectively an outward display of hatred of everything Taliban, a vocal 
nationalist identity was antithetical to Taliban narratives, faith, and actions. Anti-
extremist fighters claimed to be nationalists of a nation state that Taliban criticize 
commonly for corruption and un-spirituality least of all for Afghanistan’s—the 
government and her citizens—strong partnership with the United States and Western 
allies.631    
 
	   138	  
Additionally, the idea of “we are fighting for Afghanistan” could theoretically serve 
to reinforce and strengthen counter-Taliban operations because the narrative provides 
the individual risking his life a greater purpose and a greater responsibility—to all the 
people of the country.  Even just showing up for arbakai duty each day, before 
conducting any patrols or staging oneself at a checkpoint, is a potential death 
sentence.632  The idea of defending a country, no matter how fictional a notion, may 
act as added fuel to put one’s life at risk.633  The phenomenon also becomes a myth or 
belief that since they are fighting for Afghanistan then all of Afghanistan is behind 
them, perhaps even counting on the guardians providing a feeling of “all eyes on me” 
further propelling action.  
 
6.4 Clan Identity Still Relevant 
 
However, even though nationalism was common amongst the interviews, clan-ism 
still remains arguably the chief identity in Marjah.  Despite thirty years of disruption 
and subjugation, most communities still have some sort of viable informal village or 
tribal leadership.  Today, Afghans appear to continue to respect and identify with their 
village and tribal leadership most, even if leaders are new and unseasoned.  According 
to a number of survey services over the past decade and economic development 
reports in Afghanistan, locals today overwhelmingly trust traditional village and tribal 
leadership—and seek counsel and resolution to problems from traditional governance 
before considering reaching out to the government.634   
 
Before the 2001 U.S. incursion into Afghanistan, traditional rural systems faced 
disruption.  Militant and military interdictions, civil war, tribal leader executions and 
exoduses, fleeing populations, returning refugees, the rise of Mullahs, and new classes 
of anti-Soviet Mujahidin had the potential to upend or even permanently break 
traditional Pashtun governance.  With deaths and relocation of traditional leaders, 
much knowledge of historical informal governance and informal security mechanisms 
were all but lost in some villages.  Even NATO and ISAF policies place heavy 
emphasis on the formal government, often at the expense of empowering informal 
village and tribal leaders.635  Nonetheless, most arbakai in southern Afghanistan have 
consistently and openly underlined their feeling that community and clan come before 
all else.636   
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How have such systems survived decades of turmoil?  First, as a whole, the Pashtun 
systems of governance in rural areas are resilient despite sometimes centuries of anti-
tribal policies to include those years under the reign of the Soviets and Taliban.  Each 
qawm is unique in structure, values, and fighting style leaving outside empires and 
armies constantly changing tactics village-by-village and tribal area-by-tribal area.637  
For example, though it is possible that one Russian infantry company effectively fight 
Afghans from one village or one Marxist government representative effectively 
undermine land rights in one tribal area, those same approaches would unlikely be as 
successful in another area.  A one-size-fits all strategy to taming tribalism failed and 
frustrated central governments that have attempted direct rule.638    The system of 
disparate qawm, then, acted as an overall resilience against those attepting to sideline 
rural Pashtun mechanisms of security and governance. 
 
Second, qawm are individually resilient.  They are nature an open egalitarian system 
that changes fluidly depending on the challenge and threat.  Instead of a set leader that 
an outside power could kill to overtake a clan, leadership is most often passed on to 
the person that has the most influence—the person that people want to follow, 
whether that person is the rightful heir in a bloodline clan or not.639  Power is not 
given within Pashtun clans but instead up to the leader to prove.  There is no central 
brain or nervous system for an enemy to target, and the governance of qawm are 
rarely dependent on one person.640  To outsiders, the flexibility of Pashtun rural 
governance may seem perplexing and ambiguous.641  When under attack such as 
during the thirty years of chaos, rural Pashtuns seem to either temporarily go to 
ground or become even more diffuse and spread out.642  The tradition of fluidity has 
made the Pashtun qawm resilient under the Mongols and Taliban alike.   
 
A third reason for the survival of qawm is that, even if they are fluid, they are often 
the only consistent governance and security on which rural clans can count amidst 
empires and armies coming and going throughout history.  Many rural Pashtuns thus 
feel they must, whenever possible, protect themselves, their qawm, and their qawm’s 
way of life.  Qawm often becomes the default identity in times of instability even 
when such instability comes at the hands of internal greater tribal warfare.643  In other 
words, not only during the time of relative freedom of qawm to seek self-
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determination were qawm important, but these identities were likely also vital for 
some sense of security and stability even as the qawm identity was under attack. 
Contemporary Marjah is no exception. This block-qawm political system then 
brought forth the composition of arbakai subcommands.644  It was this system, in 
which centuries of rural resilience found a home in exact manmade borders, that the 
Marjah arbakai was able to so quickly form, unify, and rise up against violent 
extremists. This social structure was not the reason the arbakai rose up but it was the 
method with which they formed and fought off Taliban.   
 
From the beginning it was Marjah’s jirga that chose to begin the arbakai comprised 
block elders as would be the expectation traditionally.645  Ask a village where he 
lives, and he will first give you the block where his house or compound exists.  
Similarly block/qawm elders were the default arbakai sub-unit commanders.  Even if 
tribalism was not the primary stated narrative during the interviews, the qawm 
systems gave way to the subdivisions and composition of the militia.  Despite verbal 
notions of nationalism, qawm was the vehicle and process by which the fighters rose 
up and fought.  
 
6.5 Nationalism and Qawm: Not Mutually Exclusive 
 
If tribalism and traditional rural Pashtun systems are still primary identities in 
southern Afghanistan and Marjah in particular, why would so many respondents 
speak to nationalism?  Even the very idea of the Afghan nation—when pushed from a 
totalitarian and anti-tribal authority in Kabul—can threaten the identity of a tribe.  
Qawm tend to rebel against such centralized would-be absolute powers for some level 
of autonomy. However, in contemporary history to include under the Musahibin 
dynasty and under the current regime, the federal government has sometimes chosen a 
minimalist strategy that allows qawm to seek their own way of life.646   Under the 
current regime, nationalism does not obviate clan-ism.  The government of 
Afghanistan and any national sentiments under today’s government actually allows 
and encourages traditional qawm systems of governance and security.  Even at its 
inception, the government of Afghanistan sought elder input.  Then, subnational 
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governance legal documents explicitly gave tribal and village leadership more 
responsibility and authority than even the district governors. 
 
The qawm system was so prevalent in Afghanistan after three decades of war, that in 
2004 the Loya Jirga647 (tribal super-elites who met in Kabul that year) created and 
blessed a constitution that provided village and tribal leadership explicit authority and 
responsibility to govern, secure, and provide for their qawm.  Informal rural leaders 
have, in fact, more constitutional authority than even District Governors.648  The 
constitution and national subnational governance legal documents since 2004 
specifically identify titles of qawm to include the malik, khan, mullah, ulema (an 
assembly of religious leaders), community assembly, and mirab (village or tribal 
water and irrigation expert and coordinator).  The national government considers 
these village and tribal leaders as legitimate subnational governance leaders.  
Constitutionally and through federal legal decrees, these qawm leaders have the 
power and responsibility to maintain peace, security, order, and stability; maintain 
rule of law; realize and protect human rights of their followers; promote economic, 
educational, social, and cultural development; and provide services to the citizens in 
their village or tribe.649 
 
Relative to District Governors, qawm leaders hold more legal authorities.650  By 
statute District Governors have little power.651  District Governors are direct 
presidential appointees with a constituency of one: the President.  The President only 
expect them to coordinate national line ministry activities in their districts and be the 
President’s ears and eyes at the district level. District Governors command no one.  
District Governors own and oversee no police or soldiers and have no issued 
weapons, unlike qawm leader with the constitutional authority to build arbakai.  
Furthermore, District Governors cannot directly tap into one penny of the national 
budget beyond basic administrative office costs.  Only Provincial Governors can 
compete with one another for a share of the Kabul budget on an annual basis.  Any 
projects or funded activities in a district would only be those of national line 
ministries who travel to a village, ISAF, Provincial Governors impeding in a District 
Governor’s area, or a qawm leader, each who has the responsibility to deliver services 
on his own.652  This is not to say that a District Governor could not use natural 
charisma and leadership skills to represent local interests and informally convince 
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Provincial Governments and line ministries to serve district interests.  A District 
Governor could also use his personality and personal connections to serve as an 
arbiter in certain district-wide disputes.  However, the District Governor’s lack of 
legal authorities allows the qawm to exist as they do naturally and respects rural 
village and tribal resilience. 
 
Essentially, the current constitution is a materialization of the historical precedence 
for tribal power—which, for example, the Musahibin dynasty respected and used 
instead of subjugated.  This approach becomes especially practical for the citizens of 
Helmand Province, which analysts have noted is so far geographically and culturally 
from Kabul it is almost as if the province remains another nation and difficult to 
control and oversee.653   
 
Although arbakai and the practice of local traditional governance systems governing 
by their own standards in their own way is constitutional, GIRoA’s formal support for 
Marjah arbakai’s self-determination was not a fiat accompli.  In practice, the 
government of Afghanistan is split on its support for uprisings against the Taliban.  In 
some areas of Afghanistan, government-run media  and government officials from the 
provincial to national level have made statements in support of popular uprisings 
against violent extremists and have also indicated that such movements are in fact 
independent.  Some media have suggested that uprisings could “annihilate” Taliban 
vice posing a complicated long-term security threat in Afghanistan.654  As just one of 
many examples, daily paper Sarnawesht in June 2012 ran an editorial stating that they 
wished these disparate movements would “spread to other areas where people are 
deprived of schools, health clinics, and other basic needs by the Taliban.”655  National 
Directorate of Security Director Asadullah Khaled on 25 September 2012, in front of 
the national legislature, stated the uprisings were neither Taliban nor Hezb-e-Islami 
Gulbuddin-run nor were they anti-government.  He vowed his commitment to support 
such movements and see to it that they keep from turning to civil strife and chaos.656  
Sadiq Saddiqui, spokesperson for the Ministry of the Interior, claimed no U.S. or 
other outside help to the uprisings which represent natural “deep hatred of the 
[Afghan people] against the Taliban.”657 
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In other areas of Afghanistan, GIRoA officials continue to be cautious about such 
seemingly popular anti-Taliban revolts, despite constitutional consideration for rural 
traditional governance, because militias may lead to independent militias and warlord-
ism seen in the 1990s658—the type of civil strife, instability, and chaos that helped the 
Taliban to gain governance legitimacy.659  For example, GIRoA officials have 
formally and informally criticized Ismail Khan’s 2012 wishes to begin his own militia 
in western Afghanistan660 and Ahmad Zia Massoud’s 2012 public statements to begin 
an indigenous movement to ward off extremists and foreign elements in northern 
Afghanistan.661  Officials fear that such moves could lead to militias that will have to 
contend with ALP, natural arbakai, and state security to gain authority, a level of 
monopoly of violence, and legitimacy before they ever wish to become a viable threat 
to Taliban.662  Officials fear the internal warlord-ism that plagued the 1990s in 
Afghanistan, and suggest that warlord-ism in the future could perhaps even lead to 
similar instability that arguably helped the Taliban to gain a foothold in Afghanistan 
in the first place.663   About one anti-Taliban militia in the eastern Afghanistan 
province of Ghazni, hundreds of miles from Marjah, Ghazni Provincial Council 
member Sayid Ubidullah Afghan exclaimed the movement is “dangerous and harmful 
for the Afghan Government…the government will not be able to control [them].”664  
 
However, even these government critics, thus far, only use their constitutional right to 
express their opinions and attempt to sway public opinion.  There is no evidence these 
officials have not led security campaigns to rein in anti-extremist movements or 
arbakai.  In conclusion, though there are government critics of arbakai, these 
movements nonetheless exist, are a natural millennia-old tradition amongst rural 
Pashtun communities, and are legal.  Thus nationalism and clan-ism are not mutually 
exclusive.  Effective governments in Kabul have effectively supported and 
encouraged local self-rule.665 
 
Such legal authorities for traditional subnational and sub-district governance are an 
everyday practice in southern Helmand’s village of Marjah.  This village exemplifies 
rural resilient governance through not only their exercise of security and governing 
rights but also through their a unique geographical setting that defines exactly the 
qawm—the one entity, like most Pashtun Afghan rural lands, on which residents 
continue to rely. Marjah used its qawm system to create the arbakai that has helped 
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successfully defeated local Taliban.  The practice of the qawm system along with its 
central value of independence, as the following chapter will analyse, is a right that is 




The geographic clan system within Marjah may not have served as a primary war cry 
of the arbakai, but it served as the resilient mechanism by which the militia 
autonomously rose and fought. Although the hypothesis of tribalism as a motivation 
or a goal was not a prevailing notion amongst verbal narratives of the interviewees, 
qawm mechanisms were the instrument of the militia’s rise and success.   
 
Thus far in this study has uncovered that most respondents spoke of ending eras of 
fitna and jahiliyyah and fighting Taliban to somehow defend the nation of 
Afghanistan.  They were hyperbolic in their rhetoric but practical in their approach.  
However, throughout the interviews, declassified and unclassified reports, and actions 
of arbakai there appeared a single overriding theme of self-determination.  This theme 
defined and coloured every arbakai interview response—whether speaking about 
stability, Taliban identity, or nationalism—as well as every operation.  The following 
chapter will investigate this premise that underpinned the specific findings of this 
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Chapter 7 
Master Motivation: Self-Determination 
 
The previous chapters’ findings point to a common theme of self-determination, 
which, for this study, means independence and freedom to control one’s own fate 
without compulsion.666  This goal of autonomy defined and coloured the motivations 
from the previous chapters, to include stability, antipathy to Taliban identity, and 
nationalism.  As guardians sought stability and a future of education against a 
formidable opposing alien ideology, self-determination coloured their words and 
actions.  Security and education were according to their own design and vision for 
which they fought autonomously.  Although clan-ism was not an explicit driver of the 
fighters, it was the independent nature of the qawm—to seek autonomy without 
outside help—that revealed itself the fundamental inspiration for the subject of this 
case study.  
 
Even the vocal assertion of national devotion, that the previous chapter described, 
ironically allowed militiamen unprecedented autonomy to fight as they wish.  By 
outwardly claiming devotion to the country writ large—even as arbakai operate only 
in and near the village of Marjah—the militia would become less of a perceived threat 
to the federal government.  Although constitutional law allows relative tribal 
independence, many government officials fear other self-driven informal armed 
movements that could potentially turn on the government or turn to anti-government 
“warlord-ism” seen in the 1990s667—the type of civil strife and chaos that helped the 
Taliban to gain power.668  One official claimed that other, non-Marjah, anti-Taliban 
uprisings could be “dangerous and harmful for the Afghan Government…the 
government will not be able to control [them].”669  With Marjah arbakai’s claimed 
loyalty to the Afghan government and nation, no government official has yet gone on 
record to criticize, fear, or attempt to dampen Marjah’s grassroots anti-extremist 
movement.  Instead, government officials have gone on record to verbally support 
Marjah’s arbakai and underline the movement as autonomous.670  Similarly, NATO 
forces have allowed the arbakai, who claim to support the central government and 
oppose Taliban, autonomy in its composition and operations.671   
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Furthermore, the goal was also, in places, a stand-alone verbal narrative and primarily 
defined the actions of both fighters and militia commanders.  The indigenous tribal 
defence force members claimed that they initially did not accept money or support 
and were unaffiliated in any way with coalition forces or the Afghan government.  
They claimed that the local government leaders were okay with the defence unit’s 
independence and stated that government security troops would not intercede when 
tribesmen carried weapons around the town.672  Militia leaders asserted that they are 
independent from government help and control.  They are a self-proclaimed 
autonomous force without outside help or coercion.673   
 
The militia did not just call for self-determination.  It acted each day as if it already 
possessed and protected its autonomy from outside influence.  In the psyche of 
villagers and militiamen alike is the notion that Marjah is on its own.  When ISAF 
withdraws, it will be up to the villagers to keep security in the village.674  Villagers 
view the Afghan Army and Police as corrupt and ineffective when compared to the 
arbakai.  Some villages believe that the Taliban and warlords in northern Helmand 
will inevitably take control most parts of southern and southwest Afghanistan upon 
U.S. withdrawal.  Therefore, it is up to the villagers themselves to defend their ground 
today as they plan to tomorrow.  They feel they are alone.  They may look for better 
weapons and training from ISAF to fight Taliban, but they believe that the village 
alone is responsible for its own security and future.675  While other villages 
throughout Afghanistan are reportedly terrified of a Taliban resurgence once ISAF 
departs, and some even predict a complete collapse of the government,676 Marjah’s 
guardians deliberately and autonomously secured their village and intended to secure 
the future of the village according to their own will. 
 
Also, self-determination was absolute: it went beyond just opposition to and 
independence from Taliban. Marjahns appeared to oppose all entities—not just the 
Taliban—that wished to compromise the village’s autonomy.  Although the Taliban 
were an especially hated enemy of villagers, many locals also had previously opposed 
the Soviets, the Akhundzada militias in the 1990s,677 and the drug lords that 
eventually sided with the Taliban in the 2000s.678  ISAF and GIRoA support the 
independence of Marjah’s arbakai and afford Marjah unparalleled autonomy, so it was 
logical that the militiamen would have no reason to oppose the government or NATO.  
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Instead partnering with NATO and the government would allow the town the regional 
security and minimal support to conduct activities as it sees fit. 
 
This chapter will first introduce the oral stories of the guardian revealing a movement 
primarily defined as an independence movement.  In the next section, the actions of 
the militia, especially when the salaries ceased, showed dedicated self-determination.  
It will then move on to the leaders words and actions that showed autonomy as a 
central motivation.  In the following part, this chapter will look to the theme of 
liberation in greater context including its strength as an historical materialization of 
values that has inspired other similar contemporary anti-Taliban uprisings. Finally, 
this chapter will then move to how ISAF allowed self-determination.  This part of the 
story is vital because, despite doctrine and orders that called for heavy “top-down” 
NATO control over the arbakai, the troops on the ground instead enabled arbakai 
independent action and aims.  Not only does foreign security force action help prove 
that the arbakai acted truly autonomously, but it also bolstered and secured militia’s 
theme of self-determination. 
 
7.1 Fighters’ Claims of Self-Determination 
 
During the interviews, respondents spoke about a goal of self-determination via 
means anchored in self-sufficiency.  It was as if this militia would have acted 
independently of GIRoA and ISAF if given the opportunity.  Most arbakai 
interviewed expressed a self-drive to fight Taliban, as if the programs offered from 
the Marines were only helpful in efforts underway.  Many respondents appeared to 
view the arbakai as simply a mechanical and practical means to materialize their 
personal drive: “I joined the [arbakai] because I wanted more ammunition and a 
machine gun to fight my enemy—the Taliban.  The [arbakai] support me in my efforts 
to fight the Taliban” (67).  Without prompting, others appeared offended at notions 
that they served because of financial incentive: “I don’t need a salary for this. I joined 
the [arbakai] only to fight the enemy.  This is my only reason for joining the [arbakai].  
I don’t need money.  I have to fight [the Taliban].  The [arbakai] is my vehicle, my 
method, to be able to fight the Taliban.  This is what I want—even without money” 
(87).   
 
	   148	  
The following excerpts particularly underline the dual theme of seeking village and 
personal goals through independent action.  The fighters seemed to not count on any 
outside government support but instead appeared to rely only on themselves.  While 
some respondents specifically spoke of “freedom” from Taliban rule others used the 
village-wide narrative of security and education as a way to express a future free of 
unwanted Taliban control: 
 
The [arbakai] support(s) me with weapons and ammunition and 
everything I need to fight.  They are a means to do what I want to do.  
They allow me the tools to fight and kill Taliban.  [The Taliban] are 
the enemy of all of us.  Everyone in Marjah would agree with me.  
They would agree that the Taliban bring nothing but death and 
destruction.  They Taliban are invaders.  They would agree with me 
that they only bring death.  They are the embodiment of conflict and 
everything that is can get in the way of a peaceful and productive 
society.  I will fight until the day comes (yelling furiously) WHEN 
AFGHANISTAN IS CLEAN OF THE TALIBAN.  I WILL FIGHT 
UNTIL AFGHANISTAN IS CLEAN.  Clean of the Taliban completely. 
– (110)  
 
[Arbakai] offer me the support I needed—the support I sought—to do 
what I wanted to do.  They were a vehicle for my own ambitions—for 
my personal goals.  The government offers the weapons and 
ammunition.  They offer the practical materials that I need to fight off 
the Taliban.  They offer the tools for me to do what I need to do.  The 
Taliban brought fighting.  And they failed, also, to bring any 
constructive policies.  They did not nor could they build up anything or 
create any type of societal self-sufficiency.  They only break and 
destroy things.  And this is very easy for them—to destroy.  And that is 
what they are—breakers and destroyers only.  I will fight all the time—
for my entire life.  I am dedicated for all the years that I live on this 
earth. – (101)  
 
I will fight until I truly feel freedom and security.  I will fight until 
this…The Taliban are our enemy.  They do not conduct any good 
policies.  They do not do good works.  I have to fight them….I need to 
support Afghanistan and the government.  The [militiamen] support 
the government.  I need to support the efforts against the Taliban.  I 
want to help and support my country.  Before there were more Taliban.  
Now in Marjah the [arbakai has] come together.  We do not want the 
Taliban to come back again.  My children fear the Taliban.  The 
Taliban burn books and schools down.  My children want a future of 
education.  They want peace.  They will never support the Taliban.  
The Taliban only do what benefits them.  They only do for themselves. 
– (72)  
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More often than not respondents expressed self-reliance and autonomy while 
expressing their views on stability, Taliban identity, and nationalism.  
Interviewees typically included a multitude of goals and motivations—
addressing stability, Taliban ideology and violence, and patriotism in streams 
of consciousness—with underpinnings of the overriding motif of self-
determination.  For example, militia member Safar Khan suggested to media 
outlets, “[a]ll we want is to protect our areas and ourselves.  We will fight with 
anyone who destabilizes our local area, who enters our homes, prevents our 
children from going to school and creates anarchy in our peaceful lives.”679  
Another member Malang exclaimed before foreign press, “We are compelled 
to take a stand and provide security in our area, in clinics, schools…”680  The 
following interviewee spoke about the need for security, the desire to create 
the conditions for educational opportunities for youth, Taliban’s foreign and 
unwelcome nature, and violent extremist cruelty: 
 
The Taliban do not want security in Marjah or Helmand.  They do not 
allow children—girls and boys—to get an education.  The Taliban do 
not want peace in Afghanistan.   All the people in Marjah are good 
people and hate the Taliban…The Taliban do not want security.  They 
cause problems with farmers.  Before the Taliban we grew wheat.  
People want education and want to bring security, cattle, and 
productive farms.  They do not want the Taliban here…I don’t know if 
Taliban are Muslims.  Most are from Pakistan.  Rules in Islam do not 
dictate us to kill people, to cut necks, or to kill local nationals.  The 
holy book does not allow this.  For example, a few weeks ago, an 
[arbakai] commander’s friend was captured and killed.  His hands 
were tied behind his back, and his head was cut off. – (35)  
 
In the same conversation, he expressed personal and communal self-sufficiency and 
reliance to actualize his goals.  The road to autonomy for this and other respondents 
were defined with a sense of independence.  In this part of his response, the civilian 
guardian does not call on GIRoA security to defend the village or formal government 
departments to provide services.  Instead he states that independent action of the 
villagers will yield their common goals: 
 
The elders wanted peace so they made the decision to fight back and 
repel the Taliban.  I heard about the other militias in Marjah, and so I 
built one too. I began to advise villagers telling them that we need 
security.  We need to build bridges, schools, and educational centres.  
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The Taliban did not like this advice.  Most of the Taliban are from 
Pakistan and have come into Afghanistan.  My children and even wife 
are ready to fight.  We have weapons and a “canon.”  If the Taliban 
come to my compound, even my wife is ready to fight…I will fight 
forever. – (35) 
 
Many militiamen’s sense of dedication to the cause of autonomy from Taliban 
rule was such that they explicitly stated a sense of personal duty that would 
span years.  Among the interviews with Marjahns, about half of militia 
fighters claimed outright that they would fight the Taliban to the death or for 
the rest of their lives.  Over a third claimed their sons would continue the 
fight, and a few even claimed that their wives would continue the battle 
against the Taliban in a community that has little place for women outside the 
home.  
 
All the time that the Taliban are here in our country I will fight them.  
If they are breathing.  If they are operating.  If they are physically in 
Afghanistan, then I will fight them to the death.  This is how dedicated 
I am.  Truthfully.  When they are older, my children, they will have 
education.  They will support and help the government.  They will 
support and help the military. – (111)  
 
I will fight as long as I still have the strength to fight.  I have the will to 
fight on as long as it takes to expel the Taliban from the country and 
defeat them.  So it is up to the strength and ability of my body to keep 
fighting.  The children of the town want a future full of schools, 
education, freedom, and peace.  They are fully aware that the Taliban 
could never bring these things.  Kids know that the Taliban would 
block any positive and constructive community efforts.  Thus, the 
Taliban, by definition, are the enemy of the children. – (113) 
 
I will fight for as long as it takes until there is peace earned.  I will 
fight until there is not one enemy.  I will fight until we have education.  
I will fight until we have everything we want…We are peaceful here.  
We did not bring this on ourselves.  We did not ask for the Taliban’s 
invasion and the violence that they brought.  We were already here.  
We didn’t go to another country and start fighting there.  It was 
brought upon us.  I want to defend and live in my village in peace.  And 
since the Taliban mean conflict in our mind, we must fight the Taliban 
until there is peace.  By definition the Taliban cannot allow us to live 
in peace.  They cannot allow us to live without conflict.  They are not 
Afghans.  Not true Afghans.  They are from the outside.  Their tactics 
are from the outside.  Their ideals and types of violence are from the 
outside.  They invaded and brought fighting.  Fighting is not what we 
want or asked for.  We were not fighting in this town.  They came and 
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brought conflict, fighting, and violent to an area that did not want it.  
To an area that did not ask for it.  To an area that did not deserve it. – 
(101) 
 
These claims of self-sufficiency and desired autonomy underlined a strong 
resilience in the arbakai that have the potential to outlast any future Taliban 
attempts to influence or infiltrate the village.681  Militiamen had confidence in 
themselves and their martial savvy, had a belief in something far larger then 
themselves such as the stability and independence of an entire village, and 
found resolve that transcended the pain and worry of Taliban retribution.682  
They felt that they controlled their own fate and that it was up only to them.683  
Specifically, they saw these trying times—of fighting and dying for a 
village—as leading to an end of improvement for their village and children 
including stability, security, and education. 
 
7.2 Guardians’ Autonomous Actions 
 
Their claims of self-determination were not empty.  One arbakai fighter (respondent 
8) even exclaimed, “my oath is my AK” to underline that his proof of commitment 
was in his actions and not words.  Marjah’s militiamen fought actively with little 
support.  Beyond just showing up to work—a certain death sentence if the Taliban 
catches them684—and finding and reporting IEDs and Taliban activity, arbakai 
showed an offensive side.  Arbakai members went on hunter-killer missions to arrest 
or kill Taliban well outside their particular blocks, which they protect foremost.  
Marjah guardians proudly told me of running ahead of Marines into oncoming fire in 
the desert regions to the east and west of the city on their own volition.  Some claimed 
to go into the poppy growing outskirts of town where Taliban lay low and run a drug 
trade.685  Such aggression continues today.  Arbakai are known to push, still, the 
security out to areas well outside the village and have even burned stores, whose 
owners apparently are linked with Taliban elements, to the ground.686  As one U.S. 
Marine exclaimed, any militiaman “isn’t afraid to hunt down Taliban fighters.”687  
With prejudice and a sense of self-efficiency, arbakai killed Taliban. 
 
One example of this aggression, self-reliance, and independent spirit was the 
successful defeat of a large Taliban assault in 2012.  With Taliban’s leadership in 
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Quetta, Pakistan calling for jihad on Marjah’s militia, the Taliban attempted to take 
back Marjah en masse with numerous well-armed cells working in unison.  They 
began taking over compound-by-compound from the north announcing to all that they 
would retake the village and implement Taliban laws once again.  The arbakai 
stopped the assault and brutally slaughtered those Taliban that did not flee—leaving 
the dead and mangled Taliban corpses out in the fields for days to send a “message” 
to the Taliban.688  Although daily reports indicate Marjah’s arbakai patrolled their 
streets within their blocks, sometimes united into offensive hunter-killer teams, and 
killed or captured Taliban that happened to make it inside the village itself, the 2012 
victory underpins the ferocity and tenacity of a militia that views they alone must 
secure their village. 
 
In addition this evidence and talk of independence and independent action, the lack of 
enticing financial incentive underlines the independence with which arbakai fought 
and for which the fighters held as an enduring goal.  Over the years since its 
inception, there were disparate and unsubstantiated reports of individual fighters 
complaining of low salaries sometimes along with wishes for more ammunition and 
weapons, but such apparent complaints never appeared to stop any operations or 
impel any to leave service.689  Fighters continued to fight despite low salaries and 
despite periods without salaries.  Money failed to motivate Marjah’s guardians.  They 
rose up via their block systems without promise of significant or continuous financial 
reimbursement and continued to act autonomously through periods of low and no pay. 
 
Marjah militiamen continued to fight for months on separate occasions without 
wages, as it did in its first days.690  Specifically, the only U.S.-backed arbakai 
movement—whether part of a Special Operations initiative or a conventional forces 
unit’s strategy—that fought without pay was Marjah’s.  While every other 
government-backed lashkar or arbakai halted when salaries were cut, Marjah’s 
guardians continued to fight as its leaders did in the beginning.691 
 
When it came to salaries, one must study what relative riches the guardian forfeited.  
Militiamen gave up working on highly lucrative Commanders Emergency Response 
Program and Field Ordering Officer military projects and USAID contracts, which 
tended to hire locally and pay salaries that would be competitive in the United 
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States—vastly outcompeting the money offered to arbakai volunteers.692  Everyday a 
militiaman fought was a day when that person knowingly sacrificed a wage many 
times larger.   
 
Relative to other jobs arbakai members could have undertook, they received a modest 
monthly salary from Marines that, on paper and in theory, was the equivalent of $150 
U.S. dollars per month in 2011 lowered to $120 U.S. dollars per month in 2013.693  
This wage was likely stripped down for a popularly accepted and practiced “tax” to 
block elders and commanders—who most often used these “taxes” for their 
community lest rumours of egregious corruption weaken their power in such an 
egalitarian society.694     
 
Because the salary did not provide a liveable wage even by Afghanistan standards, 
civilian warriors supplemented their income so that they would not have to abandon 
the militia to return to their farms full-time.  Most arbakai members were 
moonlighting as only part-time famers,695 and on occasion set up checkpoints to ask 
money from locals.  Such a practice, in the West, one could view as corruption and 
exploitation of a population.696  But given the local popularity of arbakai and a lack of 
public backlash against armed tribesmen’s occasional and modest “taxation,” it 
appeared that “shake-downs”697 were nothing new or egregious in the culture of 
Marjah.698  Locals appeared to understand that arbakai fighters gave up full-time 
farming for securing the village.  Some Western observers even likened militia 
“taxation” to U.S. city all-volunteer fire departments seeking donations for services.  
However, this rough analogy falls a bit short as firemen in America do not wield AK-
47s when asking civilians for funds.   
 
Overall, these shakedowns appeared rare and minor compared to the exploitation of 
other formal Afghan security entities in Marjah.  For example, one villager, upon 
learning of an unsubstantiated report of one arbakai member asking for cash from a 
civilian, commented that if the culprit had instead been part of the Taliban or Afghan 
National Police, that person would have stolen “wallets, motorcycles, and 
watches.”699  Amidst claims of Afghan National Police and Army apparently 
wantonly stealing motorbikes, clothes, water pumps, cell phones, and shop goods, the 
arbakai are seen as local heroes that tended not to abuse their positions.  Amidst 
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unsubstantiated villager claims of national soldiers and cops sexually assaulting 
women, extorting locals for cash, releasing Taliban prisoners in return for money, 
threatening local Marjah contractors with death, using positions of authority to make 
money flagrantly at the expense of security, and breaking and entering homes to steal 
on a regular basis, locals view Marjah arbakai as relatively decent.700  The arbakai 
appeared to take what they needed but seemed to avoid the appearance of avarice.  
They seemed to value public opinion and continued to operate only within the limits 
allowed by their block elders. 
 
Arbakai salary, though low once it reached the pockets of guardians, was nevertheless 
potentially one steady source of partial income for the illiterate and unskilled 
volunteers.  When this money turned off, the militia continued to fight undaunted—
revealing the determination of a movement set on independence from any outside 
support.  Elsewhere in Pakistan and Afghanistan government-backed lashkar or 
arbakai programs see negotiation, cessation, protest, riot, or insurrection at first 
rumour of dwindling funds. 701  This was not the case in Marjah.  Marjah militiamen 
stayed and fought when salaries halted.  Due to a set of events and administrative 
mishandling, Marjah arbakai remained unpaid for two months during the height of the 
fighting season in 2011 and again on several occasions over the next two years.  
Nevertheless, Marjah arbakai fought on—killing Taliban, helping to fight off suicide 
attacks, dying in the line of duty, and maintaining security.  Compared to similar 
programs’ near or complete shutdown during financial crises, Marjah arbakai appears 
unique in the strength of its self-drive. 
 
In late June 2011—after the harvest season and well into the throes of the annual 
Taliban fighting cycle—battalions responsible for arbakai salaries were unable to 
renew the contract that would have left the militia salary scheme unmolested.  The 
original contract was for half a year, and the renewal would have been for an 
additional six months.702   But Marine Division command staff denied renewal 
because the would-be-new contract was for the Commander’s Emergency Relief 
Program money, meant only for tactical emergencies on a short-term and unplanned 
basis—some staffer baulked at arbakai salaries being of a short-term crisis status 
because the arbakai was a years-long program.703  Unfortunately for U.S. Marine 
Corps battalions in Marjah in 2011, they only submitted paperwork for more 
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emergency money instead of attempting to tap into other funding sources that some 
thought more appropriate.  Some argued that it was a failure of higher commands for 
refusing to take the initiative to resubmit the paperwork on behalf of the busy 
battalions for alternative non-emergency funding while others felt the blame was on 
the battalions’ paperwork incompetency.704  There may have been no one to blame, 
but the outcome was clear.  This administrative crisis paralyzed arbakai money for 
two months.   
 
After two months of miscommunication and confusion, a regimental comptroller 
along with division command staff, the division judge advocate, and battalion officers 
rewrote and resubmitted language to successfully justify Commander’s Emergency 
Relief Program funds because Marine commanders felt the program was vital.705  
Throughout the financial crisis the arbakai neither rebelled nor laid down arms during 
the heart of the Helmand fighting season.  There was not one single report of a fighter 
not showing up to a post due to money concerns, not one rumour of teams protesting, 
and not a case of arbakai commanders threatening ISAF or the district government.  
There have also been disparate and unsubstantiated reports of infrequent and late 
salary payments more recently.706  For example, some villagers and arbakai fighters 
even claimed that as late as January 2013 they had not been paid the previous four to 
five months.707  Yet, the militia continued to operate seemingly un-dazed. 
 
This set of events revealed Marjah militias to be willing and able to operate, kill, and 
die independent of money.  That money is not a primary driving motivation of Marjah 
militias reveals a certain level of autonomy and self-motivation.  Relying on a force 
whose primary aim is not money echoes Niccolo Machiavelli’s admonitory statement 
“…if one holds his state on the basis of mercenary arms, he will never be firm or 
secure; because they are disunited, ambitious, without discipline, unfaithful; gallant 
among friends, vile among enemies; no fear of God, no faith with men; and one defers 
ruin insofar as one defers the attack; and in peace you are despoiled by them, in war 
by the enemy.”708  Though perhaps colourful and dramatic, this statement illustrates a 
contrast to what witnesses observed in Marjah.  More so, Marjah arbakai operating 
with little or no wages may signal not only dedication but also longevity—a drive that 
could potentially keep fighters fighting past ISAF transition, drawdown, and 
withdrawal.  As one ISAF officer cautioned, “money can buy you temporary security, 
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but if you want to know who will stay fighting past when [NATO] leaves you need to 
look for those that will fight without a dime.”709    
 
To understand the extent of dedicated self-determination in this town, it is helpful to 
briefly examine movements similar to Marjah’s when money ceased.  In most cases, 
the anti-Taliban indigenous uprisings ceased when funding terminated pointing to the 
extraordinary independent nature of the subject of this particular case study.  Marjah’s 
arbakai shows a profound level of self-sufficiency and self-drive when compared to 
other movements that appeared somewhat to fall victim to Machiavelli’s warning that 
those that operate for money may indeed be relatively fickle regarding their 
willingness to fight and die.   
 
It should be noted that, unlike this study, the information from these other movements 
derives from local press and military observations.  There were no critical studies or 
sets of interviews to verify the stories of these other anti-Taliban arbakai or lashkars.  
Nevertheless, there was ample information that would lead to a conclusion that these 
other uprisings did indeed cease once leaders of these movements saw promised 
money undelivered or salaries. 
 
These other efforts, in the descriptions below, paralyzed awaiting undelivered 
promised salaries, projects, or contracts.  Without initiative, will, and self-sufficiency, 
these other movements could draw on no value that would have impelled them to 
fight Taliban—in stark contrast to Marjah’s exceptional sense of autonomy:   
 
• For example, in 2009 in the Achin district of Nangarhar province in eastern 
Afghanistan, vengeance may have sparked the Shinwari tribal uprising against 
Taliban, but the incentive of money appeared to be the main motivation for its 
would-be endurance.710  After an initial revenge-driven spark, cash seems to 
have become a driver for Shinwari.  These clan members reportedly promised 
$1.2 million U.S. dollars in aid directly to the elders without intermediaries.  
In early 2011, Shinwaris bemoaned to the media that supposedly only 
$200,000 U.S. dollars had yet been dispensed.711  Without the promised cash 
along with ensuing infighting amongst sub-tribes the movement retarded and 
then stopped.  Soon after, violent extremist militants begun to move through 
some Shinwari areas freely.712   
 
• The location of a similar example, also in 2011, was the Arghandab River 
Valley in northern Kandahar province, adjacent to Helmand.  Development 
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projects from U.S. Army civil affairs programs appeared to have been a 
driving factor for the village’s self-defence.  Combined Task Force 1-320 
Commander Lieutenant Colonel David S. Flynn (U.S. Army) stated to the 
press in January 2011 that he had told the village shura he would rebuild a 
mosque as a reward for the villagers’ mobilization as an incentive to recruit 
civilian guardians.  Once projects slowed and then ceased, civilian warriors 
and would-be recruits quickly returned to the lives of farming.713 
 
• Likewise, in the Gizab district of Uruzgan Province just northeast of Helmand 
in 2010, an anti-Taliban uprising came to sudden stop when the money dried 
up.  Militia members publicly asked for cash and direct support for the service 
of policing; the militia leaders went to Australian and U.S. Special Forces for 
help immediately when the revolt began.  Australian then U.S. forces, 
however, only arrived to provide tactical support—no wages in the 
beginning.714  By the end of June 2010, residents of Gizab had become 
frustrated at the lack of government and ISAF financial support.715  They 
claimed that the Afghan government-authorized 53-man civilian police team 
with a compensation of $60 U.S. dollars per-month per-troop was far too little 
to retain an active militia and continue to stave off the Taliban.716  While 
awaiting higher bidders, the movement dithered and failed.717 
 
• In 2011, in the Adezai village of the Peshawar district in Pakistan’s Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa province near Afghanistan’s eastern border, money was also a 
driver for anti-Taliban civilian forces.  In March 2011, tribal militias from this 
and adjacent villages threatened to surrender completely because they claimed 
not to have ample money and weapons to continue the counter-violent-
extremist activities.718  Between the government and lashkar accounts, it 
became clear that these once-government-backed lashkars did not have the 
ideological drive equal to militant Taliban who have been willing to fight and 
die with or without material support.719  Eventually, locals’ lack of will and 
insufficient ammunition allowed the Taliban to retake areas around the village 
via rocket attacks, suicide bombings, and IEDs.  In Adezai, insecurity stopped 
locals from attending schools or walking to markets.720  
 
• Over 400 kilometres east of Kabul in Pakistan is the town of Matta in Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa province’s Swat district.  There, in 2009, former national 
minister and leader of the 2009 ruling Awami National Party raised a lashkar 
to help the military combat Taliban elements. 3,000 Pakistanis joined to fight 
Taliban and help rebuild Swat infrastructure.  After its inception, the tribal 
leaders negotiated that their men would only continue fighting upon delivery 
of development projects.  Without robust reconstruction activities, the anti-
Taliban activities waned.721 
 
These movements, by comparison, highlight the extraordinary dedication to self-
reliance and independence Marjah held.  Even when other Afghan and Pakistani 
counter-Taliban movements began as natural uprisings using traditional Pashtun 
governance apparatus, these particular movements, unlike Marjah, ceased when 
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funding stopped.  I was as if these movements perhaps wished to act as mercenaries or 
perhaps were even a scheme to squeeze out funding from outside sources.  There was 
most often an expiration date when funding or funded projects terminated.  Marjah’s 
unique dedication to independence and self-reliance was not only evidenced in 
fighters’ words and actions but also in its leadership.  As the next section describes, 
leaders’ narratives and decisions also underline the theme of self-determination. 
 
7.3 Arbakai Leaders Seek Independence 
 
Arbakai leaders appeared especially self-driven and self-sufficient, and they led by 
their example and legend.722  Such an egalitarian culture demands that leaders must 
continuously prove themselves, and followers must wish to follow them voluntarily 
and willingly.723  In addition, Pashtun culture, and especially that which existed in 
Marjah, puts an emphasis on personal shame if a leader were to act cowardly in the 
eyes of his followers or detract from the goals and desires of his militiamen.724  
Therefore, studying the leaders is vital, as their actions and narratives commonly 
reflect those locals that comprise the qawm, which must prove worthy of leading on a 
daily basis. 
 
Marjah top arbakai commanders Haji Baazgul Khan and Motar Khan’s pubic 
announcements and interviews revealed that the phenomenon of self-determination 
was the singular overriding motivation for rising and fighting Taliban.  These 
messages also reverberated throughout the fighting force.725  It should be noted that 
the international media reported on these two leaders names, identities, titles, and 
actions.  The leaders appeared to wish to speak with reporters and have their stories 
told.  Therefore, unlike with other arbakai members, whose identity this study hides, 
this chapter will use identities and information that do not put the individuals at 
increased risk above what the press has already published.   
 
At the conclusion of the 2010 summer season of fighting, former anti-Soviet mujahid 
and block elder Haji Baazgul Khan began meeting with other block elders to increase 
the size of his militia and help others build militias also. By November 2010, he 
announced to media outlets he had raised 150 of fellow block farmers as one initial 
arbakai movement to repel the Taliban that would soon be followed with other blocks 
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dedicating units to protect the village.726  
 
Marjah’s block elders and arbakai commanders appear to be motivated and resolute in 
their determination to fight and kill Taliban and appear to be well received throughout 
the blocks.727  They were not, however, beneficiaries of formal government positions 
and formal government authority.728  Instead, they were former mujahidin,729 who 
continued their legend through contemporary battles against Taliban cells in and 
around Marjah.730  Marjah is a warrior culture with a warrior mindset and ethos, like 
many Pashtun areas.731  The populace seemed to respect and follow war-hardened 
leaders.732   
 
No one handed commanders titles, but instead they earned their posts through their 
dedication to lead the village to self-determination.  Proving their worth each day, 
block elders were charismatic linchpins without formal government titles that rose 
and stayed in position due to their leadership skills and tactical savvy.733  Qawm 
leaders continued putting themselves in harm’s way to spark enthusiasm and devotion 
amongst the guardians. Arbakai commanders have no career path and nowhere to rise 
professionally.  Their meagre salaries do not seem to be a driving force.  Instead 
volunteering to prove themselves as warrior leaders each day appeared to be their 
immediate professional aim: to create an aura, according to commanders’ followers, 
of charisma.734 
 
The informal but ubiquitously respected commander Haji Baazgul Khan735 was 
“fiercely” independent, a warrior of the anti-Soviet mujahidin, and a natural leader 
who eschewed several offers of governmental appointments in favour of defending 
his qawm against the Taliban.736  Baazgul graduated from a self-driven low-intensity 
counter-Taliban insurgent during the Taliban’s realm in Marjah to the relatively 
informal local Interim Community Council Chair to an influential arbakai commander 
who nonetheless did not encroach on other blocks’ independence.   
 
Numerous Marines and Afghans described Baazgul as a walking legend.  When he 
enters a room, everyone stands and instantly makes a path for him to walk to his 
seat.737  The district governor’s guards—charged to thoroughly search anyone and 
everyone attempting to enter the governor’s compound—do not dare pat down 
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Baazgul or any of his deputies.738   His reputation as an exterminator of Taliban is 
unquestioned.739  His legend, his presence, and his integrity are unquestioned by 
locals and foreigners.740  Independent and resilient is how ISAF views this man: a 
visionary of a strong anti-Taliban sustainable immune system.  Locals fear Baazgul’s 
demise or retirement.741  Agreeing on Baazgul’s influence as a charismatic are the 
violent extremists—evidenced with Taliban’s attacks against his family and in his 
neighbourhood. 
 
Even in his old age, he appears to continue to be a front-line commander willing to 
lead by example.  He checks on his security teams and appears undaunted even during 
firefights.742  His deputies joked in the summer of 2011 about just one of the times 
Baazgul personally fired a rocket-propelled grenade at Taliban cell causing total loss 
of the hearing in his left ear.  During our conversation, he appeared unable to hear at 
all in his left ear giving possible credence to this tale.  He appears to inspire a feeling 
in others to fight against Taliban.  Like many of his qawm leader colleagues, his 
legend had made him even more influential than the District Governor. 
 
His modesty and seeming unconcern for his own safety and fame underline the 
charisma that his followers feel.  When this researcher met first with him in the centre 
of an empty large tent in 135-degree heat, he—a quiet charismatic more interested in 
action than words—looked at the ground and gave brief answers.  He appeared to 
have no care that international press and academics in Washington, DC and London 
wrote about his feats.  He did not bat an eye that he is an internationally known figure.  
He even appeared unimpressed that English-language online media had reported his 
personal travails and victories.   
 
When interviewed in the summer of 2011, he spoke of the Taliban viciously killing 
his brother—confirmed through by numerous sources743— since being the first qawm 
elder to command an arbakai sub-unit.  Baazgul found his brother’s remains in an 
open hole in the ground; the brother was not afforded a proper Islamic burial.744  He 
mentioned in an interview: 
 
They not only killed my uncle they killed my two sons.  They killed my 
family.  They targeted me because I am an honest person living right 
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here in Marjah doing the right thing.  They brought this to me.  They 
kill people here.  (I will fight) for life.  This is clear.  [The Taliban] are 
not Muslims.  They do not act like Muslims. 
 
It may never be completely clear if he is personally driven by grief, vengeance, purely 
village independence, blood feud, an increase in political sway of his minority ethnic 
tribe the Daftani,745 or all of the above.746  But it appears clear that immediate power 
and fame are not major factors.  Furthermore, his efforts were not a revenge-filled 
reactionary counter-revolution against Taliban.  On the contrary, he orchestrated 
guardians’ initial rise the moment he was afforded an initial security bubble from 
absolute Taliban repression.  He went on to help actively secure and stabilize their 
village and offer the opportunity for education.  A drive towards independence from 
any future violent extremist incursion appeared his underlying narrative for why he 
rose up and continued to put his life on the line.  
 
Understanding well and accepting his mortality amidst a war in which he remains a 
primary Taliban target, Baazgul ordained a deputy who wields personal charisma in 
addition to the influence naturally afforded to anyone dubbed Baazgul’s second-in-
command.  This charismatic chief lieutenant, named “Masoud” (for the purposes of 
this study, his true identity will remain hidden—even though the press publishes his 
identity, he is not as well known as the others) from a different block than Baazgul.  
Like Baazgul, Masoud’s charisma allows him to lead followers into battle and 
possible death and allows him to enter any meeting in Marjah to speak openly with 
top visiting political leaders.  When Masoud speaks, the government listens.  Like 
Baazgul, actions appeared to spark or at least strengthen Masoud’s charisma.  In 
battle, Masoud appeared undaunted and resolute.747  He has been known to fight 
Taliban with hunter-killer teams outside Marjah proper and fight in bright white robes 
alongside Marines without permission or coordination—the blaringly white tunics 
possibly making him a greater target in a firefight to show bravery.748  In addition to 
this warrior nature, Masoud also has a unique penchant towards economic 
development.  Accepting his lack of academic credentials having never attended trade 
school or any type of secondary education, he often speaks with his Kabul University-
graduate brother in Kandahar about practical development issues that may help to 
help Marjah.  Specifically, Masoud, with his brother’s counsel, had begun in 2011 to 
build fish farms and help farmers irrigate fields more effectively in Marjah.  Masoud 
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knows his own intellectual limitations and thus admittedly counts on an advisor—a 
sign of modesty and perhaps effective leadership.  Like Baazgul and other qawm 
leaders and deputies, his day-to-day leadership for his qawm afford him influence 
instead of a title or acknowledgement from ISAF or GIRoA. 
 
His words were similar to those of other interview respondents—expressing self-drive 
and autonomy along with a deep hatred of Taliban actions: 
 
…Taliban do not want security.  They do not want to improve 
Afghanistan.  They offer nothing by destruction.  They are cowards.  
They are backwards..Taliban take everyone hostage.  Every person 
hostage.  In Marjah they only allowed people to grow poppy.  SO, WE 
ROSE UP AGAINT THE TALIBAN.  We do not allow Taliban in my 
block.  I will not allow Taliban in MY country.  I PUNCH THE 
TALIBAN IN THE FACE. MY AK IS MY OATH.  What other type of 
promise—what other type of oath—could be more certain…In Marjah, 
people generally want peace.  Just 10% want to help the Taliban.  The 
other 90% want peace…If the Taliban want to join society then fine.  If 
they want to reintegrate, that is okay.  But if not, then I will fight the 
Taliban for the rest of my life.  I will never allow, while alive, the 
Taliban to come into my community…My son, who is only 7 years old, 
already says he wants to fight the Taliban on the frontlines.  He raises 
his arms up like his is holding a weapons and says he really want to 
fight on the front right now…The Taliban are not Muslims.  They are 
terrorists.  The Taliban defame Islam.  They are against Islam.  Islam 
is a good religion.  Islam knows good.  Islam wants peace—as most 
people in Marjah want peace and are good Muslims. 
 
Aside from Baazgul and Masoud, there are only two others this study can identify and 
discuss because these two appear in open source online reporting. Another arbakai 
commander is Marjah’s reportedly most aged elder and former anti-Soviet mujahidin 
commander Haji Mator Khan who had left Marjah prior to 2010 to hide out in 
Helmand’s capital until the Marines cleared most Taliban from Marjah.749  Mator 
Khan, unlike some other self-assigned fervently anti-Taliban Marjah residents hiding 
out in Lashkargah, quickly fulfilled his promise to return to Marjah.  Possibly driven 
by the death of his son at the hands of the Taliban, Mator Khan used his sway as the 
most senior elder750 to raise a Marjah militia unit in his block after Baazgul’s initial 
efforts.  With his clout and understanding of historical informal governance, Mator 
Khan inspired numerous other Marjah blocks to dedicate militiamen.751  
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Like Masoud and the rest of the militiamen, Mator Khan was able to weave together a 
rich narrative of personal loss, nationalism, and determined fortitude to rise up 
independently against Taliban for a future of village autonomy: 
 
I lost my son and lost much of my family to the Taliban.  I am 55 years 
old and oppose the Taliban.  I will never willingly allow the Taliban 
back into Marjah.  This I swear...Islam does not allow Muslims to kill 
innocents.  And the Taliban kills Muslims and everyone.  Everyone is 
innocent.  Everyone is neutral.  No matter your religion.  And Islam 
does not allow killing—especially killing of innocents.  Afghanistan 
does not want Taliban, nor does Afghanistan want the Taliban culture.  
The Taliban are from Pakistan, and Pakistan is the source of the 
Taliban.  The Afghan Taliban are not strong.  All misery is due 
ultimately to Pakistan.  Pakistan creates the suicide bombers.  It is 
Waziristan from where they come.  That is where most of the Taliban 
are.  They do not want security or peace.  Like in Pakistan, where there 
is no peace and security, the Taliban want Afghanistan to be the same 
thing.  They want a place and a culture of fighting.  And Afghanistan 
will not want to lose its culture.  And the Taliban will interfere with our 
culture.  We must talk with the Taliban and see if they will join the 
government.  We must teach them and make them realize that life is 
good, and they can join society.  If the Taliban do not want this—if they 
do not wish to re-join society—then the Afghans will fight the Taliban 
and fight them for however long is necessary.  My sons, local children, 
and everyone around here hate the Taliban.  My sons go to school, but 
the Taliban would never allow this.  And this fact upsets my children.  
My children, like the other children around here, are keenly aware of 
this.  And are upset about the Taliban for this reason. 
 
While Baazgul, Masoud, and Mator Khan may be considered the most influential and 
important charismatic leaders of the 400-strong fighting force, some individual 
fighters also appear to embody an inspiring and almost berserker charisma to push out 
violent extremist and attain autonomy.  One such guardian saturated local 
contemporary folklore, and with such name recognition he has likely made it high on 
the local Taliban hit list.  This person known only as Koko Jan is said to have run 
down the street alone after gun-wielding Taliban with only a knife.  Alone, he enjoyed 
running out into the desert outside Marjah to hunt and kill Taliban members: “Marine 
sources maintain that Koko Jan [one of the first to join the militias] was observed 
running after several Taliban into the desert alone, and that he successfully shot the 
perpetrators.”752  His stories grew to legend amongst arbakai and ISAF members 
alike.  Today he also finds his way to visiting western media sources on his own 
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volition to speak about his dedication to self-determination, apparently unconcerned 
with his high profile bringing the possibility of especially acute Taliban retribution.753 
 
Without formal GIRoA appointment, Marjah arbakai charismatics have earned an 
authority over militiamen.  Their dedication and almost berserker attitude towards 
undauntedly killing Taliban at great risk to their own health, lives, and families likely 
inspire, spark, or at least strengthen Marjah arbakai’s enduring operations against the 
Taliban.  With such figures at the helm of this southern Helmandi movement, it is no 
surprise that arbakai goals to self-determination are resolute and committed each day. 
 
Observers of Marjah’s arbakai might wonder why the village would not descend into 
fighting amongst the many qawm—with powerful and armed block elders turning on 
one another for more power.  An observer may also wonder why the theme of self-
determination is ubiquitous.  The answer is in Marjah’s geography.  The block system 
creates a balance of power for Marjah.  If one block or one block elder gains too much 
power, the other block elders will unite to check his power.  Additionally, when 
Marjahns want to elect a district governor or mullah, they typically want someone 
from outside Marjah, so that no one man disrupts the delicate balance.  In short, the 
block system helps to cut down on the possibility of warlord-ism and helps to promote 
unity.754   
 
This balance of power may also help to ensure the relative unanimity of goals of those 
interviewed for this study.  If all the blocks agree to a decision—for example, to raise 
an arbakai to gain village autonomy—then arbakai followers may feel confident that 
the entire village upholds any decree.755  Such unity allowed the arbakai to rise up 
block-by-block like dominos.756  One officer described the spread as “viral.”757  While 
other natural anti-Taliban uprisings flail before dissolving into intra and inter-tribal 
disputes,758 Marjah’s internal balance of power likely helps to maintain its cohesion 
and longevity.    
 
In summary, guardian commanders and charismatics shared with other militiamen the 
beliefs that Taliban brought instability and an alien ideology.  They then channelled 
these feelings into autonomously raising militia units that would defeat Taliban and 
then offer a constructive future according to the town’s will.  Furthermore, the 
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structure of the leadership helped ensure that blocks would continue to be united in its 
goals and actions. 
 
The goal of independence via self-sufficiency is not only showcased in the words and 
actions of Marjah’s guardian leaders and fighters but also in centuries of historical 
precedent.  This town’s movement, in historical context, appeared one of the latest 
examples of a traditional value of autonomy against outside would-be oppressive 
actors.  While the last chapter found that fighting for one’s qawm was not a primary 
verbal narrative, the next section will look to the qawm value of self-determination as 
a storied and practiced centre of gravity.   
 
7.4 Self-Determination: A Centre of Gravity 
 
Though most guardians were self-identified nationalists and did not speak of fighting 
for tribalism, it was the qawm system that was an innately accepted vehicle for the 
arbakai’s rise, structure, and efforts towards self-determination. With self-sufficiency, 
the qawm system was the method for locals to organize and rise.  Arbakai’s 
immediate and viral birth759 occurred block-by-block like dominos.760  Even as 
nationalism was a war cry, qawm continued to appear to be the strongest identity of 
those in town even well after the arbakai was stood up.  Block elders continued to 
hold the most power and responsibility—far more than the District Governor.761  
Likewise, block elders became arbakai sub-commanders unless the block elder felt 
old or infirmed and appointed someone else from the same block.  Furthermore, 
guardians foremost were expected to patrol and protect their own blocks.  The qawm 
system was the method through which those in Marjah rose and fought.762 
 
Encoded in this qawm identity, in the case of Marjah, was foremost this sense of self-
determination.  This central value has historical precedent.  As the second chapter on 
the history of southern rural Afghanistan explained, qawm often fight against 
invading armies and suppressive central regimes.  Ultimately they fight for the aim of 
autonomy against entities that would otherwise wish to impose laws and ways of life 
foreign to rural qawm.763  Such an historical phenomenon holds relevance for Marjah 
today.  It was the continued goal of self-determination for all Marjah’s qawm that 
appeared the greatest motivation as opposed to the idea of qawm itself.764 
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The village’s arbakai appear to follow a deeply engrained tradition that spans 
centuries.  The strength and resilience of traditional Pashtun rural societal structures 
through Afghanistan’s tumultuous history underlines the historical precedence of 
Marjah’s arbakai.  The qawm system became the phenomenon to which rural 
residents in southern Afghanistan often clung despite and sometimes because of 
outside or central government threats.  At its essence, this rural system was a vehicle 
for locals to consistently seek their own communal goals and was not a mechanism 
that existed only because of tradition.  Within the history of qawm either fighting 
outside actors or reuniting after times of extreme turmoil, is a sense of autonomy and 
self-sufficiency.765  Thus the Marjah arbakai’s overriding theme of self-determination 
is a contemporary manifestation of a consistent goal that span generations back.  
 
In history, Pashtuns felt they must, whenever possible, protect themselves, their 
qawm, and their qawm’s way of life.  This sense of self-sufficiency and self-
determination allows qawm to often be the default identity in times of instability even 
when such instability comes at the hands of internal greater tribal warfare.   This clan 
system would never lay down weapons and ammunition—even assault rifles and 
grenades today—willingly because most Pashtuns in rural Afghanistan count on their 
qawm foremost to defend their lives and land.  The idea of disarming qawm is 
uncomfortable and even suicidal in the eyes of rural Pashtuns.766 Clans have in the 
past killed to maintain their autonomy.    
Historically, anti-oppressive-central-government and counter-outsider movements 
normally begin qawm-by-qawm767 for independence—beginning locally where they 
resided.  While lasting central governments in the past typically relied on influential 
tribal leadership and landowners to help collect taxes near municipalities, no 
government has appeared to co-opt rural qawm enduringly.768  Even Afghan warlords 
who attempt to subjugate rural qawm systems normally fail in the face of this 
persistent Pashtun identity.769   In short, self-determination historically has acted as 
centre of gravity and rallying cry for uprising.    
If the historical pattern of independence amongst qawm was so strong, why does this 
phenomenon not manifest itself into uprisings against outside forces throughout 
Afghanistan today?  In fact, self-determination is so relevant as to become a main 
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driver of many other contemporary movements on which there is limited data.  
Similar to Marjah, there is evidence that other relatively successful contemporary 
counter-extremist clan movements held autonomy and self-sufficiency as a means and 
an end.  Although not part of this case study, highlighting other successful counter-
violent-extremist grassroots movements in Afghanistan and Pakistan underline the 
still-relevant deep-seated historical value of independence as a driver.  
 
The following anti-violent-extremist movements operated with autonomy, and their 
operations were not contingent on salaries, projects, or peace accords.  They show the 
will and resolve to fight Taliban with whatever they have on hand and choose not to 
use their initial reaction to Taliban violence as a bargaining chip with GIRoA or the 
United States government to gain anything for themselves.  The following movements 
appear also to show a self-driven resolve.  Independence and independent action 
appears, according to the reports available, to allow the movements to flourish locally.  
Marjah was one manifestation of a seemingly fervent value of Pashtun qawm, that, 
however, is not contemporarily ubiquitous as the previous section explained of other 
movements that ceased over lack of funding. 
 
• Andar, 2012: Reports suggest the Andar awakening may be bent on self-
determination beyond its initial acrimony over Taliban actions.  The uprising 
in the Andar District of Ghazni Province in May 2012, successfully drove out 
Taliban wholly from villages.770  The Taliban tried again for a foothold in the 
same villages, but locals reportedly repelled the incursion again.771  According 
to press reports, three months after the uprising began in Andar’s village of 
Payendi the movement grew to 250 armed citizens with control supposedly 
over approximately 50 villages.772   
 
These anti-Taliban rebels armed themselves with their own personal weapons 
and claimed no outside or government support—no weapons and no money 
come from the government or Coalition Forces, according to the fighters.  
They have not claimed alliance with U.S. elements, and uprising members 
have openly denied supposed reports of GIRoA support.773  Rumours, 
however, abound that Hikmatyar’s Hezb-e-Islami774 militia group and GIRoA 
security chief Asadullah Khalid (originally from Ghazni) have provided some 
forms of personal support to elements of the uprising.  As well former Ghazni 
governor turned national minister of tribal affairs has claimed some role as a 
leader within the movement—though citizen fighters appear wary over his ties 
to GIRoA and past perceived corruption.775  Some reports state that Khalid has 
even given hundreds of thousands of dollars just to select friends who may be 
commanders in the movement though Khalid himself denies these rumours.776  
To what levels this support occurs, how much this support allows the uprising 
	   168	  
to be autonomous vice subjugated to an outside influence, and how much non-
natives want to seem apart of a successful movement in speeches alone is 
unclear.777  Nonetheless, in their actions, the Andar awakening seems to have 
unfolded with autonomy and resolve. 
 
• Spin Boldak, 2006:  Colonel Abdul Raziq (as of March 2013 he held the rank 
of General and operated as Kandahar Provincial Chief of Police) led a small 
unit of his fellow tribesmen against Taliban elements.  Like Marjah, the Spin 
Boldak movement continued unfazed by lack of direct outside support.  
Tenacious offensive operations defined the character and propaganda of the 
movement.  Colonel Abdul Raziq’s tribal militia from the Adozai clan of the 
Achakzai tribe tenaciously killed Taliban leaders and IED cells.  His militia—
in 2006 numbering from 400 to 1,700 at various periods—conducted major 
incursions far outside tribal boundaries.  His exploits included disparate 
regions such as Arghandab, Maiwand, Zangabad, and Bandi Taimoor—areas 
in southern Afghanistan far from his home village.778 
 
Their operations were so aggressive and self-sufficient that self-defence also 
became a powerful message. Raziq had supposedly killed so many Taliban 
that taking the fight to the Taliban as brutally and swiftly as possible may have 
been Raziq’s only defence.  He likely became a priority target for Taliban, and 
Raziq may have felt that continuation of operations may have been his road to 
survival.779 
 
Raziq sought funding by any means necessary, never wanting to be beholden 
to any outside entity, and exploited his earlier ties to border checkpoint guards 
to take money and drugs.  Raziq critics claim he was filling only his personal 
coffers.  However he continued the fight against the Taliban and still today 
remains the most renowned single anti-Taliban fighter as the Provincial Chief 
of Police in the province of Kandahar.780  How much his movement is a 
manifestation of Pashtun qawm independence from Taliban influence vice a 
vendetta-ridden rise of a cult of personality is unclear.  What is clear, however, 
is that at its inception, Raziq’s followers showed a drive towards independence 
through self-sufficiency. 
 
• Dir, Pakistan, 2009:  The anti-Taliban leaders and fighters continued the fight 
and did not appear to pause to gain leverage for government money.  Security 
became such a paramount issue that heated debates ensued on whether to and, 
if so, how much to ask for outside military support.  The anti-militant fighters 
were, in 2009, split between how much government military intervention 
would be wise.  Some felt that seemingly callous indiscriminate government 
bombing would mean civilian deaths and a population’s exodus.  Others felt 
that strong Pakistani military operations might be necessary to completely 
destroy Taliban remnants in the area—an all-out-war would be the only way to 
keep villagers safe.781  Both sides of the argument appear wary of government 
involvement and the side effects of clumsy military support.  But each sect 
seemed keen on increasing overall security and only allowing outside support 
and intervention solely in the name of ridding Taliban from their area. 
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In conclusion, autonomy, both as a goal and as a means by which to achieve that end, 
was the overriding theme with historical practice for those successfully fighting 
Taliban.  While regional GIRoA officials and Afghanistan federal laws nurtured this 
independence, the Taliban proved they did not and would not allow Marjah to govern 
and secure itself independently with a view to continue security and education.  It is 
conceivable that this militia may have revolted or protested government or outside 
military units had these alien actors elected not to allow the volunteers to operate 
independently towards a goal of autonomy.  But it was, instead, the Taliban that locals 
saw as a threat to independence.  It is not surprising, then, that other relatively long-
lived uprisings against Taliban violent extremists in Pakistan and Afghanistan also 
sought self-determination.   
 
Despite that self-determination seemed a storied centre of gravity in Marjah, ISAF’s 
position in southern Helmand, prior to the arbakai’s rise, had the potential to stifle the 
militia’s relative freedom to act and seek their own aims.782 Although legally arbakai 
had protections and authorities under the modern Afghanistan constitution, the heavy 
presence of ISAF troops along with military doctrine that barely accounted for self-
driven militias had the potential to retard drives for self-governance.  That the 
arabakai could have the ability to seek self-determination was not a fiat accompli. 
 
7.5 Military Troops Strengthen Self-Determination  
 
At first look, analysts could doubt the veracity of self-determination due to heavy 
ISAF presence; DSF doctrine, which calls for direct action by ISAF; NATO focus on 
formal government at the expense of interaction with informal governance; VSO-type 
methodologies, which require direct recruitment by ISAF troops to build artificial 
civilian militias; and ISAF commanders placing this doctrine and mindset on the 
village of Marjah as a main effort and mainstay of military and economic 
development strategy.  Although arbakai are legally protected phenomena within the 
Afghan laws, a student of the military surge and outside-funded projects in the 
millions of U.S. dollars could also logically assess that the actions of the local anti-
Taliban civilian efforts were just extra guns in a tightly planned campaign to 
overwhelm Taliban in Marjah with conventional ISAF Army and Marine troops.  
However, Marjah’s case was exceptional.    
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The foreign troops’ tactics on the ground in and near Marjah assured that the actions 
and words of Marjah’s militia were not part of some ISAF information campaign but 
instead truly represented beliefs of the locals.  Furthermore, the U.S. and allied forces 
and civilian counterparts’ approach, which were minimalist with regards to this 
arbakai, revealed that the local civilian fighters’ actions indeed required self-
sufficiency and self-reliance.   
 
The U.S. Marines and their other NATO military and civilian partners effectively 
identified and enabled a societal resiliency in lieu of a more direct approach. Instead 
of following the literal approaches of the District Stability Framework and Village 
Stability Operations doctrine that called for direct U.S. presence, activities, 
development projects, and security, the local Soldier and Marines chose to focus on 
empowering this resilient entity with a minimalist approach.  The view was that if 
resilient actors, whose goals were in consonance with the goals of ISAF and the 
United States and her partners in Afghanistan, were already showing signs of success 
it would behove a light approach—a strategy to slightly empower a known anti-
Taliban force to succeed.  This was a far cry from directly recruiting a militia to do 
ISAF’s bidding.  It was, instead, an acknowledgement of a resilient and effective 
grassroots effort that has had a history of being the most consistent and robust entity 
against outside actors.  Fortunately for ISAF and GIRoA, alien actors were the 
Taliban in the eyes of Marjahns as ISAF and GIRoA were enabling Marjah’s self-
determination. 
 
Initial ample security for qawm leaders to organize took several months during the 
2010 spring offensive with help from intervention from the highest-ranking officer in 
Afghanistan. After 90 days, General McChrystal’s frustration grew.  The battalion 
commander in Marjah asked for patience to conduct concerted holistic 
counterinsurgency. Senior NATO civilian advisor in Afghanistan Mark Sedwill 
agreed that patience and a more discreet presence was necessary but also understood 
McChrystal’s frustration over high international expectations.  The ISAF commander 
felt that United States government’s patience was ticking.  McChystal famously called 
the situation in Marjah his “bleeding ulcer,”783 because the operation there had taken 
resources, troops, and money without immediate impact. 
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Commander of coalition forces for southern Afghanistan British Major General Nick 
Carter pushed back and declaratively stated that no new forces were needed in 
Marjah.784  To this McChrystal, before staff, press, and subordinate commanders said 
that Carter felt that way because “it’s your plan.”785  From this conversation ISAF 
sent a second Marine battalion into Marjah with a view to hasten security.  These two 
units, Second Battalion of the Sixth Marine Regiment and Third Battalion of the 
Ninth Marine Regiment, effectively brought the requisite security bubble for locals to 
potentially govern as they once did through traditional qawm.786  However 
international attention, a commander’s intent to use heavy and direct force, and 
stability operations doctrine was a potential recipe to ignore geographically based clan 
systems or even ignite antipathy from the block-qawm system of Marjah. 
 
Doctrine, between 2007 and 2011, called for direct stability operations in which U.S. 
and Coalition Forces would physically conduct or pay for projects to mitigate sources 
of instability.787  The doctrine held no room to simply empower local indigenous 
resilient actors with anti-violent-extremist sentiment788  This doctrine—ISAF 
mandated throughout Afghanistan—the District Stability Framework and its 
subsequent manifestations called for U.S. troops to directly mitigate systemic causes 
of instability instead of allowing clans to stabilize and secure themselves by their own 
volition, vision, tradition, and timeline.789 
 
In addition to the required stability operations framework, there was also the 
precedent of the Village Stability Operations methodology that called for direct 
recruitment of tribesmen as artificial, foreign-recruited auxiliary police units.  In 2010 
Regimental Combat Team-1 Commanding Officer—who would later respect the 
natural arbakai movement—attended a joint Center for Strategic and International 
Studies and RAND meeting in which academics in no uncertain terms suggested that 
Local Defence Forces were the only way to reach a suggested 40:1 security force to 
civilian ratio.790  He also received briefings on the Village Stability Operations 
program in with the Special Forces focused on direct recruitment.791  The concern was 
numbers to thicken counterinsurgency efforts.  The recommendations never called for 
allowing natural rural resiliencies to operate on their own accord in their own manner 
with minimal U.S. involvement. 
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ISAF commanders in Kabul, even after Marines had established initial security, 
planned a heavy direct approach into Helmand—and then Marjah specifically—to 
defeat the Taliban.  This approach had the potential to ignore centuries of proven rural 
resilience of qawm.  Doctrine and a commander’s intent to use overwhelming western 
forces had the potential to either sideline or suppress the natural indigenous qawm 
that had in the past had the tendency to rebel against all outside destabilizing powers.  
U.S. policy ignored the phenomenon that tribes and villages, no matter how displaced 
and how war torn, could be empowered to defeat the Taliban.  Embedded in the U.S. 
trajectory of heavy and direct operations was inevitable failure if Marjah’s qawm 
viewed international forces as an outside threat to their way of life.  The U.S. heavy 
approach could potentially have mired U.S. troops into a drawn-out battle against not 
only the Taliban but also the most enduring Afghan rural system: the qawm and their 
arbakai.  The question was not one of whether the U.S. policy could succeed as much 
as how operators would act on the ground despite inappropriate counterinsurgency 
strategy.   
 
The U.S. troops on the ground in and around Marjah had a unique advantage in 
Afghanistan—an angle that would allow them to ignore doctrine and any Kabul 
NATO and ISAF order to employ a heavy presence in Marjah.  U.S. Marines in 
Helmand were the only units in Afghanistan to command completely their own terrain 
and airspace.  They were also the only who were not under the direct command of the 
supreme coalition commander based in Kabul.  Instead, they answered to a U.S. 
Central Command Marine Corps Lieutenant General.792  Such relative independence 
may have helped the Marine units in and around Marjah to break doctrine and four-
star-in-Kabul commander’s intent by allowing the qawm to operate with 
independence and impunity once Marjah was initially secure enough for the arbakai to 
rise.   
 
Also, the officers on the ground did not ask for permission from Kabul or from 
Division command.  A low profile and light approach was only sanctioned with 
regimental staff.  When rumours and then reports of the Marines’ approach reached 
division levels of command, the Afghans were able to show success in operations, 
allowing the Marines to continue this non-doctrinal minimalist approach.793  Marine 
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advisors on the ground in and around Marjah elected a minimalist approach, waited 
for proof of effect on improvements in stability and security, and then reported this 
success.  At that point, commanders at the division and then through the four-star 
level would have been hard pressed to stop a tradecraft that appeared to meet the 
commander’s end state of stability and local repulsion of Taliban presence, incursion, 
and influence. 
 
This U.S. light approach continued through 2012 and then through the transition in 
2013—although transition initiatives really began as early as 2010 since NATO forces 
allowed arbakai to operate on their own.  The American advisors chose a low 
presence and found that the lower the presence, the better the security forces in 
Marjah—to include the arbakai who conducted the day-to-day internal security—
could independently improve themselves and succeed over the Taliban.  Marine 
advisors found that security would depend on Marines when there was a large 
American presence.  On the other hand, the modest presence and few advisors not 
only gave locals an opportunity to know how to operate without Marine presence.794   
As 2012 Afghan Security Advisor in Marjah U.S. Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel 
Phil Treglia stated, “[i]f you put 19 [U.S.] Marines in one area that meant there are 19 
[U.S.] Marines working to get things done.  And that means there are 19 [Afghans] 
who aren’t doing their job.”795  He and other advisers invested in a constructive 
course of action in which Afghans appeared to operate best in the lead conducting 
their work in their own way.796  U.S. officers consciously chose this approach to allow 
locals to conduct security and stabilization on their own well before transition.  The 
idea was that locals would be on their own soon anyhow so it behoved outside 
security forces to give them independence as immediately as possible.  Only in this 
way can locals gain confidence in themselves and practice the types of self-driven 
operations they would have to conduct post-NATO drawdown and withdrawal.797  
ISAF advisors felt it vital that such resilient Afghan actors gain confidence in 
themselves; they should be able to trust themselves and rely upon themselves.798  
ISAF mentors and advisors in Marjah saw themselves as gentle persuaders or 
intellectual helpers—allowing locals to fail, learn, and strengthen on their own.799  
Additionally, they noted that the locals were in the best position to secure and 
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stabilize their own blocks because they know the people, the terrain, and the patterns 
of the society.800   
The local U.S. conventional Marine commands eventually used programmatic money 
and short training sessions to further empower the arbakai.  However, these foreign 
troops created nothing.  As the commander for 3rd battalion 6th Marine regiment in 
southern Marjah stated on 3 July 2011, the tribes had militias before as a natural 
security arm of qawm.  ISAF recognizing arbakai with modest salaries and basic 
tactical training was just a slight elevation of what was already there.  He surmised 
that after programmatic funding, the arbakai and qawm structures would continue as 
they had before. Marjah successfully used locals who already enjoyed influence, into 
a hands-off minimalist Village Stability Operations-like program.801  Any funding and 
training was simply a recognition and slight empowerment of what already had 
existed naturally.  However, according to two regimental commanders commanding 
operations in Marjah, two battalion commanders commanding operations in Marjah, 
and interviews of locals, the titles and anorexic training do not substantially change 
the efficacy, disposition, strength, motive, or identity of the militia. 
   
Stability operators focused on strengthening resilience against current and future 
instability—a resiliency in this case being “the capability of a strained body to recover 
its size and shape after deformation caused especially by compressive stress” and “an 
ability to recover from or adjust easily to misfortune or change.”802  To some degree 
ISAF operators went beyond enabling resilience and likely were identifying anti-
fragility803—referring to similar entities that not only have the capability to withstand 
change and misfortune but also actually become stronger through adversity.  
 
However, stability operators were looking for a specific type of resiliency or anti-
fragility.  Specifically, operators were attempting to identify and leverage a kind of 
resilience that would lead to a specific type of stability that is defined by the U.S. and 
partner nations’ end state with regards to violent extremism. These particular resilient 
entities specifically counter violent extremism and stabilize their communities to 
disallow future violent extremist influence, presence, and incursion.  According to the 
campaign plan, “stable enough” means specifically incapacitating violent extremists 
and building impermissible environments to future violent extremists.804  Their 
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enduring absence becomes “stable enough” within the framework of the formal 
United States’ campaign goals.   
 
Therefore the troops on the ground in southern Helmand were identifying and 
enabling a resilient person or network that strived for stability through increasing 
support for governance, lessening support for insurgency, and strengthening societal 
capacity with a particular view to permanently undermine violent extremist presence, 
incursion, and influence.  What this translated into on the ground was local actors 
using indigenous sustainable solutions on a self-regulated timeline—quietly 
empowering local immune systems against the conditions that allow NATO’s enemies 
safe haven and growth.  Effectively, ISAF commands in southern Helmand identified 
and enabled a militia that:805 
 
• Actively counters, undermines, or lessens support and growth of violent 
extremist groups and supporting criminal organizations and cells. 
• Offers or supports alternatives to viable violent extremist programs. 
• Increases support for government and/or locally recognized governance 
institutions and leaders such as town councils, block elders, and other 
traditional governance entities, who show attributes of also being resiliencies. 
• Strengthens societal capacity and/or cohesion—the ability of a community to 
address its own sources of instability such as security for education. 
• Does not show characteristics of supporting or contributing to zero-sum power 
games because the block system suppressed one elder gaining unwanted 
village-wide power. 
• Displays determined and sustained motivation through narratives and action to 
undermine support for insurgents, increase support for governance, and 
strengthen societal capacity. 
• Displays self-motivation that is not for sale by violent extremists.  
• Actively supports or leads efforts to kinetically cause sustained continuous 
defeat of violent extremist cells. 
 
In the case of Marjah, tactics to leverage the arbakai specifically included a plethora 
of minimalist activities.  From doing nothing to ensuring initial ample security for 
block elders to meet at the militia’s inception, the following is a short summary of 
distinct modest approaches employed:806 
 
• Avoided intervention or communication but instead simply acknowledge and 
keep distance. In many cases “identifying and reporting” on resiliencies was a 
constructive course of action assuming these consonant bodies are able to 
conduct their business as usual. 
	   176	  
• Created a security bubble to allow resilient actors freedom of movement and 
freedom to plan, collaborate, and grow in strength. To even meet and organize, 
resilient bodies required some security space from violent extremists, because 
these societal lynchpins willing to stand up against insurgents may face the 
threat of assassination, execution, and torture. 
• At first, the U.S. troops also had a quick reaction force at the ready to surge in 
an area if threats build.  Beyond just a security bubble, the arbakai leaders may 
have required confidence that competent, powerful, and quick reaction units 
are available if violent extremists were to overwhelm them, kinetically and 
suddenly.  If such resilient actors do not have the hardware, ammunition, and 
knowledge to at least defend themselves against an attack, they may be less 
likely to sign up for certain death from reprisal without a sense of security. 
• Trained resiliencies on stability operations best practices such as finding and 
mitigating those sources of instability that may allow insurgency to gain new 
traction in the given area of operations.  Specifically DSF was one class that 
was provided at the District Centre. 
• Negotiated with district and provincial governments to appoint a consonant 
body to formal or informal community or government positions if this resilient 
actor is willing and believes it could expand his or her reach.  In Marjah the 
block elders comprised a GIRoA and ISAF-sanctioned Community Assembly. 
• The security enabled meetings with other resiliencies to foster networking.  
ISAF allowed liaison with Afghan-led radio stations and other media outlets 
and provided logistics for religious training and/or meetings with religious 
leaders. 
• Allowed local resilient actors to conduct their own messaging—directly to 
international press and to studies such as this one. 
 
The mindset of foreign stabilization practitioners in Marjah can be described as the 
ability to see different types of stabilizing powerbrokers that already exist and 
leverage these indigenous bodies to meet the stated tactical, operational, and grand 
strategic objectives.  The objective would be ideally to strengthen these community 
linchpins that already strive to set conditions antithetical to both insurgency and the 
unstable climate that may enable insurgency.  Titles for this framework could include 
“stability operations by proxy,” “light footprint counterinsurgency,” “operational 
minimalism,” or “resiliency appreciation.”  But “consonance” is most appropriate 
because its primary meaning of “harmony or agreement among components”807 
suggests U.S. or other outside entities acting in concert with those personalities and 
organizations that are already naturally affecting the mission’s end state.  
 
In addition to the local ISAF units in Marjah, provincial and district GIRoA also 
acknowledged this arbakai as an independent, self-motivated phenomenon. GIRoA 
publically stated that the Marjah arbakai was a self-initiated phenomenon—not an 
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artificial GIRoA and ISAF initiative.  The Helmand governor’s office claimed that the 
tribesmen were not a government-initiated arbakai but instead a completely grassroots 
spontaneous movement sparked on the heels of Taliban suppression.  The office 
claimed the locals were viscerally “fed up” with violent extremist crimes against 
humanity.808  Even the 2011 Helmand governor spokesman Dawoud Ahmadi 
emphatically stated that the village security force was unconnected to government or 
would ever be809 even though the arbakai would eventually receive some funding and 
training from international forces.   
 
While the Taliban were unwelcome, those outside entities, to include NATO units and 
the presidentially appointed district governor, appeared to be in Marjah as welcome 
guests by the arbakai and militia commanders.  This sense of hospitality810 in general 
is not just a congenial phenomenon but plays into a Pashtun tradition of nanawatia811 
or offer of physical refuge.  Although Marjahns would unlikely wish to house outside 
Afghans and non-Afghans in their personal compound, ISAF and GIRoA 
representatives were welcome in the village in general.  The Taliban, when they first 
came to Marjah in the 1990s, sought safe haven in Marjah compounds.  However after 
Taliban tried to upend the village’s systems of governance and security, they were 
welcome no more. 812 
In summary, in contrast to the surge on Marjah and in the face of doctrinal U.S. 
military strategies that called for U.S. forces to maintain heavy presence and daily 
oversight over the arbakai, the local U.S. tactical units in the village quickly elected 
for a minimalist approach protecting the arbakai’s goals of autonomy.  U.S. Marine 
Corps commanders in Marjah stated publicly that they were identifying and allowing 
societal structures and resiliencies that already existed to operate with autonomy.813  
Effectively ISAF units located in and around Marjah were tapping into a resiliency 
that has historically proven a formidable force from unwelcome outsiders; they 
nurtured the autonomy and self-reliance that the arbakai sought.  The local ISAF 
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7.6 Conclusion 
The foreign security forces, against precedent, chose to enable instead of stifle drives 
for independence of outside control.  This allowed this study to uncover that Marjah 
militia’s self-determination was an underlining motivation and goal.  The fighters’ 
interviews, the actions and words of the arbakai block commanders, and the 
willingness of guardians to fight and die without financial incentive reveal not only 
self-reliance but also a move towards autonomy.  Self-determination was not an 
abstract societal aim but instead a viable way to live and operate each day for the 
arbakai.   
 
Autonomy was not only a major theme in and of itself, but it also helped define the 
other motivations of this counter-violent-extremist grassroots movement.  As 
guardians sought stability and a future of education against a formidable opposing 
alien ideology, self-determination coloured their words and actions.  Security and 
education were according to their own design and vision for which they fought 
autonomously.  Although geographic clan-ism was not an explicit driver of the 
fighters, it was the nature of the qawm—to seek autonomy without outside help—that 




















In conclusion, this case study of a single counter-violent-extremist movement found 
self-determination as the central theme of the motivations, actions, and goals of 
Marjah’s militiamen.  The arbakai prided itself in its self-reliance and independent 
mindset.816  Militiamen felt they and they alone would have to defeat violent 
extremism, refusing to rely only on foreign or national formal security forces.  
Autonomy—underlining both oral narratives and the independent nature by which 
they fought and suffered—appeared the centre of gravity and inundated their 
responses to the interviews, their idealistic and perhaps exaggerated verbal goals, and 
their determined spirit.   
 
This chapter will now, in summary, answer the initial research questions on what 
conditions allowed the arbakai to operate and succeed, and what outside military and 
government actions enabled such a grassroots movement to thrive and seek 
independence.  For this last question, it should be noted, that one cannot study the 
Marjah case in a vacuum especially as the militia existed and acted in close proximity 
to arguably one of the most powerful military forces in the world that chose to focus 
on Marjah as a once main effort of the Afghanistan campaign.  Then, the chapter will 
address its impact on counterinsurgency literature with regards to theory, policy, and 
practice.  Finally, it will provide an outlook on future comparative studies of other 
grassroots counter-violent-extremist movements and where this case study may lie 
within potential forthcoming scholarship.  
 
8.1 Drivers and Conditions of Marjah’s Militia 
 
What were the initial conditions—the security, economy, previous interactions with 
violent extremists, and geography—for a potentially successful grassroots kinetic 
movement? For this particular case study, an initial ISAF security bubble was 
necessary.  To even meet, organize, and plan, the arbakai and block elders required 
some security space817 without the immediate threat of violent extremists.818  
Assassinations, executions, and torture face any tribal or village leader considering 
undermining violent extremists.819  Potential uprisings also required confidence that 
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competent, powerful, and swift quick reaction units would be available if violent 
extremists were to overwhelm them suddenly.820  Although the militia, in a matter of 
months from its birth, appeared to be the most reliable, consistent, and effective 
security unit in the village proper, an initial security bubble from outside security 
forces was necessary for the militia to begin.  
 
Economically, the semi-arable land allowed the locals to farm, once security was in 
order so they were not necessarily reliant on millions of U.S. dollars of ISAF 
development projects or the Taliban poppy trade in order to put food on the table.821   
In the deserts surrounding Marjah, where locals claim that poppy is the only viable 
crop given the dry soil,822 the Taliban give out poppy seeds and demand yields from 
the harvest.  When growers fail to provide enough poppies, farmers go into debt.  
Taliban may also defend poppy fields whose owners could otherwise not fend off or 
pay off government-led poppy eradication.823  Being economically dependent on the 
insurgency would likely make a populace wary of biting the hand that feeds by 
warring with violent extremists.824  On the otherhand, in Marjah, the locals continued 
nutritious subsistence farming once there was ample stability for civilians to tend to 
their fields along the secondary canals inside the village.  Low-technology traditional 
subsistence farming825 allowed fighters and their families to sustain anti-Taliban 
operations without relying on outside subsidies or Taliban help.  
 
Regarding past interactions with violent extremists, the locals received a taste of 
arguably some of the most violent Taliban suppression of citizens in Afghanistan.  
Taliban leaders ranged from would-be drug lords, who previously turned the village 
into an opium market and used the locals as unwilling servants for poppy growth and 
the drug trade;826 hardcore adherents to Taliban’s quasi-Deobandi faith that held no 
room for Marjah’s tribalism and mysticism;827 those that received and acted on orders 
from the top Quetta leadership as Marjah became a main effort828 not only for ISAF 
but also for the Taliban;829 and insurgent commanders, who saw themselves as closer 
to al-Qa`ida in nature willing to torture and execute civilians seemingly without 
restraint.830  In short, such violence from a perceived alien entity and foreign ideology 
flamed local hatred of the militiamen and appeared to deepen their commitment to 
defeat violent extremists.  Most importantly to the guardians, though, was that the 
Taliban were obstacles to local political autonomy and independent action.  The mere 
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speed of the militia’s rise and relative success over the Taliban followed quickly by 
farming, qawm governance operating as they had before the Taliban, local healthcare, 
and education831—even when it meant locals opening private homes up to teach 
children when schools were not yet built832—revealed local resolve to be autonomous 
and act according to own set of goals.   
 
The unique geography of Marjah created clear neighborhoods by which the arbakai 
could rely to build sub-militia units.833  Furthermore, it allowed the civilian fighters 
attainable missions amidst perhaps exaggerated and idealistic claims of securing 
Afghanistan for a future free of Taliban and a destiny that allowed nationwide 
education to better young lives and build intellectual resilience against insurgent 
influence.  While fighters, during the interviews, spoke of ridding the country of 
Taliban to allow security and education, they were able to funnel such grand 
aspirations into realistic chores: helping their smaller block units secure their own 
areas to allow for schools and independence.  Furthermore, the balance of power 
amongst the blocks writ large may enable longevity as the overall system discourages 
warlords or particular block elders to gain traditionally unwarranted power.   
 
The final condition that allowed this movement to excel was a mindset of independent 
action that allowed the movement to thrive.  In the case of Marjah, there were a 
myriad of distinct motivations to include a goal of security and education while 
ridding the area of an alien force in the name of the nation.  However, each idea 
hinged on independently spirited action as a means and relative autonomy as an end.  
This motivation and aim appeared to be a central source of strength for the uprising—
providing a core forte that compelled civilian guards to stay at their post, patrol, and 
kill Taliban even as they were targets of the insurgency’s highest leaders834 with 
limited resources and sometimes no income.835  Enabling their ambitions for 
independence, national laws, provincial Afghan government representatives, and 
outside military operations enabled and protected the objectives and tactics of this 
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8.2 Foreign Military Actions that Enabled Independence 
 
Furthermore what are the conditions, mindset, and strategy of outside military 
forces—both the Coalition Forces and the Afghan formal security services—to help 
such a movement to be able to sprout in the first place?  Because grassroots 
movements and their motivations did not stand amidst an empty canvas, this study is 
also a story of the tradecraft of the foreign military.  The new framework that those 
units in Marjah elected to employ both minimalized destabilizing side effects and 
guaranteed that local guardians would speak and perform according to their own aims.  
It allowed and nurtured the self-reliance locals used and independence the arbakai 
sought.   
 
NATO military units in other areas of Afghanistan normally followed the doctrine of 
Village Stability Operations836 and the District Stability Framework837 that called not 
only for presence and activities by outside actors but also promoted the notion that 
outside actors must recruit, oversee, and guide the actions of local militias and 
activities.838  Doctrine still today holds that outside military forces along with civilian 
diplomatic and development partners should spend money and mitigate sources of 
instability directly to bring about security and stability.839  However, the case of 
Marjah stands out in stark contrast as one in which the opposite was done—outside 
forces nurtured independence and allowed a natural movement to flourish.840  The 
findings of this study thus point to the potential upside of a counterinsurgency 
approach in which outside forces simply allow or empower local initiative to stabilize 
areas vice direct and heavy intervention.   
 
Operational,841 historical, 842 and legal843 precedent suggests leveraging community 
resiliencies, in this case, was an efficient, effective, and direct way to reach campaign 
goals.  The strategy strives to attain consonance with indigenous stabilizing forces.  
The tactic in Marjah ensured a local understanding of stability, minimalized potential 
destabilizing secondary effects of heavy outside presence and money, and promoted 
transition.  In other words, it was in ISAF’s best interest, in this case, to have allowed 
Marjah’s militia to seek its own goals of autonomy with independent resolve. 
 
	   183	  
Concerning the challenge of understanding how locals interpret stability—since this 
definition would theoretically be the goal of doctrinal stability operations—the U.S. 
Marines were able to simply empower local resilient actors to define and seek their 
own goals, whatever they might be.  Instead of trying to uncover a myriad of local 
perspectives and directly attempting to reach this end with a large military and 
civilian force, the local NATO units simply enabled the militia to act on its own.844 
 
In the same vein as overcoming the conundrum of defining local stability by simply 
enabling locals to build their own capacity, this tactically minimalist approach 
allowed potentially effective information operations—the coordination of public 
affairs messaging, psychological operations, and the development, dissemination, and 
reception of information.845  The locals, themselves, can better employ master 
narratives because they understand the locally deep-seated ideologies, belief systems, 
history, and language as no outsider can.  Only locals are fluent in the visceral and 
logical, rational and irrational, personalized and ubiquitous messages.  And only at the 
local level, amongst trusted colleagues, friends, relatives, and neighbors will person-
to-person transmission of narratives take on intensity, emotion, and color.  Through 
trust, recognized monuments and temples, visual motifs, and repetition will oral 
narratives naturally travel and strengthen.  Locals are the experts at local 
messaging.846   
 
Oral narratives may reflect the identity of a community in such a way that NATO 
information operations may be wise to leverage or amplify local stories instead of 
creating new messages.  Each narrative is grounded in history, expressing a group’s 
identity, accomplishments, challenges, ambitions, and desires.  And through such 
narratives, communities can recognize their identity amidst outsiders and neighboring 
communities.  During developing events—such as regional warfare, foreign incursion, 
and environmental disasters for example—narratives allow a community to gauge 
meaning and understanding.  Narratives emerge without necessarily conscious design 
as communities continue to develop and preserve identity, sometimes inoculating 
societies from outside ideas and ideologies.847  Thus a minimalist approach that only 
enables or allows natural arbakai verbal statements to spread naturally may be optimal 
for a place like Marjah, where locals’ goals jibe with the Coalition Force-led 
counterinsurgency.  
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This mindset of finding and empowering resilient bodies cuts across traditional 
military and civil service lines of operation.  Most United States and civilian units in 
Afghanistan adhere to at least three lines of operation: security, development, and 
governance.848  The challenge arrives when military units allocate money, personnel, 
and time evenly or with some uninformed artificial allocation across lines of operation 
that may not be appropriate for the environment.  By focusing on resilient bodies, 
commanders could better prioritize lines of operation to meet the mission end state.  
Instead of a unit spending about a third of its effort on each aforementioned standard 
line of operation, it can prioritize these lines of effort around specific actions to 
identify and promote Marjah arbakai, who play a role in security directly and in 
governance and development indirectly by maintaining ample stability for elders to 
govern, locals to farm, and young persons to attend school. 
 
Additionally, by minimizing operations, presence, and even interaction with the 
arbakai, the NATO units on the ground in and around Marjah could minimize 
destabilizing effects.  In other areas of Afghanistan the foreign forces often 
unwittingly exacerbated instability.  The paradox of stability operations is that they 
can have destabilizing side effects when foreign entities are the protagonists. 
Practitioners may be exacerbating the very thing they are attempting to alleviate.849  If 
stability is the “normal” functioning of governance, level of violence, and adherence 
to laws as seen through the eyes of any given Afghan,850 then even the existence of 
outside actors may bring about change that may slow return to normalcy.  
  
The very presence of foreign security forces and foreign aid organizations—even 
those claiming to conduct stabilization activities—can have destabilizing effects.851  
U.S. forces can bring insecurity852 when those units become violent extremist targets 
and civilians are caught in the crossfire—both literally and with regards to 
allegiances.  Also, there is some evidence that foreign military presence can bolster 
insurgencies’ rhetoric and perhaps strengthen violent extremist recruitment.853  The 
presence of foreign security services play into the modern violent extremist 
propaganda efforts that the West is at war with Islam and ultimately attempting to 
occupy Muslim-majority lands.854  
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Regarding militia salaries and equipment, the commands on the ground elected a 
modest approach—so laissez-faire that the arbakai went sometime months without 
any pay despite commands having tens of millions of dollars to spend on security and 
projects.  Such an approach may have been wise, as more money may have caused 
instability.855   Even when projects are aimed at attempting to mitigate analyzed 
sources of instability, those projects can add to overall instability and insecurity.856  In 
the case of the 2001-2014 war in Afghanistan, the NATO spending and projects in 
Afghanistan are the primary source of funding for violent extremists, to include the 
Afghan Taliban and local al-Qa`ida.  Siphoning off and “taxing” military and aid 
projects eclipses violent extremists’ money from poppy, morphine, opium, and heroin 
development and smuggling and all other criminal efforts combined.857  The Special 
Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction has underlined a number of 
unclassified cases when money spent on any project has eventually gone into the hand 
of insurgents—in the case of Marjah on the outskirts of the village858--not to mention 
that more money into the village could have exacerbated perceptions of corruption.859  
The relatively hands-off approach of Marines ensured minimum destabilizing effects 
of money. 
 
Perhaps most important to the international security forces was that focus on enabling 
locals allowed effective transition.  In fact, empowering Marjah’s guardians was not a 
tactic with a view towards transition—when a central government or outside force 
wishes to drawdown or withdraw and leave locals with the responsibility of their own 
stability and security—it is, instead, the very practice of transition itself.  It is the art 
of allowing locals to solve village problems on their own timeline via indigenous 
means.860  The minimalist tactics allowed the arbakai to fail, solve problems, and 
strengthen their community in their own way with their own will.  Such efforts can be 
described as sustainable because the fighters were more likely to feel invested 
ownership of their operations and any owned facilities or equipment. 
 
Well past a given transition date, it may be the existing deeply burrowed societal 
resilient bodies that outlast the Taliban.  Some counterinsurgency analysts claim that 
the Taliban and similar regional violent extremist organizations have the patience to 
outlast Coalition Force presence.861   But the Taliban may unlikely outlast an 
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arbakai’s presence such as Marjah’s.  Dedicated societal linchpins may meet or even 
undermine Taliban’s willingness to endure.862   
 
8.3 Policy Implications  
 
With regards to counterinsurgency literature, this case challenges the assumptions and 
arguments of those authors who recommend large-scale counterinsurgency 
operations.  For example, Mark Weiner863 and John Nagl’s864 recommendations and 
intonations to view tribalism as potentially destabilizing society and weakening a 
central government are not supported by this case study.  Marjah’s arbakai directly 
helped the town’s stability865 and strengthened the central government in that it 
worked within legal parameters866 and helped to fight an enemy of the state.  
Additionally, those experts such as David Galula,867  who call for a heavy “top-down” 
government-centred tactics in counterinsurgency, would not be able to look to Marjah 
to support their arguments.    
 
This case, instead, pushes the research of those experts who underline the advantages 
of low-foot-print tactics relying on local resiliencies to its logical extreme of simply 
allowing or empowering some indigenous movements to flourish—to act as an 
immune system against violent extremism.  This study provides one actualized 
example of Anthony Cordesman,868 Robert Pape,869 and Andrew Wilder’s870  theories 
and recommendations of the importance of low-impact counterinsurgency.  The case 
study supports their conclusions in an extreme way: the ISAF troops on the ground 
worked with the militia minimally and only allowed and leveraged them to violently, 
enduringly, and passionately defeat the local insurrection.  Policy-wise, the story and 
analysis of Marjah’s arbakai underline the same lasting resilience of Pashtun systems 
of governance—even after despotic rulers of the distant past—that Thomas 
Barfield,871 Arturo Munoz,872 and Khan Idris873 have described.  It is a modern 
materialization of a historical phenomenon in an extreme way: the traditional columns 
of Pashtun life found roots not only in an artificial town just over half a century old 
but also resurged after over three decades of warfare and violently instituted anti-
tribal policies.  
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It must be caveated, however, and emphasized again, that this is an analysis of Marjah 
only.  As the literature review in the first chapter discussed, there is evidence that 
contemporary viable Pashtun resilience systems are not ubiquitous.  Following over 
three decades of Russian, warlord, and then NATO intervention, many areas do not 
have what Afghan experts Scott Mann874 and David Phillips875 deem normal rural 
governance and security mechanisms, even if these systems will eventually resurge.  
Stories abound of villages in which farmers do not have even the most basic 
knowledge of farming that their dead or fled fathers and grandfathers held.876  Special 
Forces and U.S. conventional troops’ unclassified after action reports claim that 
institutional tribal knowledge is so lost that, in some cases, tribal farmers kill earth 
warms fearing these creatures hurt crops (earth warms are actually often helpful to 
crops, as even the most inexperienced farmer around the world are taught well).  The 
assertion begs the question: should governments combating violent extremists 
consider policies that centre on just leveraging militias and other resilient entities?  
No.  Clearly such a one-size-fits all policy would fail in areas where clan leadership 
and traditions have been degraded and not yet resurged.   
 
Instead, this study points to the significance of tradecraft—operational and tactical 
tools to allow the military, diplomatic corps, and development services to meet an end 
state within legal and strategic parameters—over one singular policy or approach.  In 
the case of countering violent extremists, a situation in which many disparate radical 
cells embed in dissimilar tribes and villages throughout the world, it may be logical 
that policy emphasize tradecraft and not a singular “top-down” “solution” for all 
situations.  Of course, such a notion of emphasizing tradecraft that could call for 
vastly different strategies from one area of operations to another, would be most 
applicable for areas like Afghanistan in which villages, municipalities, geography, 
and tribes are sometimes so dissimilar as to make the country seem an area of many 
nations.   
 
Another policy implication for Marjah is the possibility of supporting a militia that 
could lead to future civil war, federal government degradation, and long-term 
instability.  Those against supporting tribal militias in Afghanistan point to the civil 
war of the 1990s to illustrate their fears for a future of chaotic clan warfare.  However, 
as the second chapter in this study reveals, the factions that defined those pre-Taliban 
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days comprised not defensively natured traditional arbakai but instead former 
mujahedin warlords and their mullahs, who defied regular Pashtun ways of life.  
Marjah’s militia, as with other modern jirga-instigated security forces, does not vie for 
power outside the village and would likely dissipate once enduring security is 
ensured.  In fact, Pashtuns tribal elders rarely become enduring warlords as this 
egalitarian society does not bestow special powers to its leaders.  Instead clan chiefs 
are first among equals and rise and fall on their usefulness to members.  It is unlikely 
that tribesmen would continue to support an elder who brought his clan unnecessary 
widespread warfare, death, and time away from farming.  The same cannot be said for 
the false Western-recruited paramilitary militias from ISAF programs that create new 
mini-armies vice leverage stabilizing forces that are natural to the indigenous 
population.  While some of these artificial militias may die off once money stops, it is 
certainly possible that some—having received some training and some arms—may 
wish to exploit locals and cause instability lastingly.  In conclusion, those indigenous 
tribal militias that are, conversely, self-motivated and working towards their own 
goals may be one of the most stabilizing phenomena of this counterinsurgency.   
 
8.4 Future Studies of Anti-Extremist Movements 
 
However, even if similar themes of self-reliance against violent extremist presence 
play out in other Pashtun areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan and perhaps throughout 
the world, Marjah is still unique.  However, NATO stabilization mission and the 
activities of violent extremists found in Marjah are not.  Therefore, there may be some 
commonalities to other case studies.  According to the President of the United States 
and numerous reports from top U.S. military commanders and staff, the U.S. military 
and partner civilian agencies will continue to counter violent extremism for decades to 
come.877  While in the case of Marjah, the ground forces in and around the village 
elected, despite doctrine to the contrary, a minimalist approach to enable local 
resilient actors, future operators will unlikely have the luxury of choice.  Amidst 
budget cuts and troop number drawdowns,878 a light footprint approach to stability 
operations and counterinsurgency may be the only option for future missions.  Even if 
future commanders choose not to follow a similar minimalist tradecraft that troops in 
Marjah applied, it is highly likely that U.S. and Coalition Force units will work, or at 
least interact, with local grassroots anti-extremist movements such as in Andar district 
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of the Ghazni province in Afghanistan (2012)879 and tribes of the Anbar province in 
Iraq (2006-2007).880  Scholars will likely have many opportunities in the future to 
study and analyze self-driven movements and the strategies that militaries use to 
leverage, interact, observe, ignore, or quell.  
 
As the U.S. government faces sequesters, furloughs, troop reductions, and budget 
cuts881, U.S. troops and civilians conduct low-cost and light-foot-print contingency, 
intelligence support, logistical support, foreign-internal-defense training, stabilization, 
or counterterrorism missions from the Philippines to Pakistan to Yemen to Mali.882  
With minimum small-purpose military footprint883 the United States will intend to 
defeat violent extremists and deny them further safe haven.884  This mission assumes 
an end state of local populations’ enduring repulsion of violent extremist influence, 
incursion, and presence.885  Although unstated in military and executive-level reports 
in the United States government, these goals assume that local actors and 
communities may play a some sort of role in enduringly keeping out violent 
extremists from areas so that there is not a requirement for U.S. troops to remain in 
countries as was done in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
 
While the U.S. military numbers dwindle and number of missions increase, violent 
extremist cells—whether al-Qa`ida inspired, bred, branded, or similar in outlook—
continue to aspire to regional and global reach and impact.886  They continue to be 
relevant and will likely offer opportunities to study anti-radical movements.  Violent 
extremists threaten regional stability, partner nations, and the U.S. Homeland and 
evidently will unlikely surrender.887  Becoming more decentralized, independent, self-
sufficient, fluid, flexible, and resilient, these groups are continuously learning from 
tactical defeats.  From Southeast Asia to West Africa888, violent extremists exploit 
unstable areas where traditional governance has broken down or where schisms 
persist between formal national governments and natural local governance systems—
exploiting and exacerbating sources of instability.889   This phenomenon has allowed 
violent extremists to double geographic breadth in the past five years alone.890 
 
Thus the next decade will offer researchers ample opportunities to study indigenous 
anti-extremist movements as they unfold.  While historical accounts and interviews 
with those involved after movements end will offer scholars perhaps reflective 
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perspectives, many involved in such movements will be killed with nothing to share.  
In addition, in some tribal areas and villages, there are few written accounts of 
motivations and the greater context around uprising.  Although there are plethora of 
methods to study a historical event, the approach in this case study—of obtaining 
first-hand accounts of an uprising as it was in its throes—has the advantage of direct 
observations, recording accounts of fighters and leaders that may very well die well 
before the movement ends, and receiving perspectives without the lens and judgment 
that may accompany any historical account.  Future studies, therefore, may be wise to 
find ways to uncover narratives during a movement as they perhaps compare and 
contrast to the findings of this case study that self-determination chiefly motivated 
those who elected to kill and die to defeat violent extremists.  Alternatively, perhaps 
the more discreet motivations of security, education, nationalism, and a moral, 
spiritual, and national antipathy toward violent extremism may prove more 
appropriate comparison for forthcoming analysis of other regions as well as perhaps 
Marjah again.  Either way, this case study may be useful as a first look of a 
burgeoning discreet discipline. 
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Appendix A. 
 
The core research comprised interviews with over one-quarter of Marjah’s arbakai to 
include its top leaders and deputies between May and September of 2011.  As much 
as possible, the interview strategy applied survey standards such as random samples, 
careful translation of questions, word appropriate questions for Marjah, and a large 
sample size.  The goal was to collect professed aspirations, identities, goals, fears, 
motivations, and thoughts on the Taliban as the fighters were serving actively in the 
militia. Open questioning was therefore paramount to hear fighters’ numerous 
competing ideas that may include themes and ideas not covered in the literature 
review or initial research. 
 
The study employed some survey best practices so that interview results would be 
representative of local perspectives.  The interviews targeted adult males, who 
voluntarily combat violent extremist elements, to find out what motivations initiate 
and sustain its members and communities.  Stratified sampling (breaking up the target 
group into separate cells such as female fighters and elderly fighters) was unnecessary 
since village militia members are male and typically between 18-35 years old. The 
oral survey included 113 militiamen out of a total of an estimated 400 civilian 
fighters, over 25 per cent of the study’s target population—a sufficiently large number 
to minimize sampling error.  To avoid judgment, convenience, or cluster sampling, 
the interview strategy broke the targeted community into 20 geographic areas and 
randomly surveyed fighting age males from each area.  These locations included 
government centers, supply points, households, arbakai checkpoints, and streets.  In 
conclusion, the study used a large sample size, and each militia member had a 
reasonably equal opportunity of being selected. 
 
The interviews included the following questions (the numbers correspond to the 
numbered answers below): 
1) Why do you oppose violent extremism? 
2) What were the events that led up to your opposition to violent 
extremism? 
3) What are the main reasons your tribe/village opposes violent 
extremism? Why? 
4) How long are you willing to oppose violent extremism? Why? 
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5) Will your sons oppose violent extremism?  Why? 
6) What is the religion of the Taliban? 
 
Respondents rarely answered questions directly and did not tell linear stories.  
Sometimes after the last question, perhaps feeling the interview was finishing, they 
would add in rich stories and analogies pertinent to earlier questions.  What was 
recorded, per participant, was essentially one single nonlinear storyline that did not 
abide by the structure of the questions.  So when analysing the statements, use was 
made of the entire story.  The questions ended up serving at-times as signposts and 
inspiration for emotional stories, descriptions of events, and streams of consciousness 
that were master messages for each participant 
 
A challenge to this interview scheme was estimating the total sample size.  There are 
the number of arbakai members whom the U.S. Department of Defense pay, the 
number of members that arbakai leaders claim, and the number of arbakai that NATO 
advisors estimate.  The estimates of size changed several times per month in the 
spring and summer of 2011.  Such changes in estimates were sometimes due to 
changes in NATO funding and programming (allowing for over 1,300 militiamen 
before the interviews began dwindling down to 800 and then 400 later in 2011); 
occasional accidental or natural deaths, assassinations, injuries, retirements; and 
migration by some to the formal Afghan government army or police.890  Additionally, 
this study focuses on the village proper of Marjah, not those militiamen in the 
“village” of Sistani; the desert outskirts to the north, south, and east; or the Afghan 
Local Police in Nad Ali (the formally recognized incorporated disctrict in which the 
village and unincorporated agricultural district of Marjah reside).  The estimated total 
as the final formal NATO count in 2011, in this study’s areas of interest, was 400.890 
 
It should be reemphasized that appropriate ethical restraints kept this researcher from 
providing identity information for any interviewee except for those three individuals 
mentioned in chapter seven—whose identities are well known to local and 
international press and whose interview answers jibed with their quotations in 
numerous news outlets.  The reason for this restraint is to avoid the potential for the 
Taliban to use this study for possible future retribution or Taliban court arraignment 
of this study’s subjects.  The Taliban and other violent extremist organizations have 
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used Western publications in the past to judge against civilians.  Even providing just 
the date, bloodline tribal affiliation (even if this identity is not primary to most 
citizens of Marjah), and specific location (such as block name or grid coordinates) of 
each interviewee could easily provide the Taliban ample information to identify 
individuals or (even falsely) accuse specific militiamen if there is a Taliban 
resurgence in Helmand.  Although more identity information could lead to interesting 
appendices of analyses on lesser important identities or the differences of opinions in 
separate blocks, recording or divulging such information would put the interviewees 
at risk.  Even if this study remains only in scholar’s hands, there is no certainty that 
the Taliban or its sympathizes in the West would not be able to gain access to it 
through subversive means.  King’s College London’s ethical parameters are 
absolutely appropriate for this study, as this researcher has observed violent extremist 
use of Western studies (that provide identity information) to conduct retribution 
against populations. 
 
The following are summarized paraphrases of answers to the interview questions in 
Marjah from 2011.  The location, names, titles, and dates are not given in-line with 
ethical guidelines.  Furthermore, I will not acribe other labels to respondents so that 
readers may not misinterpret the paraphrased transcriptions as anything else but in 
random order, and so that readers may not link answers to exact locations, identities, 
or exact days and times (except for the number atop each answer set—each indicating 
a different individual).  The numbers to the left of answers only indicate the question 
asked as described in the chapter on methodology.  When reading responses, readers 
are reminded that answers are often given in open narrative form and often appear not 
to correspond to the interview questions. 
 
1 
1) The Taliban are not educated.  They have no understanding of anything 
intellectual nor have they attended any accredited schools or universities.  The 
Taliban is the enemy of all of Afghanistan.  The entire land.  I am the enemy of 
all Taliban.  I am the enemy of each of them.  The Taliban does not allow us to 
build schools and clinics.  They do not allow us to go to school, better ourselves, 
and receive education and enlightenment.  They get in the way of what we want.  
We want schools, and they not only look down on this but they had gone out of 
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their way to stop us from being educated.  They do not even allow the young 
people to be educated. 
2) The Taliban put a roadside bomb in my community mosque and also in my 
compound.  The Taliban have also worn clothes of a soldier to trick us and not 
let us know his true identity.  The Taliban soldier tricks us to kill innocents.  To 
kill us when we have not done anything. 
3) All the people of the Taliban and others fought in the civil war for 20 years.  
And Taliban then, like now, want first to fight and then to take over.  I must 
defend my village, my country, and my family.  We must stop their fighting and 
not allow them to take over this town again. 
4) I will fight Taliban forever unless they become educated and want to join 
society.  Then I will allow them to return into the fold.  Otherwise, they will 
continue to be our enemy.  And as long as they are our enemy, I will continue to 
fight them. 
5) My son, my wife, and everyone want to fight the Taliban because the elder says 
to do so.  And if the elder says something, then they do it.  I am the elder for my 
area, and the people around me think like me and follow my direction as I 
suggest. 
6) No answer. 
 
2 
1) Taliban are destroying our country.  The Taliban really equal destruction and 
nothing constructive.  They only want to wreck my country.  They come from 
Pakistan mainly, as well as get help from Iran.  They also want to destroy our 
infrastructure.  They want us to be destroyed from the inside out.  From schools 
to roads to clinics, the Taliban only want conflict.  They only want war. 
2) Taliban do not allow people in schools, and have put IEDs in schools and 
clinics.  They do not want Afghanistan to improve.  They do not want 
individuals to improve their lives nor do they want us as a society to improve 
ourselves.   
3) We want to fight all the Taliban because they do not have constructive policies.  
The Taliban do not want peace.  They do not work for anything good or 
positive.  They bring conflict, and we must stop this.  We must stop their 
destruction. 
4) We will offer peace with the Taliban first, and if they do not want it is a good 
thing for us to fight all of the Taliban.  As long as they stay outside society and 
only want conflict, they will be the enemies of Afghanistan.  And as long as they 
are the enemies of Afghanistan, we will fight them continuously.  There is no 
end, for me or for my children, as long as the Taliban seek only destruction. 
5) Yes. 
6) No answer. 
 
3 
1 The Taliban do not want peace.  Also, Taliban do not want schools or roads or 
to improve Afghanistan.  They bring only war and conflict.  They do not want us 
to live together peacefully.  They do not want us to improve as a society. 
2 It is therefore necessary for us to fight the Taliban.  We must fight the Taliban.  
This is necessary.  This has to happen.  Also, Pakistan supports the Taliban to 
disturb Afghanistan.  The weapons are from Pakistan, and the Taliban are 
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mostly outsiders so we can recognize them.  We know when someone is not 
from our block.  We know when someone from Pakistan is walking around 
amidst our homes.   
3 In Afghanistan there are two types of people: The majority who want peace, 
schools, and clinics.  And then there are the others who take the side of the 
Taliban.  It is this second group who is wedded to fighting and misery—who do 
not join the police, who do not want to be self-sufficient, who do not want to 
improve our communities.  We ought to speak with the Taliban and show them 
the positive and constructive progress of Afghanistan.  To invite them to join 
society—show them schools and clinics and the importance of families, 
children, and babies.  Perhaps they will not fight if they see all this.  Perhaps 
they could not fight after seeing this.  But if they fail to change then we must 
fight the Taliban. 
4 We must fight the Taliban for a long time because they are likely bent on 
fighting the entire Afghan people.  They appear, in reality, to want to fight 
everyone inside Afghanistan for quite a while.  So we will have to fight if they 
never want peace. 
5 My son and my daughter go to school.  The Taliban would never allow them to 
do this.  So it is ingrained in their mind to be against the Taliban at a very young 
age.  They hate the Taliban.  Children want something that the Taliban would 
fight to deny. 
6 No answer. 
 
4 
1) While the Taliban do not allow schools and clinics, Afghans wish for good 
productive lives.  Afghans want ways to improve ourselves—our bodies and our 
minds and our society.  The Taliban never want us to improve ourselves.  They 
only bring conflict. 
2) The Taliban destroy this country.  They aim to destroy our villages and cities.  
This defines who they are, and explains why we fight the Taliban.  And it is 
Pakistan that makes it this way.  Pakistan taught them to make and lay IEDs in 
Afghanistan.   
3) Mostly Afghanistan opposes the Taliban.  But in addition to those against the 
Taliban there are some neutral and some pro-Taliban elements of Afghan 
society. 
4) We must totally destroy the Taliban from Afghanistan. 
5) Yes.  My children are all young and already hate the Taliban because the 
Taliban do not want Afghanistan to be a peaceful place. 
6) No answer. 
 
5 
1) The Taliban do not want peace—nor do they want schools and clinics. 
2) Only because of my hatred for the Taliban did I approach the Marines to help 
out my block security forces. 
3) The majority of people oppose the Taliban, but some who have relatives in the 
Taliban are for the Taliban. 
4) I will always oppose the Taliban because they come from Pakistan. 
5) Yes.  My son goes to school, and the Taliban would never allow this.  He 
understands this. 
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6) No answer 
 
6 
1) Before the Taliban, the block elder would solve all the local problems for the 
people.  But when the Taliban came, they arrested people, handed out bread, and 
taxed locals—to control the populace without any regard for the traditional 
leadership.  The Taliban asked me to join them, and I said no.  They killed 
people.  They destroyed a bridge.  They destroyed my village.  So I took up my 
gun and fought the Taliban.  And I swear my opposition to the Taliban with my 
gun.  My gun is my oath.  The Taliban are against peace, and we are against the 
Taliban. 
2) The Taliban are against peace and security.  They are the enemy.  They only 
want insecurity and conflict.  This is what they have brought and want to bring 
again. 
3) All people here want the Taliban destroyed.  The locals around here want 
security and peace. 
4) As long as the Taliban are unable or unwilling to be educated to be allowed back 
into society, then we will fight them. 
5) Yes.  All people here oppose the Taliban to include all kids.  We are all against 
the Taliban—children and adults alike. 
6) No answer 
 
7 
1) I am against the Taliban because they destroyed schools and bridges and did not 
want peace.  They only bring destruction and war. 
2) The Taliban kill innocents. They killed my son with 200 bullets into his body.  
You have to understand that fighting the Taliban is my own idea.  This is not me 
going along with the ideas of the Marines or the Afghan government.  This if 
my own plan, my own idea, and my own initiative.  They only kill innocent 
people.  One week ago they killed a soldier.  This soldier was innocent.  This 
soldier did nothing to deserve to be killed.  This soldier did not destroy homes 
and kill children 
3) Everyone who lives here in Marjah, and all of Helmand hates the Taliban.  The 
Taliban do not want Afghanistan to improve.  The Taliban only want war.  They 
bring only fighting.  They offer nothing for us to improve. 
4) We will fight the Taliban for a long, long time.  The Taliban have only two 
options.  Either they can join society, or we will kill them all. 
5) My children are all against the Taliban, because my kids want peace.  I talk to 
them every day about the Taliban.  My children do not want fighting and seek 
only peace, education, and schools.  
6) The Taliban are of a different religion.  Islam does not allow people fighting 
each other.  Islam does not allow destroying bridges.  Islam does not allow 
blood.  Islam is good.  It is peaceful.  It is humanitarian.  The Taliban abuse 
Islam.  The Taliban are not Muslims.  They are illegitimate Muslims.  They do 
not rate to be part of Islam.  The Afghan people are Muslim.  Taliban are not 
Muslims.  Muslims do not kill innocent people. 
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1) Because the Taliban do not want security.  They do not want to improve 
Afghanistan.  They offer nothing by destruction.  They are cowards.  They are 
backwards.  
2) That Taliban take everyone hostage.  Every person hostage.  In Marjah they only 
allowed people to grow poppy.  SO, WE ROSE UP AGAINT THE TALIBAN.  
We do not allow Taliban in my block.  I will not allow Taliban in MY country.  
I PUNCH THE TALIBAN IN THE FACE. MY AK IS MY OATH.  What other 
type of promise—what other type of oath—could be more certain. 
3) In Marjah, people generally want peace.  Just 10% want to help the Taliban.  
The other 90% want peace. 
4) If the Taliban want to join society then fine.  If they want to reintegrate, that is 
okay.  But if not, then I will fight the Taliban for the rest of my life.  I will never 
allow, while alive, the Taliban to come into my community.   
5) My son, who is only 7 years old, already says he wants to fight the Taliban on 
the frontlines.  He raises his arms up like his is holding a weapons and says he 
really want to fight on the front right now. 
6) The Taliban are not Muslims.  They are terrorists.  The Taliban defame Islam.  
They are against Islam.  Islam is a good religion.  Islam knows good.  Islam 
wants peace—as most people in Marjah want peace and are good Muslims. 
 
9 
1) I lost my son and lost much of my family to the Taliban.  I am 55 years old and 
oppose the Taliban.  I will never willingly allow the Taliban back into Marjah.  
This I swear. 
2) The reason is that Islam does not allow Muslims to kill innocents.  And the 
Taliban kills Muslims and everyone.  Everyone is innocent.  Everyone is neutral.  
No matter your religion.  And Islam does not allow killing—especially killing of 
innocents. 
3) Afghanistan does not want Taliban, nor does Afghanistan want the Taliban 
culture.  The Taliban are from Pakistan, and Pakistan is the source of the 
Taliban.  The Afghan Taliban are not strong.  All misery is due ultimately to 
Pakistan.  Pakistan creates the suicide bombers.  It is Waziristan from where 
they come.  That is where most of the Taliban are.  They do not want security or 
peace.  Like in Pakistan, where there is no peace and security, the Taliban want 
Afghanistan to be the same thing.  They want a place and a culture of fighting.  
And Afghanistan will not want to lose its culture.  And the Taliban will interfere 
with our culture. 
4) We must talk with the Taliban and see if they will join the government.  We 
must teach them and make them realize that life is good, and they can join 
society.  If the Taliban do not want this—if they do not wish to rejoin society—
then the Afghans will fight the Taliban and fight them for however long is 
necessary. 
5) My sons, local children, and everyone around here hate the Taliban.  My sons go 
to school, but the Taliban would never allow this.  And this fact upsets my 
children.  My children, like the other children around here, are keenly aware of 
this.  And are upset about the Taliban for this reason. 
 
10 
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1) I oppose the Taliban because the Taliban are the enemy of Afghanistan.  They 
are the enemy of all our people and everything that Afghanistan means.  They 
hate Afghanistan.  They hate the way we live. 
2) The Taliban kill innocents everywhere.  They do not kill soldiers.  They kill 
innocents, women, and kids.  This is what they do.  This is who they are.  I do 
not want Taliban in Marjah. 
3) The Taliban in Afghanistan are uneducated.  They are ignorant.  They don’t 
understand what they are doing.  And it is Pakistan and Iran who take the side of 
the Taliban in Afghanistan. 
4) I will fight the Taliban for a long time.  It would be good if the Taliban joined 
society.  But if they do not do this, then I will fight.  I will clear Afghanistan of 
all Taliban. 
5) All kids oppose the Taliban.  The kids and even the women know Taliban are 
not good. 
6) The Taliban do not represent Islam.  They are not Muslims.  We are Muslims.  
Their actions are illegal within Islam.  Suicide bombers are illegal.  Cutting off 
heads is illegal.  These actions are unsanctioned in Islam. 
 
11 
1) I oppose the Taliban because they get support and supplies from Pakistan.  
Pakistan is a big enemy.  I do not want outsiders to interfere here. 
2) The Taliban are here.  Some help them.  The Taliban do not have any good 
ideas.  They just kill people and grow poppy.  All the people do not want the 
Taliban. 
3) In this district, the Taliban kill innocents.  The Taliban do not allow school, but 
our government provides schools, clinics, and mosques. 
4) If the Taliban joined the community, then no there is no problem.  But if they 
continue to oppose the government, then we will fight until we have completely 
removed the Taliban.  
5) 100% yes.   People know that the Taliban are terrorists. 
6) The Taliban are Muslim in name only.  They kill people, cut off people’s heads 
and not allow Islam.  Just by praying does not make you a Muslim. 
 
12 
1) The Taliban are an atrocity.  They kill innocents. 
2) The Taliban are dangerous.  They are a big problem.  The Taliban want to 
occupy this land.  They would bring terrorists like before.  They would be a 
shelter for terrorists. 
3) The Taliban are cruel.  All the people know this.  All communities, all Afghans, 
and those in Marjah and Helmand know this. 
4) Unless we can make Taliban like human beings, we will not allow them to come 
here.  We will fight or educate.  But either way we will eradicate all the 
Taliban—clear them from this land. 
5) The young living under the Taliban take the side of the Taliban against the 
government.  But the very young oppose the Taliban.  For example, a couple 
days ago the Taliban shot two people—killing one and leaving the other injured.  
We must remove the Taliban.         
 
13 
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1) This is our homeland, our district, our country.  The Taliban are the enemy of 
our country and my family.  I now want to help my family and my country. 
2) I want to have a relationship with our people and with Afghanistan and keep my 
family safe.  So I fight the Taliban and keep them secure.  During the 13-year 
war with the Taliban took everything.  There was no peace.  There was no 
education. 
3) Before in Marjah there were many Taliban.  Now we are stronger than the 
Taliban.  The ANA and police and our national security forces are stronger than 
the Taliban.       
4) I will erase the Taliban from the country.  The Taliban are the enemy of the 
country. 
5) (no answer) We have schools in the district, and my kids go to the schools.  The 
Taliban would not allow that. 
6) Some say that the Taliban are Muslims.  But I think they are wrong.  On the 
radio I hear that the Taliban kill civilians, innocents, and Muslims.  
 
14 
1) The Taliban are not good people.  During the Taliban’s reign people were 
jobless.  The Taliban only sought fighting in Afghanistan.  When the Taliban 
became the enemy of my family and my country I went to the side of the 
government to fight them. 
2) This is my Helmand.  And the Taliban is Helmand’s enemy.  If I see Taliban, I 
will kill them, fight them, or capture them. 
3) I am happy for the Marines.  Before the Marines came there was no government.  
But now there is security enough to continue our lives. 
4) I am happy for my duty to fight the Taliban.  I will fight Taliban happily for the 
rest of my life. 
5) The Taliban came from Pakistan and then came to Marjah.  Before the Taliban 
life was better, and after the Taliban life is better.   Now there is security.  Yes, 
my son will be again the Taliban.  But I am illiterate, and I don’t want my 
brother and children to be illiterate.  So I will continue to fight so that they can 
go to school.  I want my children to be engineers or doctors. 




1) I am unhappy with what the Taliban have done.  The Taliban came at night and 
just ate and drank everything I had.  They are our enemy and the enemy of the 
country.   
2) I like our country.  And the Taliban is the enemy of Afghanistan. 
3) We have not broken the enemy.  There were robbers in the 9 block area.  The 
Taliban came.  Some friend of mine went to fight them.  But the enemy was 
better and better equipped. 
4) I will help out for life. 
5) I want to keep the country safe and allow my kids to continue with education.  
Before the Taliban, children could not go to school.  Now they can go to school. 
6) I have heard that the Taliban are Muslims.  But I don’t think so.  They burn 
down schools. 
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1) Before in Marjah, the Taliban were here.  People were unhappy.  The Taliban 
were not good to the people.  Before the Taliban we worked on our lands and 
helped our community. 
2) I want to bring security.  I do not want the Taliban to come back again.  I will 
fight them.  They are the enemy of my family. 
3) I think the Taliban will not come again to Marjah because the local police were 
jobless but now have jobs. 
4) I want to save my family and our district for life. 
5) Right now I have a weapon so my family can be safe and my children can 
continue their education.  My children do not like the Taliban and think the 
Taliban are the enemy.  They are unhappy with the Taliban. 
6) I don’t know about their religion.  But I think they are not Muslim because they 
cut off the heads of civilians. 
 
17 
1) I oppose the Taliban because the Taliban are cruel with people.  They kill some 
civilians, and that is why I have a conflict with them. 
2) The Taliban do not allow schools and offer no services in Afghanistan.  They 
are against all people.  They put IEDs in the roads.  This is why we fight and kill 
them. 
3) The Taliban are from Pakistan.  And Pakistan does not want Afghanistan to 
improve.  Afghanistan is my country.  The IEDs are from Pakistan.  These are 
the main reasons. 
4) The Taliban has calmed down a bit.  If they join us, then there is no problem.  
Then I would have no problem with them.  But if they choose to continue 
fighting, then we should and must fight them until the Taliban are erased from 
Marjah and from Afghanistan. 
5) Yes. 
6) The Taliban say they are Muslims, but Muslims don’t act the way the Taliban 




1) The Taliban do not want Afghanistan to improve.  They come in the night from 
Pakistan and have killed some of the local elders.  This is why I oppose and 
fight them. 
2) I joined the militia because we help Afghanistan.  We bring peace to 
Afghanistan.  We secure the locals.  This is why I serve in the way I do. 
3) People don’t want the Taliban.  Taliban do not allow peace.  They do not allow 
children to go to school.  They do not allow asphalt on the road.  They do not 
allow betterment of roads.  They do not allow clinics.  They do not allow school. 
4) We will fight a long time.  If they join us then that would be good.  The others 
that do not give up we will kill and remove from Afghanistan.  But if they 
choose peace and join us then that would be good.  Otherwise we will kill, 
remove, and fight.          
5) Yes. 
6) Taliban are Muslims.  They don’t know any better.  They are uneducated and 
unread Muslims.   
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19 
1) The Taliban have not allowed children to go to school.  And the children need 
education.  The Taliban do not allow this.  The Taliban trained small children to 
do bad things.  So we make conflict with the Taliban and will keep fighting 
them. 
2) I joined the militia because they make conflict with the Taliban.  In my service, I 
think of it as the young generation defending civilians.   
3) Here in Marjah, the Taliban cannot come in.  They are terrorists, conduct terror, 
and cannot come join with the people.  All the parents tell the children RISE UP 
AGAINST THE TALIBAN.   
4) If they do not join us in society in our community, then we will fight and 
remove them from Marjah.   If they join us that would be good. 
5) Yes. 
6) The Taliban say, “we are Muslims.”  But they have come from the community 
of Arabs and Pakistanis.  They are not in a good way.  Muslim people are not 
cruel and do not kill in the way the Taliban do. 
 
20 
1) The Taliban are not good people.  They came into our compound whenever they 
wanted.  They taxed us.  They at our bread, our lunch, our dinner.  They are bad 
for families and bad for children.  The come from Pakistan and other countries 
so we fight them. 
2) I joined the militia a couple months ago.  Then the Taliban arrested me and tied 
my hands behind my back.  The Taliban hit me.  But when they released me I 
went back to the militia where I have 20 friends to help protect me.  The Taliban 
would it me three times per day.  They did not allow me to have food.  They did 
not allow me to have bread.  They did not give me food. 
3) Our militia needs heavy weapons, and we do not have enough heavy weapons to 
properly fight the Taliban.  They have heavy weapons, and we do not have.  The 
Taliban do not come into Marjah these days.  The Taliban are not in Marjah not. 
4) We have to fight the Taliban until they are removed entirely. 
5) Yes because Pakistan came here and were not ok with the schools.  The Taliban 
were cruel to the children. 
6) The Taliban claim they are Muslims, but I know that they are not Muslims.  I 
say they are not Muslims. 
 
21 
1) Every one of them came from Pakistan to Afghanistan to fight with the 
government.  They come from Pakistan. 
2) I joined the militia because the Taliban are cruel over the people.  They came 
into my compound.  The Taliban fights and is cruel.   
3) They hit people.  All of Marjah hates the Taliban and likes the militias and 
maybe the National Army. 
4) If the Taliban join us, then no problem.  If they do not join us that we fight them. 
5) Yes.  Our children do not want fighting.  They do not want killing.  They do not 
want conflict.  They want peace. 
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6) The Taliban say “we are Muslims.”  But their action is not the action of 
Muslims.  They came from Iran and Pakistan to only fight.  They say they are 
Muslims.  But they are only Muslims in appearance. 
 
22 
1) The Taliban kills people.  They mess with all the people and create problems in 
the community.  They come from Pakistan.  Pakistan policy is not good in 
Afghanistan.  Every time the Pakistanis fight and create problems in 
Afghanistan.  They are not good for this country. 
2) (angry, yelling) The Taliban are supported by Pakistan.  Pakistan sends in the 
IEDs and ammunition.  The Taliban are uneducated.  Pakistan trains Afghans 
and has used them to put IEDs in the road.  The religious schools in Pakistan 
train kids to commit suicide.  The all have come from Pakistan. 
3) All of Marjah hates the Taliban.  The Taliban does not belong.  They say we are 
spying for the government.  All of Marjah does not want them.  They are not 
good.  The decapitate people.  They are cruel.  They are especially against all 
Afghan peoples.  The majority of Taliban came in on motorcycles so now all the 
people are scared of motorcycles.  They are cruel, decapitate people, and tax 
locals.  All of Marjah residents hate the Taliban. 
4) (angry, yelling, animated) We will fight until the Taliban are removed.  The 
Taliban come from Pakistan and Iran.  WE SHOULD ERADICATE THE 
TALIBAN.  Their source is in Iran and Pakistan.  50 years ago Americans came 
to help build Marjah.  Now there are problems with irrigation, but this was not 
solved because poppies require little water, so there was no need to fix this 
service that we now need. 
5) Yes.  Everybody is against the Taliban to include the children and sons.  
Everyone. 
6) (angry, yelling, animated) There is a difference between my religion and the 
religion of the Taliban.  In my religion, there is no killing people.  We cannot 
kill even some people.  Suicide is not allowed.  I think the Taliban are not 
Muslims.  The laws of my religions and the Taliban’s religion are different. 
 
23 
1) Iran and Pakistan are the source of the Taliban. 
2) Because Iran and Pakistan are the source of the Taliban, the United States 
should block the Afghan borders with Iran and Pakistan, and everything will be 
solved. 
3) All of Marjah hates the Taliban. 
4) Yes, I will fight them until they are removed and pushed back to Iran and 
Pakistan. 
5) All the problems are with Afghanistan’s rivals Iran and Pakistan.  The main 
problem is Iran and Pakistan. 
6) Afghans are uneducated.  But some join the militias.  THE TALIBAN 
RELIGION IS TERRORISM.  They are not good.  They are not Muslims.  
Pakistan and Iran stimulated the Afghan Taliban.  But some of them have 
become HUMAN AGAIN and are now against the Taliban.  The Afghan 
Taliban are under the Pakistani Taliban.  They ARE NOT MUSLIMS.  They 
have a bad effect and are bad men.  They affect Afghanistan negatively. 
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24 
1) We oppose the Taliban.  They are not good people.  The Afghan Taliban are not 
as bad.  The can talk to friends.  We oppose the Pakistan Taliban.  But the 
Afghan Taliban are somewhat humanitarian. 
2) We must clear the Taliban out of Afghanistan.  Pakistan supports the Taliban.  
Everything comes from Pakistan—there is much evidence of this.  We must 
clear them out. 
3) The Taliban are not good.  They kill.  They are just in the desert.  They are 
against peace.  The United States should solve this problem.  The source of the 
problem is in Pakistan, so the United States should go there. 
4) Every time the Taliban is here, then we should fight them. 
5) Our sons oppose the Taliban.  The Taliban does not want peace.  All the 
children know this.  Everyone knows this and is afraid.  We have a problem with 
the border.  The Taliban treat kids badly.  Kids want peace, schools, and clinics. 
6) There are different Taliban.  There are those from Pakistan and those from 
Afghanistan.  One type is Afghan.  Maybe they will join with us.  Then there is 




1) I oppose the Taliban because the Taliban kills those that join the government.  
So I must defend my life. 
2) (animated, loud) In Marjah last week (town to the east), the Taliban entered by 
night.  They came to a farm and said that the tractors that harvested the wheat 
belong to the government.  So the Taliban burned the tractors and then left the 
area.  The Taliban stated that is was government property.  This is evidence for 
the reason that we fight the Taliban. 
3) The Taliban does not want anyone to go to school.  They do not allow schools or 
clinics inside Marjah. 
4) If the Taliban came here and joined us and the government, then this would be 
good.  If not we should fight the Taliban for a long time and ERADICATE 
THEM. 
5) Yes.  Our sons see the Taliban as cruel to kids.  Children hate the Taliban. 
6) The Taliban claim to be Muslims.  But Muslims are not again education.  
Muslims do not kill.  Muslims want peace.  Muslims want to be united.  God 
belongs to all people, and never against people.  The Taliban are not Muslims. 
 
26 
1) The Taliban are the enemy of our families and of our children.  They are our 
enemy so we not fight them. 
2) That Taliban fight.  They came into our house.  They ate our food. 
3) The village is very unhappy with the Taliban.  Now the people are happy that 
the Taliban have left. 
4) I will fight through the rest of my life. 
5) Before in Marjah, children could not go to school.  Now they can go to school 
and are happy. 
6) We are Muslims.  We heard that the Taliban are Muslims.  I don’t think they are 
from our religion. 
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27 
1) My country and my district should be safe.  The Taliban are our enemy.   
2) They are our families’ enemy.   
3) Our people should be safe.  We fought Taliban yesterday and would have killed 
more Taliban had we had more ammunition. 
4) I will fight the Taliban for life. 
5) Before the children could not go to school and were not happy.  Now they are 
happy that they can go to school. 
6) The Taliban’s religion is Islam, we have heard.  The Taliban are the enemy.  
They want to break the Muslims’ religion.  WE CANNOT ACCEPT THIS.  
OUR QURAN DOES NOT ALLOW OUR PEOPLE TO KILL. 
 
28 
1) The Taliban are our enemy.  Yesterday we captured a Taliban commander.  
2) Now the Taliban are our Homeland’s enemy. 
3) That Taliban are the enemy of our country. 
4) I will fight them for life.  When they kill me, my son will take over and fight 
them. 
5) Yes.  We should capture the Taliban in Pakistan. 
6) Around the world there are different religions.  And Islam has different sects.  
Taliban are Muslims, but they are not from our sect.  The Taliban are educated 




1) We have to fight the Taliban.  In our village they shoot the Marines and destroy 
our homes. 
2) I wanted to fight the Taliban so I went to the militia. 
3) They destroy our homes. 
4) I will fight the Taliban. 
5) Our children fear the Taliban.  The Taliban shoots and causes fighting in every 
village they enter. 
6) I cannot believe that the Taliban are Muslims.  They get their education from 
Pakistan and come from Pakistan.  Their religion is different than ours. 
 
30 
1) Before being in the militia, I was a mason.  I joined the militia to fight the 
Taliban because I like my country and my people. 
2) I came aboard to keep the safety of my family. 
3) There is a large distrust of the Taliban.  There are some Taliban left but not 
many here.  Last week Taliban wanted to plant a mine.  When they were 
working on it they killed themselves.  So there is some Taliban left. 
4) I will fight as long as necessary to keep the safety of my family. 
5) Our children do not like the Taliban because I am militia.  I also teach them that 
the Taliban is the enemy.  They fear the Taliban because the Taliban has killed 
students. 
6) The Taliban says that they are Muslims.  I think that mostly they are not from 
our religion.  They came to our village and ate our food.  The people were not 
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happy.  The Taliban is incorrect and not from our religion.  They consider the 
people of Afghanistan enemies. 
 
31 
1) The Taliban are our country’s enemy.   
2) I like the county so I fight. 
3) The Taliban are not from our country. 
4) I will fight.  When the Taliban leaves, then I will stop. 
5) Our children fear the Taliban.  They want to continue school. 
6) The Taliban are also Muslims but don’t know about religion. 
 
32 
1) The Taliban burned down schools and destroyed houses.  They fought with the 
military.   
2) The Taliban come from Pakistan with different names and break our country 
and kill people. 
3) We will fight the Taliban all the time. 
4) When we had doctors and engineers, they would kill them. 
5) I love Marines.  Marines love our children.  Before there was no education.  
Now our country has education and our country is helped. 
6) They are Muslims.  But they are like children and like crazy men.  They don’t 
know much about Islam. 
 
33 
1) The Taliban do not have good programs for our society.  
2) I like being in the militia.  And the village people love me because I’m in the 
militia. 
3) The Taliban are from Pakistan. 
4) I am willing to fight for the rest of my life.  I will fight until there are no more 
Taliban in Marjah.  There are not that much Taliban left in Marjah.  Yesterday 
we tried to capture five Taliban but four escaped. 
5) Now the Taliban have shown themselves as no good.  The children love my 
(armband/uniform for militia). 
6) Taliban are Muslims. 
 
34 
1) When we started to build in Marjah, the Marjah people felt good about it.  
2) The Taliban are foreign people. 
3) They will come back and back and strike back and back. 
4) Now the Marines are doing a good job against the Taliban.  If it continues like 
this, then the ISCIs and Marines together will end the fighting in a year.  
Otherwise without the Marines it might take 20 years.  Who is going to take the 
place of the Taliban?  People are not doing everything they could for the 
Marines.  Many people only act with the permission of the Taliban.  The good 
places are under the government.  Under the Taliban, the villagers felt bad.  
People were hurt and scared. 
5) (no answer) 
6) (no answer) 
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1) The Taliban do not want security in Marjah or Helmand.  They do not allow 
children—girls and boys—to get an education.  The Taliban do not want peace 
in Afghanistan.  The elders wanted peace so they made the decision to fight 
back and repel the Taliban. 
2) I heard about the other militias in Marjah, and so I built one too.  The Marines 
do not know who is Taliban and who is not.  Our militia knows. 
3) I began to advise villagers telling them that we need security.  We need to build 
bridges, schools, and educational centers.  The Taliban did not like this advice.  
Most of the Taliban are from Pakistan and have come into Afghanistan.  All the 
people in Marjah are good people and hate the Taliban.  The Taliban do not 
want security.  They cause problems with farmers.  Before the Taliban we grew 
wheat.  People want education and want to bring security, cattle, and productive 
farms.  They do not want the Taliban here. 
4) Yes, I will fight forever. 
5) My children and even wife are ready to fight.  We have weapons and a “canon.”  
If the Taliban come to my compound, even my wife is ready to fight.   
6) I don’t know if Taliban are Muslims.  Most are from Pakistan.  Rules in Islam 
do not dictate us to kill people, to cut necks, or to kill local nationals.  The holy 
book does not allow this.  For example, a few weeks ago, an ALP commander’s 
friend was captured and killed.  His hands were tied behind his back, and his 
head was cut off. 
 
36 
1) There are three types of Taliban—they are divided into three parts.  There are 
those that get support from our country.  There are those from another county.  
And there are those that strike mosques, clinics, and everything. 
2) I work for myself.  I love that Taliban that do not touch the local nationals.  And 
then there are those that fight for themselves and cause fighting in Marjah.  And 
then there are those that call for a religious nation under a Mullah.  This last type 
believe that those that help Marines are spies.  They do not like those that help 
the government. 
3) Some of the Taliban cause fighting and strike mosques, clinics, and everything. 
4) No answer. 
5) The children are scared of the rifle of the Marines and of some of the Taliban. 
6) The third kind only wants people to grow poppy.  Their religion is Islam. 
 
37 
1) We hate the Taliban.  They do not allow education.  They do not allow bread to 
be made or schools. 
2) If the people stand up then the future will be good. 
3) Some fight the Taliban. 
4) Whenever they are off our land, then we will put our guns down. 
5) We fight the Taliban.  The Taliban has no benefit.  They strike our schools, 
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1) Most of the Taliban are foreign from Pakistan.   They do not want security in the 
village.  They come into our compounds in Afghanistan.  When I want 
something like a school or a bridge, they destroy it.  Pakistan does not want 
security in Afghanistan.  Pakistan wants Afghanistan backwards.   
2) Security.  Security for the village.  IEDs are made in Iran and Pakistan.  They 
put them under the bridges. 
3) Everyone has made the decision for security in Marjah.  Most of Taliban are 
from Pakistan and Iran.  Now they are pussies and can’t do anything.   
4) I will fight the Taliban for ten years (I will defeat them in ten years).  I ask why.  
Why the Pakistanis, ISI, and CIA comes after us.  The United States killed 
Usama bin Ladin, but the United States does not want to fight Pakistan. 
5) When the children grew up, the Taliban did not allow them to be around freely.  
The Marines and our militia fought the Taliban and pushed them away.   
6) I don’t know exactly what the religion is.  There are the wahabi salafi influences 
from Pakistan, and the Akhunda (likely referring to Bahai’I faith of a low-
ranking clergyman, normally a derogatory term) influence from Iran. 
 
39 
1) Our purpose is to bring security to Helmand, not just to Marjah.  I spent six 
years in Lashkar Gah—I was scared and hid when the Taliban came.   
2) I had to find a way to bring security to Marjah and made the decision to return to 
Marjah to plan security and send away the Taliban.  I decided to fight the 
Taliban.  I saw one Talib behead 20 people. 
3) Most of Marjah does not like because they came into people compounds and 
shops.  Now we only hear about them.  When the Marines leave the people are 
not going to fight the Taliban.  They are not going to fight alongside the 
government. 
4) When the Marines leave, I will not fight against the Taliban.  Unless everyone 
has weapons, in which case I can fight the Taliban for life because we know 
who is and is not the Taliban.  I stood up the ALP because we got weapons from 
you and the Afghan people.  The United States left us alone to fight the 
Russians.  We left.  Then everyone came in—Usama bin Ladin, Mullah Omar.  
Don’t leave us alone again.  The Afghan government is not good.  It is not an 
authority.  Karzai won’t do shit.  He only talks on radio and the television. 
5) My wife and my family, when the Marines came, everyone fought the Taliban, 
who wanted civil war again.  Afghans cannot go back to Pakistan and Iran 
again.  We don’t want displaced persons again. 
6) The Taliban has a few religions.  They do not pray, and they do not know about 
God.  They are Wahabbi.  I don’t know much about this.  Their beliefs are from 
Pakistan and Iran. 
 
40 
1) Most of the Taliban are educated and trained in Pakistan and fight against us and 
the Marines as well as all of Afghanistan and its militias. 
2) I signed up for the militia because the Taliban killed Marines and civilians.  
Why should I stand around?  I wanted to help out the Marines and fight Taliban.   
3) All the people tell me that I have the responsibility—that this is my obligation—
to not allow the fucking Taliban in.  I will fight the Taliban and send them away. 
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4) I will fight for about two years.  If it is possible to prolong the fight again the 
Taliban, I will.  In my village there is no Taliban.  If the village people and 
government help out, I will prolong the fight. 
5) My children are five and six years old.  If someone told them that the Taliban 
are coming they would hide because they are scared of the Taliban.  When they 
grow up, God willing, they will send away the Taliban if the Taliban returned. 
6) I don’t know exactly.  Most are wahhabiya from Pakistan. 
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1) (emotional, angry) We must clear out the enemy because the Taliban are not 
from Afghanistan.  They are from Pakistan. 
2) In the past, Ahmad Shah Masood fought against the Taliban and the tribes.  
Now the Taliban belongs to Arab countries and Pakistan.  We are uneducated, 
and the Taliban made us drug dealers.  So we wanted to form a militia. 
3) The Taliban do not want security.  We must push them back to Pakistan.  We 
need security in all of Afghanistan and Helmand. 
4) I will fight the Taliban until they are completely finished. 
5) If you ask my son, he will say that the Taliban are our enemy.  The big enemy.  
People were uneducated.   
6) There are three types of Taliban.  First are the Sunnis in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan.  Then there are the wahabbi.  Then there are the Mahdi-an from being 
trained in Pakistan. 
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1) The Taliban are a negative influence on Afghanistan.  They came from outside 
Afghanistan.  They want to destroy Afghanistan. 
2) They detained me after they asked me to support the Taliban—and I refused.   
3) I helped a former Marine Corps battalion commander a lot.  And I helped the 
people.  The Taliban destroyed everything.  They did not let Afghans go to 
school, and they made us grow poppy.  They offered us nothing. 
4) I probably will fight the Taliban until they are out of Afghanistan.  I held three 
large shuras numbering in the hundreds to not follow the Taliban and to 
establish peace.  I would say, “look at what they did to me.” 
5) I have 16 sons and 11 brothers.  I advise them and tell them to work for GIRoA 
and oppose the Taliban.  I tell them what to do, and they do it. 
6) Their religion is Islam, but they do not act like Muslims. 
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1) The Taliban are against kids and against families.  They do not want peace. 
2) The kids want to go to school, and we need schools and bridges. 
3) The Taliban do not want kids to be educated.  They are like wild animals. 
4) I will fight the Taliban until the area is secure. 
5) Yes, our kids have to be against the Taliban.  They Taliban are our enemy.  The 
Taliban do not want kids to go to schools.  They do not want schools or bridges.   
6) Their religion is Pakistani—Wahabbi. 
 
44 
1) A few months ago, the Taliban sent me away to Lashkar Gah.    
2) We returned to bring security. 
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3) My son and his cousin worked with the Marines to fight the Taliban. 
4) The Taliban came here and sent us away.  They took everything.   I just had the 
clothes on my body.  I was gone, it felt like forever, for seven to eight years. 




1) This is my obligation to fight against the Taliban.  
2) I wanted to figure out how to bring security to my area.  So I talked to the local 
Marine Corps colonel.  And I made the decision to stand up a militia.  The 
militias know who is good, who is bad, and who is Taliban.  We have been very 
helpful to the Marines. 
3) The Taliban do not want security. 
4) IF ONE TALIBAN IS LEFT, I WILL KILL HIM. 
5) I’m pretty sure my children will be like me. 
6) Most of the Taliban say that their religion is Muhammadin.  But they are not 




1) I don’t care if it’s Taliban or anyone.  If there is insecurity—in Afghanistan or 
the world—and they don’t want peace, then I am against these people.  I am 
against anyone in the world that is against peace. 
2) (NO ANSWER.) 
3) (no answer) 
4) (NO ANSWER.) 
5) I don’t know about my sons.  They will make their own decision when they 
grow up. 





2) (NO ANSWER.) 
3) (NO ANSWER.) 
4) The Taliban are pussies.   




1) The United States needs to talk to everyday to the people in Pakistan who are 
causing the problems.  The most important thing  is that we build schools, have 
educations, and have teachers.   
2) (NO ANSWER.) 
3) If we want security and peace, then the children need education.  We need to 
talk to the president of Pakistan.  Most of the Taliban are from Pakistan.  In the 
past, your fathers and grandfathers helped us a lot to build Afghanistan and 
helped with security especially in Marjah.  You killed Usama bin Ladin in 
Pakistan.  You need to talk with the Pakistani president, or there will never be 
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security.  Two years ago I saw a camp in Pakistan for Afghans.  I asked the 
guards why they would not let the Afghans leave the camp.  The Pakistani 
soldiers said that the U.S. president would not allow the Afghan people there to 
leave out into the town because they could come back to Afghanistan (it 
appeared that he was referring to bad people, as he was not upset from this story 
but instead told it as if it were evidence that the source of the Taliban is in 
Pakistan).    
4) (NO ANSWER.) 
5) My children now are small.  When they grow up they will make their decision.  
I hope that the U.S. and Afghan children will sit down and figure it out together.   
6) Salafis from Pakistan.  The United States needs to talk to the salafis. 
 
49 
1) The first thing is that the Taliban do not care about anyone.  They are not good 
at anything.  THEY DO NOT OFFER ANYTHING. 
2) My people were tired of the Taliban when the Taliban were causing problems.  
The people did not want the Taliban.  An easy way to solve this problem was to 
stand up a militia. 
3) The villagers think that the Taliban is not good for families. 
4) The only way to solve the situation is to keep the people busy (he appeared to be 
referring to jobs and employment).  And then the Taliban would only last about 
two months.  Then the Taliban would be done. 
5) My kids will be like me.  If the Taliban act in the wrong way then my children 
will fight them.  The Taliban want to bring children to the schools in Pakistan. 
6) (no time to answer this question because a US commander came by and needed 
to meet with him in private urgently) 
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1) The Taliban do not want security or peace in Afghanistan, especially Marjah. 
2) A few months ago, the situation was dangerous in Sistani.  The Taliban put 
IEDs in the roads and by canals and bridges.  I showed the Marines where these 
IEDs were.  The Taliban told me that they would kill me.  They beat me and 
shot me twice in the leg (he showed me two healed bullet wounds on his left 
calf).  They came into my compound and destroyed it.  The Taliban do not want 
security. 
3) The Taliban are from another country.  The locals hate the Taliban.  The Taliban 
would not build or allow us to build bridges, canals, and schools. 
4) I will continue to fight until the Taliban are defeated.   
5) I believe that when my children grow up they will be educated and maybe they 
will fight again the Taliban?  Maybe they will follow our rules?  If the fighting 
continues then they might help, and they will get educated.  The situation will be 
better. 
6) The Taliban are Muslim.  But I don’t know what’s what about religion.  The 
Taliban’s religion is the Quran.  The says they believe in the Quran.  But they 
are taught in Pakistan and are from Pakistan. 
 
51 
	   262	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1) The Taliban are not good people.  They are the enemy of Afghanistan.  The 
Taliban take the side of some tribes like the Alikozai.  The Taliban are not good 
for Afghanistan. 
2) I want to protect Marjah, my village, and serve Afghanistan.  I am uneducated.  
And I want my son to be able to go to school.  But the Taliban do not allow 
people to go to school. 
3) All the people know that the Taliban are not good people.  They do not solve 
problems.  Their courts are a problem.  They want people to fight.  The Taliban 
takes one side or the other.  They are not a good arbitrator, they do not have 
good judgment, and they kill people indiscriminately. 
4) While I am still alive I will oppose and fight the Taliban. 
5) All kids and all in the young generation oppose the Taliban because the Taliban 
regime are not good.  They do not let people go to school.  They would today 
not let children g to school and be happy. 
6) The Taliban say they are Muslims.  But the Taliban are not.  They don’t allow 
Islamic law.  The Taliban kills.  But Muslims do not want to eradicate people 
and don’t allow suicide.  The Taliban joined with the Pakistani people to make 
those Pakistanis go to religious schools. 
 
52 
1) I suffered a lot under Taliban rules.  The Taliban are not well educated.  They 
are in the hands of Pakistan and Iran who pay them.  They are cruel and no one 
will follow until the Taliban spreads terror.   
2) They used to kill one person to get taxes from everyone—making that one 
person an example.  And this becomes propaganda that spreads outward.  They 
would make an example of one person for the community over someone who 
refuses to grow poppy for or give food to the Taliban. 
3) A person who loves the human race feels respect to do something for that place.  
He will be loyal t that place.  The Taliban made people worse than animals.  
People were uneducated.  So one educated person would come along—if he 
does something good then this is an opportunity.  But the next day the Taliban 
would kill or kidnap this person.   Or he would disappear or flee.  Marjah used 
to be heaven for drug lords, smugglers, killers, kidnappers.  The Taliban’s main 
income was smuggling. Shops used to only sell opium.  Any program where 
guns and bullets are involved needs money.  They support themselves with 
drugs, and use this money to kill families and destroy lives.  It is money for 
destruction.  These days are like eid (holiday).  Children can go to school.  You 
can see it on their faces.  But it doesn’t quite feel as good as the early days.  
After Operation Mosharak, all the shops are now busy, and the economy is 
booming.  Now there are tractors and motorbikes.  This was impossible before.  
Before there was one guy with a tractor on this piece of land.  Now each of his 
cousins has a tractor.   
4) Before you couldn’t walk because of the dust.  Now the roads are better.  There 
are solar powered lights.  Now the city is calm.   
5) Before an old person would be beaten if the Taliban needed to collect food from 
him.  Now he can walk and drive and bike around.  Before the power was not 
given to the block elders.  They were the most wanted by the Taliban.  It was a 
cat and mouse game. 
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6) Everyone knows.  Islam is a religion of friendship and peace.  It is not a religion 
of f killing someone in the middle of the street.  They talk about the Prophet, 
may God keep him.  But Islam is like water.  It can drown you or save your life.  
If someone is already a bad guy then he will twist the truth.  Before a woman 
could not go to bazaar without a man.  Doesn’t matter if she needs medicine.  
Now kids are going to school again.  It doesn’t matter if people are street 
vendors, doctors, or professors—everyone sends their kids to school and share 
stories with one another about their kids in school.  The Taliban captured 
Marjah in 2009.  And Marjah suffered more than the rest of Afghanistan.  So 
now Marjah deserves more good things for itself. 
 
53 
1) The Taliban only want to fight.  I do not want this fighting.  The Taliban only 
want suicide attacks. 
2) I am happy with our militia and want to give to our country and our government.  
I want there to be schools.  I am happy with this security.  I fought with the 
Russians as a mujahid.  I helped to solve that problem.  Before the Russians and 
even during the Russians people were educated.  But after the Russians, people 
were uneducated as it was through the Taliban rule. 
3) The Marines are 100% good.  We will all fight for security for a long time like 
we did against the Russians. 
4) I will fight for life.  Even as a boy I wanted to fight.  I want to fight and kill all 
the Taliban.  I want to help Marjah and help Afghanistan. 
5) When my son is old he will be like those in the militias.  He likes the arbakai.  
He will be against the Taliban in the future. 
6) My religion is against the Taliban.  Pakistan and Iran are the enemy.  Baazgul, 




1) I became an ALP block elder and leader to help my country.  Why should I stay 
at home?  I appreciate that the militias were and are helping.  I am happy to help 
and enjoy helping.  I enjoy killing the Taliban and fighting the Taliban. 
2) My father is a malik and was a block elder.  So I have followed in my father’s 
footsteps. 
3) In Marjah, the Taliban caused fighting in the street.  So now I have 30 men.  
Marjah needs ISCIs. 
4) I will not leave the ISCI.  We need agriculture and security in Marjah.  We need 
security in Marjah and Afghanistan.  We need to have security everywhere 
forever. 
5) My son goes to school now.  But he will fight the Taliban and help against the 
Taliban in the future.  Today we are teaching the students to be educated and 
they will learn.  And they will learn about the true nature of the Taliban. 
6) The Taliban brought suicide attacks here.  Everyone here has the choice between 
helping and fighting.  And the Taliban choose fighting but should be helping.  
That Taliban are not like Muslims.  Muslims are just.  Taliban are not just.  That 
Taliban do not allow schools and are against Islam. 
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1) I am against the Taliban because the Taliban do not like Afghanistan.  
2) I wanted peace so I decided to combat the Taliban.  My life is now good.  This 
is how I wanted it.  Children can go to school, and there is security. 
3) The Taliban are against Afghanistan and Marjah culture, security, and 
education. 
4) I want to fight the Taliban for the rest of my life.  I will not leave the militia or 
militia’s mission. 
5) My son is just like me.  He wants to remove the Taliban from all of Afghanistan. 
6) The Taliban’s religion is not good.  They do not think or care about people, 
women, and children.  They are outside the religion.  They want to destroy, use 
bombs, and hurt people only. 
 
56 
1) Since the ALP stood up I do not see Taliban.  The Taliban brought insecurity. 
2) I am against the Taliban because they damaged my home as well as destroyed 
my tractors and motorbikes. 
3) The Taliban are not here now.  Nobody likes the Taliban because they now have 
security and education.  People have knowledge of who the Taliban really are. 
4) I will not stop until all the Taliban are removed from the village.  This is 
important for children. 
5) I have two sons.  They both today work for the militias and will continue to do 
so. 




1) We do not like the Taliban.  They do not allow security and are against security, 
knowledge, and education. 
2) My life is good, but I need more money.  Before ISCI, things were no good.  
The Taliban were everywhere and destroyed everything for me.  They hurt my 
family and my brother.  They came to my family’s compound at night to stay in 
the wintertime.   
3) More and more people joined the ALP so that the Taliban would not be in 
Marjah.  To drive the Taliban from Marjah.  The Taliban came to compounds at 
night.  And they forced us to pay them money. 
4) I will fight until there is peace in Marjah.  Until peace is in place. 
5) My son will take over the security role to secure Marjah. 
6) The Taliban’s religion is not good because they kill so many people and 
children.  The Taliban are not Muslims. 
 
58 
1) We hate the Taliban.  The Taliban killed my uncle and cousin.  I seek out 
revenge for them.  I will avenge them. 
2) I have to do this because the Taliban are our enemy.  If people did not join the 
ISCI, then this would be bad for Marjah.  The ALP is harmful for the Taliban.  I 
want to protect my family, my relatives, and my wife. 
3) The Taliban annoy people and misuse and mistreat people.  They put mines in 
the road which people walk down and kill people.  They beat people.  This is 
why  people in Marjah do not like them. 
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4) As long as I am alive I will fight the Taliban.  I will fight in Marjah against the 
Taliban for life. 
5) When my son is raised, he should also fight against the Taliban. 
6) They are the same religion as me.  They are Muslims. 
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1) I was against the Taliban because I worked in a company.  The Taliban called 
me and asked why I was working for the government.  I was just working in a 
company. 
2) I am now with the government in a war against the Taliban because they bother 
me. 
3) The Taliban came into our homes.  They killed a lot of people.  They took 
money and food from the locals.  They spent one night with my mother and my 
sister.  They did this throughout Marjah. 
4) I will fight to remove the Taliban.  The Taliban will kill me because I work for 
the ISCI.  They will kill all ISCI. 
5) The TB shot me in the leg.  I killed three TB commanders.  My son will fight for 
the ISCI.  They will defend my community and my farm.  My name means 
Black and drives fear in the Taliban. 
6) They are not Muslims.  They come from Pakistan, their religion.  They kill 
Muslims in Afghanistan.  We are Muslims.  They are not. 
 
60 
1) I fight because I want to bring security to this area. 
2) The government needs us.  Afghanistan needs me.   
3) Those in Marjah know where the Taliban is.  They, and the ISCIs, believe that 
the Taliban is not good.  They are not good for families.  The Taliban is the 
enemy of Afghanistan. 
4) As long as my country needs me, I will serve. 
5) When my children are older I will tell them the Taliban is the enemy of our 
country.  They are the enemy of governance. 
6) They are Muslims.  But a different type of Muslims. 
 
61 
1) Because the Taliban were educated in Iran and Pakistan.  They are outsiders.  
They come from the outside. 
2) I want to help Afghanistan.  I feel that I need to support Afghanistan.  I want to 
bring peace and security. 
3) The Taliban are against the people.  They Taliban are against peace.  They do 
not want or allow peace.  They are against Afghanistan improving.  They do not 
want Afghanistan to improve. 
4)  I will fight them all the time as long as they are in Afghanistan. 
5) My children fear the Taliban.  They want education.  And since the Taliban do 
not allow education, the Taliban are the enemy of the children here.  And the 
Taliban’s enemy is children. 
6) I don’t know.  If they are Muslims, then why would they kill civilians?  I don’t 
know.  I don’t understand them. 
 
62 
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1) The Taliban are the enemy of the people of Afghanistan.  They do bad work.  
They executed hurtful policies.   
2) Because I like the ISCIs.  I will stay with them with their support from our 
country and the Afghan government. 
3) They kill.  The Taliban breaks schools and homes.  They are against education.  
They do not allow people to be educated.  They burn down schools and 
mosques. 
4) I will fight for the rest of my life.  I will serve for the rest of my life. 
5) I don’t know what my children think right now.  I know that they want 
education—something that the Taliban do not allow. 
6) I think that the Taliban are Muslims too. 
 
63 
1) The Taliban are the enemy of the civilians.  They do not like civilians.  And they 
are the enemy of the family. 
2) I like peace.  I long for peace.  And want to help Afghanistan. 
3) When the Taliban came in, Marjah came together to fight them.  And Marjah 
will always fight and be against the Taliban. 
4) For all time.  For all the days of my life. 
5) The kids do not like the Taliban.  They are against the Taliban.  They are 
absolutely fed up with a future that the Taliban would offer. 
6) Muslims too. 
 
64 
1) The Taliban are the enemy of the families.  Afghanistan is for us.  They do not 
want a better life in Afghanistan.  They are against us improving ourselves. 
2) Because the Taliban do not bring security or peace.  They are against these 
things. 
3) Because I, and the ISCIs, can bring security and peace.  We need U.S. support.  
And we need our ALP commander. 
4) I am very tired from fighting.  We have security and peace right now in our 
community.  But I will strive for this always. 
5) My children fear the Taliban.  When they are older they will be like me.  My 
children like education.  They believe that the Taliban is their enemy.  They fear 
the Taliban. 




1) The Taliban do not offer anything positive or productive.  They do not conduct 
good policies.  They only bring bad works, bad things.  They are the enemy of 
civilians. 
2) I want to defend Afghanistan.  I feel that I have to.  I am compelled to—to 
myself. 
3) Marjah is just like me.  Now we join the ISCIs.  The Taliban will never be here 
again. 
4) As long as there are ISCIs.  As long as my country is behind me, I will serve to 
defend Afghanistan. 
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5) My children want education.  They will also help our country.  They want 
Afghanistan to improve.  They do not and will not like the Taliban.  They will 
be against the enemies of Afghanistan. 
6) They are the same.  Muslims. 
 
66 
1) The Taliban do not like my personal style.  They do not like what I eat and 
drink.  They do not like the way I eat and drink.  I’m a man.  And I do not want 
anyone getting in the way of me.  I do not want anyone getting in the way of 
what I want. 
2) Now I am young.  I want to defend my country.  I have to join the ALP to break 
the enemy.  To break our enemy.  To break the Taliban. 
3) Marjah is united together with the ISCI.  When our community is behind the 
ISCIs the Taliban cannot come.  All the people like us.  And all the people in 
Marjah are not happy with the Taliban. 
4) The Taliban are not from Afghanistan.  They are from Pakistan and other 
countries.  They have foreign roots.  I will be against them and fight them for 
life. 
5) My children are like me.  They want freedom. 
6) There are different people with different beliefs around the world.  I have heard 
this, that they are Muslim.  But I don’t think so.  I don’t know exactly. 
 
67 
1) When the Taliban were in our district they brought fighting.  Everyday there 
was fighting.  They killed civilians and caused strife amongst the community. 
2) I joined the ALP because I wanted more ammunition and a machine gun to fight 
my enemy—the Taliban.  The ALP support me in my efforts to fight the 
Taliban. 
3) The Taliban are the enemy of Afghanistan.  The ISCIs and the community will 
only allow people and government into our district.  No outsiders.  We will not 
allow outsiders back in here. 
4) I will fight until I feel security.  Unit I feel secure.  As long as the Taliban is the 
enemy of Afghanistan, I will fight them. 
5) The children want peace and schools.  They know that the Taliban are the 
enemy of these dreams.  And therefore they believe the Taliban to be the enemy.  
They will continue like this. 
6) I have a lot of examples.  When the Taliban came, they fought civilians and 
killed innocents.  The Taliban brought fighting amongst society.  Education and 
peace.  This is what the Taliban fight.  And they are not from our religion.  I 
have lots of examples. 
 
68 
1) Because the Taliban brought fighting right beside my home.  They brought 
SHAME. 
2) I want to help Afghanistan. 
3) Marjah is united behind the ISCIs.  Marjah like the ISCIs.  We enjoy support 
from all of Marjah.  And all of Marjah considers our enemy their enemy.  The 
enemy of Marjah and the ISCIs is the Taliban. 
4) For life. 
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5) My children feel that the Taliban are the enemy.  My child is only four years 
old, and he already wants to join the ALP to fight the Taliban. 
6) The Taliban are not Muslim.  They do not share the same religion as us.  They 
come from a new religion from Pakistan.  This religion gets support from Saudi 
Arabia.  This is a new belief system. 
 
69 
1) The Taliban came to our village.  They fought beside my house.   
2) My family had to run to another safe area.  And I came back to fight the Taliban 
to save my wives and mother.  For their safety. 
3) They brought fighting to our homes. 
4) I will fight them all the time, for the rest of time.  I will fight until I am sure they 
are defeated.  Right now there are no enemy present in my block. 
5) I don’t know about my children when they grow up.  They fear the Taliban now.  
In the future they want to be engineers or doctors.  They seek education.  They 
seek things the Taliban would not allow. 
6) They are not Muslims. 
 
70 
1) Because the Taliban are my enemy.  They are the enemy of Afghanistan.   
2) They do not want a better Afghanistan.  They offer nothing. 
3) I have an example.  One of my friends was working for a company.  A company 
that was considered to be under the auspices of Afghanistan.  And because of 
this the Taliban shot my friend in the head.  But the Marines came to help. 
4) I want freedom.  And I will fight for this goal for the rest of my life.  I am 
dedicated for life. 
5) My child is in school.  Actually he’s in the 3rd grade.  When the Taliban came 
before, he couldn’t go to school.  The children want peace.  They want security.  
They want to go to school.  They want education.  Things the Taliban forbade.  
6) The Taliban are Muslims.  But they are different.  Different from us. 
 
71 
1) The Taliban are the enemy of Afghanistan. 
2) I have to help to fight against the Taliban. 
3) The Taliban killed my brother.  My brother was young.  He was innocent. 
4) I am dedicated for life.  My entire life.  As long as the enemy is alive—as long 
as the Taliban exist—I will fight them. 
5) Right now the children want a good future.  They long for education. 
6) They are Muslims, but they are different now than our sect of religion.   
 
72 
1) The Taliban are our enemy.  They do not conduct any good policies.  They do 
not do good works.  I have to fight them. 
2) I need to support Afghanistan and the government.  The ISCIs support the 
government.  I need to support the efforts against the Taliban.  I want to help 
and support my country. 
3) Before there were more Taliban.  Now in Marjah the ISCIs have come together.  
We do not want the Taliban to come back again. 
4) I will fight until I truly feel freedom and security.  I will fight until this. 
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5) My children fear the Taliban.  The Taliban burn books and schools down.  My 
children want a future of education.  They want peace.  They will never support 
the Taliban. 
6) The Taliban are not from my religion.  We have freedom in my religion.  I will 
not allow them to tell me what to do.  The Taliban only do what benefits them.  
They only do for themselves. 
 
73 
1) I don’t like fighting that they bring.  The kill and bring only fighting. 
2) I want to keep Afghanistan and my people safe and secure. 
3) Since the Taliban, there has been less corruption now in Marjah.  And this has 
cause the people of Marjah to be against the Taliban. 
4) I want my rights.  And until I have my rights I will fight against the Taliban.  I 
will fight until I feel good and feel freedom.  I seek freedom. 
5) Children know the Taliban are the enemy.  An example is when the Marines 
first arrived, the Taliban saw me work with them.  They came to my compound 
and kidnapped me.  They beat me and would only free me for over 400,000 
Afghani. 
6) They talk as if they are Muslims.  Maybe they’re not Muslims. 
 
74 
1) The Taliban came to Marjah and brought fighting to our homes. 
2) We have to fight the Taliban.  Our village is unified.  They are together.  The 
big man, the elder, the chief, said to go to the ALP and join to fight.  He told us 
to help the people.  And so we did. 
3) We are all together on this.  The Taliban can no longer come into our 
community safely.  We can never like them.  All the people are like me against 
the Taliban. 
4) I will help out.  I will fight for the rest of my life. 
5) Our children do not have good memories about the Taliban.  They witnessed 
fighting and death and the burning of schools.   
6) The Taliban claim to be Muslims.  Maybe they’re correct.  But they do not act 
morally.  They do not do good works.  I do not know. 
 
75 
1) We are all together in our efforts.  If one person acts, everyone else will come to 
his aid and help.  The answer from everyone will be the same.  We are against 
the Taliban. 
2) It is better for us to support our country and our government.  I have to come 
here and help.  I propelled to be here. 
3) We were not free when the Taliban were here.  They were actually in our very 
own homes often.  We were happy for the Marines and the government.  All of 
Marjah is like me.  We all want to be free of the Taliban. 
4) I feel good now that we have security.  I want it to stay this way, and I am 
willing to fight for the rest of my life. 
5) The children are like everyone.  And everyone likes to be free.  The children, 
like all of Marjah, want a good future. 
6) When the Christians were here, all Muslims fought against the Christians.  
When the Taliban came here—and the Taliban are not correct Muslims, not 
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proper Muslims—we all come together to fight against the Taliban.  The Taliban 
are not good Muslims.  They are from Pakistan.  They are educated in a place 
called Waziristan.  Do you know this place?  Have you heard of this place?  
They are the enemy of Afghanistan.  They are wayward twisted Muslims. 
 
76 
1) We all know better.  The Taliban are the enemy of all civilians. 
2) The Taliban came into my homes.  Men came right besides my home and 
brought fighting. 
3) They kill our children.  They burned down our children’s schools.  They did not 
bring any good policies. 
4) I am in this for life.  The Taliban will be my enemy for life. 
5) The Taliban burn down schools.  They put explosives on other men.  Children 
have heard about this and even seen this with their very eyes.  They have seen 
the Taliban cut off the heads of people.  If they see the enemy.  If they see the 
Taliban.  They tell me.  They report it. 
6) They are not Muslims.  I’ll give you an example.  They kill civilians.  They kill 
children.  Islam does not allow this fucking shit.  Islam would never ever 
fucking allow this.  I will never believe that they are from Islam. 
 
77 
1) We need a better future, and we need education.  The Taliban brought a wealth 
of fighting to Afghanistan.  This is not a good thing.  We lost everything.  They 
brought nothing positive. 
2) I fight the Taliban because I want peace.  I want a future of freedom. 
3) We all know that it is most important that we have good clinics, good roads, 
good canals, and help from the government.  When our country helps its 
civilians—when the government helps its civilians—the Taliban does not want 
this.  The Taliban want nothing good.  The Taliban does not want Afghanistan 
to improve. 
4) I need to keep the people of this district forever safe.  I will continue my efforts 
for life. 
5) Our children have seen the bad works—the bad policies—of the Taliban.  They 
know about the Taliban.  They want good education and a bright future. 
6) Muslims do good deed.  They want people to be better. Islam improves life.  We 
are good Muslims here.  But the Taliban do bad deeds and so they are bad 
Muslims.  They are educated from the other side of the Pakistani border—in 
Pakistan.  The neighbor countries are similar to the Taliban.  They are all the 
enemy of Afghanistan.  Our neighbors provide various forms of support for the 
Taliban.  Specifically it is Iran and Pakistan.  They all do not want us to 
improve.  They are all against us.  They all want fighting.  They are our 
enemy—Iran, Pakistan, and the Taliban. 
 
78 
1) The Taliban do not allow children to go to school.  They destroy our schools and 
do not let us eat.  They kept us from even eating bread. 
2) I want to support my community better.  Our people.  The ALP supports the 
community in this way.  Our country needs the ISCIs. 
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3) That Taliban brings fighting.  Usually the Taliban comes to fight with the 
Marines and make civilians get in the way—causing civilians to die 
unnecessarily.   
4) I will fight the Taliban for life. 




1) They broke our country.  So I will fight them.  They made caused many 
problems for the people.  They brought fighting. 
2) I want to keep my community secure.  I want to bring security to civilians and 
help Afghanistan. 
3) They did not bring any good policies.  The Taliban only brought strife. 
4) I will fight for all time.  I will fight the Taliban.  I will fight them until they 
leave.  I want security.  I want peace. 
5) My children are like me. 
6) Muslims.  They use “kalima.”  Do you know what this means?  It means the 




1) I was injured from the Taliban during my duty with the ISCI.  The Taliban shot 
me with a PKR round. 
2) When the Taliban came before, they lived in my block.  The cut the heads of my 
friends.  I need to support this effort, this campaign, against the Taliban.  The 
Taliban are the enemy of the family, of my family.  When they came I only saw 
fighting in the village.  I only say civilians getting killed. 
3) The Taliban put in mines in the road.  They exploded people and killed.  They 
injured civilians.  The Taliban came into my home.  They are against the 
civilians.  They are the enemy of the helpless—so I joined the ISCIs.  To defend 
the defenseless. 
4) Now we do not have fighting.  But we are ready for the Taliban on our block.  I 
feel that this job is my duty.  And it will be a duty for the rest of my life.  I want 
peace and do not want fighting.  Now I am with the ISCI, I am by my 
relationship with the government.  I am put into the same pool as those that help 
the government.  Everyone knows that if the Taliban capture me they will kill 
me.  So I am happy to be with the ISCI. 
5) Everything I do, my children will do.  If I want peace, they want peace too.  If I 
fight or want to capture criminals, they want to and will want to do this too. 
6) They are Muslims.  But fighting is not our religion.  No religions allow fighting.  
And the killing of people.  Our enemy cuts off the heads of friends.  And the 
Taliban gets support form other countries.  Everything bad in Afghanistan is 
from Pakistan.  All the suicide bombers are from Pakistan.  The Taliban’s 
weapons are from Pakistan.   
 
81 
1) The Taliban are cruel.  They kill everyone that works for the government.  They 
kill anyone that has anything to do with the any organization that is even related 
to the government. 
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2) The Taliban killed my family.  They killed them with undue cruelty. 
3) The Taliban are so cruel and don’t even know they people that they kill.  The 
Taliban are cruel.  When they capture people who have anything to do with the 
government they kill these prisoners in the most cruel fashion. 
4) I will fight for the rest of my life.  For life. 
5) It is clear.  When the father fights—that’s me—than the children will also fight. 
6) Pakistan.  Pakistan.  Pakistan.  Pakistan.  Pakistan.  They follow a different sect 
of religion that is based out of Pakistan. 
 
82 
1) We do not like fighting.  The Taliban only bring fighting.  They fight with me 
and my village.  They only bring fighting into Afghanistan. 
2) I feel that I have to defend our block. 
3) Again, our town does not like the fighting.  We need it to stop.  And Taliban 
only brings fighting. 
4) All the time.  I will fight for the rest of my life.  I will fight as long as I have the 
ability to fight. 
5) The Taliban do not allow education.  They are against education.  My kids want 
to be educated.  They seek education.  And the Taliban would never allow this.  
It is clear how my kids feel and will feel. 
6) They are Muslims.  But there are some differences. 
 
83 
1) I have to fight the Taliban.  They are not good people.   They are against the 
civilians.  They are bad people towards the civilians.  I want a free life.  We all 
want to live freely.  And the Taliban is cruel and would never allow this. 
2) I want to help my country.  I want to help Afghanistan.  The ALP is able to fight 
the Taliban.  So that is why I join them.  So that I have the ability to fight 
Taliban. 
3) I don’t think that they can come to the district anymore.  We are all together in 
our view of the Taliban—in sharing my view of the Taliban.  Our town is united 
in its view of the Taliban and united in its fight against the Taliban. 
4) I will fight them all the time.  Only when they leave, would I ever give up or 
stop fighting. 
5) My children feel exactly the same as me.  They like education.  They want and 
seek education.  They want a better future—which the Taliban, almost by 
definition—would stop. 
6) Their religion is Muslim.  They get support and education from Pakistan on 




1) The Taliban do not want Afghanistan to improve.  They do not want or want to 
allow my country to improve.  So they bring fighting.  And so therefore I have 
to fight them likewise. 
2) I need the support and ability to fight the Taliban.  So I felt that I had to join the 
ALP to properly fight the Taliban to the best of my ability. 
3) All of Marjah is fed up with the Taliban.  We are all against the Taliban.  The do 
not offer or do any construct policies or actions.  Their actions are corrupt and 
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bad.  Their bad actions include cutting off the heads of civilians.  They are very 
bad all the time.  They are cruel all the time. 
4) I will fight all the time.  For all time.  We feel in the districts that we do not 
want the Taliban.  When they leave and when we have peace, then I would like 
offer a different type of help to my country.  I am dedicated.  I will, at that time 
when peace is reached, wish to serve my country in a different capacity. 
5) Under Taliban governance, there was no school.  During that time our children 
fear the Taliban.  Our children like education and do not like the Taliban.   
6) They say that they are Muslims.  They use the Muslim religion to conduct bad 
activities, bad works.  They abuse the religions for their bad things. 
 
85 
1) I do not like the Taliban.  They fight near our homes.  They kill children. 
2) Our people support the ISCI. 
3) Throughout all of Marjah about 95% of people are against the Taliban.  They 
like the security and governance that the ALP help to bring.  Only about 5% of 
those in Marjah support the Taliban. 
4) I will never like the Taliban.  Ever.  They are criminal.  It is good to have a good 
government.  They kill people.  They do not like peace.  They destroy schools.  
They destroy buildings.  They destroy things.  I will never want the Taliban. 
5) My children act and do like me.  They also do not like the Taliban.  They also 
will not support the Taliban. 
6) If my beard is not big enough then they would come by and slap me.  Just about 
my beard length.  They would come about something so small.  Such a tiny 
matter.  And slap me in public.  We are now happy that we have the government 
and the ISCIs and the Marines here. 
 
86 
1) The Taliban are not good people.  They are bad people.  They came into my 
home.  They used brute force, brute strength to take what they want and do what 
they want.  They used their strength to do what they want.  We had no ability, 
no strength at the time, to fight the Taliban.  We could not fight against the 
Taliban. 
2) We have to come join the ISCI.  They use their strength, so I need the strength 
to fight the Taliban.  I am compelled to defend Afghanistan. 
3) They use bad works and do this wrongly in the name of Islam.  They cannot 
have this government.  And I do not what them to have governance over this 
area.  They just cannot rule us. 
4) I will fight them all the time.  For the rest of my time.  I will fight until they 
leave completely. 
5) When the Taliban were here before, the children were afraid of them.  They 
feared the Taliban.  They had fear.  My children want peace and like education. 
6) They are Muslim.  At least this is what they say.  But the conduct bad works, 
bad things.  We all know better.  Their religion is from Pakistan.  Their religion 
is also heavily influenced by the ISI people in Pakistan. 
 
87 
1) The Taliban get their support from Pakistan.  We do not want Pakistan influence 
or Pakistan in here.  Pakistan does not want Afghanistan to improve.  They do 
	   274	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
not want to allow enlightenment, education, or any type of development.  They 
do not want anything positive for us.  So the Taliban are our enemy.  And we 
will fight this enemy. 
2) You know Baazgul?  That Taliban killed his brother.  And like this, the Taliban 
killed my uncle also. 
3) The Taliban takes people and lands away.  They want the government lands.  
They want to take the government lands away from the government.  This is the 
reason for their fighting.  Over land.  Over government land.  It is a contest for 
land. 
4) I DON’T NEED A SALARY FOR THIS. I joined the ALP only to fight the 
enemy.  This is my only reason for joining the ISCI.  I don’t need money.  I 
have to fight them.  The ALP is my vehicle, my method, to be able to fight the 
Taliban.  This is what I want—even without money. 
5) My children are much like me.  In their views.  They feel that they must kill 
Taliban also.  My children all know that my uncle was killed.  They all know 
about this and talk about this.  My children will also kill Taliban when they 
seem Taliban.  They will also kill Taliban.  They only need to see Taliban to kill 
Taliban. 
6) They do bad works by the Islamic religion.  They use the Islamic religion.  They 
use Islam for fear.  They are not Muslim.  And we are partners.  If you need 
anything from me, I can help. 
 
88 
1) The Taliban are our enemy.  They are my enemy.  They do not want peace. 
2) The Taliban bring a lot of fighting.  They cause many many casualties.  They 
broke our country.  And try to break our country.  Crush it.  So I naturally joined 
the ALP of course. 
3) In the world there are many different kinds of people.  Some like fighting.  
Some like the government.  The people that like the government cannot come 
back here, because of how the locals feel. 
4) As long as I am alive I will fight the Taliban. 
5) Even young people, when the children will become just old enough, are and will 
join the ISCI.  They want school.  They want education.  They want that that the 




1) Because the Taliban cannot be from the Islamic religion.  They are going the 
wrong road of religion.  The other way, the correct way, is with Islam.  They are 
the enemy of Islam.  They are our enemy.  They are bad people and conduct bad 
works, bad activities. 
2) I do not like fighting.  I want peace.  If the Taliban came with peace, if they 
came back into the fold, then I would stop fighting them. 
3) If people like the Taliban, this means that they have bad minds and bad 
education.  They don’t understand. 
4) I will fight until there is peace, or until the Taliban offer peace. 
5) All the Afghan people, and this means children included, want peace.  No one 
wants fighting like this.  Peace.  All the people want peace. 
6) They are Muslim.  But different. 
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1) The Taliban are not good people.  They are all about killing Afghan people.  
They want Afghanistan to fall.  This is how people feel. 
2) I DO NOT NEED SALARE.  I only want victory for my Afghanistan.  For my 
country.  They kill my family, and they are the enemy. 
3) I hope all the people unite and people meet against the Taliban. 
4) I want to help our country.  I will fight for all time.  For as long as I live. 
5) My children are the same like me.  They do not and will not like the Taliban. 
6) They say they are Muslim.  But they do not know about Islam.  They get their 
support and influence with regards to religion from outside countries. 
 
91 
1) Because I want to help my country.  I want to help build and improve my 
country. 
2) My friends joined, so I wanted to join. 
3) We want no more Talban.  And right now in my area there are no more Taliban.  
Everyone is like me.  It is our duty to see that there is no more Taliban. 
4) This is my duty.  I have nothing else to say than I feel this is my duty. 
5) They like the military and will want to join the forces against the Taliban. 
6) The Taliban are the same like me.  But they fight with Afghan.  I do not know, 
do not understand, why they want to fight and kill us. 
 
92 
1) Because they are the enemy.  They want to break the country. 
2) Because I like the military.  The militants against the Taliban, I like. 
3) I think the Taliban have left the district.  They cannot again come here.  They 
have fallen to the ISCI. 
4) All the time.  I like this.  I like the ALP and the mission. 
5) My children like education and schools.  They want education.  And they do and 




1) Because they are educated in Pakistan and Iran.  They are against this country.  
They never want Afghanistan to function.  They conduct bad works.  They break 
everything.  They destroy bridges and burn down schools to the ground. 
2) Actually, because I am Muslim, I should defend my home.  And the way to do 
this is with a uniform, a badge, and registration with the government. 
3) Marjah is better day-by-day.  Each day.  All people like the schools.  And this is 
not how the Taliban would have it. 
4) I will fight for all time.  For my life.  There should be peace.  There must be 
peace. 
5) My children also like the schools.  And the Taliban would not allow this. 
6) They say they are Muslims.  They have support from Saudi Arabia, Iran, and 
Pakistan.  They do not allow us to improve.  They do not want us to improve. 
 
94 
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1) I want peace.  The Taliban are bad people.  They oversee bad events.  They are 
against civilians.  They are the enemy of civilians. 
2) I have to come to the ISCI.  To support the government. 
3) Money is a problem.  People work for them to get money, and then there is 
ensuing corruption. 
4) We are all an Islamic country.  I feel that Afghanistan is an Islamic country.  So 
I will fight for this Islamic country. 





1) Because the enemy is educated and supported and run by Pakistan and Iran.  
They get their support from those places.  The Taliban are the enemy. 
2) We need in our district help.  We need someone to support.  So this is why I 
joined the ISCI.  To get the support to fight the Taliban. 
3) I think that all people share my perspective.  They want ISCIs here, and all 
people want to be ALP like me. 
4) For life. 





1) The Taliban are our enemy.  They do not offer anything.  They do not provide 
money for anything positive.  They want to break our country.  Destroy it. 
2) Because our enemy needs me.  They need me to fight the enemy. 
3) Over time things have gotten better.  All the people united and joined together to 
help the government.  They feel the Taliban are the enemy. 
4) All time.  No matter what.  Even as anything arises.  For all time. 
5) They like the government.  So they will join the government and join efforts 




1) The Taliban do not offer governance.  They break bridges and burn schools.  
They kill civilians.  So I want to help. 
2) One month ago, I joined ISCI.  The Taliban are not good people.  They are the 
enemy.  So I fight them. 
3) All the people understand that they destroy.  They do not govern. 
4) I want peace.  I would only stop when I feel that we have peace.  Perhaps 30 
years.  Otherwise for all time. 
5) I think that my children like education and schools—so they will be against the 
Taliban now and as adults. 
6) They are Muslims.  But their education and support is from Pakistan. 
 
98 
1) They not only killed my uncle they killed my two sons. 
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2) They killed my family.  They targeted me because I am an honest person living 
right here in Marjah doing the right thing.  They brought this to me. 
3) They kill people here. 
4) For life. 
5) This is clear. 
6) They are not Muslims.  They do not act like Muslims. 
 
99 
1) The Taliban are not Afghan.  They do not comprise Afghans nor is their origin 
Afghan in any way.  They are from Pakistan.   And they are our enemies.  
Pakistan is our enemy too. 
2) They are against families.  They are against the family—my family and the idea 
of family.  I want to help people.  I want to support a constructive society and 
help my community.  The Taliban mean destruction only.  They are against the 
very social fabric of this town. 
3) The Taliban are our direct enemy.  This is clear, of course.  When the Taliban 
are here that means that there is fighting here.  The Taliban are fighting.  The 
Taliban mean fighting.  They are conflict.  If they are here, there is by very 
definition conflict here. 
4) I will fight on until l I make my country safe and build up Afghanistan.  And as 
long as there is Taliban, they are an impediment to this.  It is my duty to fight 
them as long as it takes and support development and constructive policies. 
5) My children feel that education is very important.  They want education.  This is 
very important for them.  They want to go to school and earn degrees to work.  
They have clear visions for this.  They understand what they want from this day 
forward.  And the Taliban would never allow this.  The Taliban would never 
allow education or my kids to go to school, and my children very much 
understand this clearly. 
6) They are Muslims also.  But they conduct fighting, which is not very Islamic.  
This is not Islamically correct—to fight.  Yet they fight.  This is not the correct 
policy and action for a Muslim.  What they are doing is incorrect. 
 
100 
1) We are peaceful here.  We did not bring this on ourselves.  We did not ask for 
the Taliban’s invasion and the violence that they brought.  We were already 
here.  We didn’t go to another country and start fighting there.  It was brought 
upon us. 
2) I want to defend and live in my village in peace.  And since the Taliban mean 
conflict in our mind, we must fight the Taliban until there is peace.  By 
definition the Taliban cannot allow us to live in peace.  They cannot allow us to 
live without conflict. 
3) They are not Afghans.  Not true Afghans.  They are from the outside.  Their 
tactics are from the outside.  Their ideals and types of violence are from the 
outside.  They invaded and brought fighting.  Fighting is not what we want or 
asked for.  We were not fighting in this town.  They came and brought conflict, 
fighting, and violent to an area that did not want it.  To an area that did not ask 
for it.  To an area that did not deserve it. 
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4) I will fight for as long as it takes until there is peace earned.  I will fight until 
there is not one enemy.  I will fight until we have education.  I will fight until 
we have everything we want. 
5) They believe that schools are good. But it is most important to bring more 
teachers.  The children want school.  We all want school.  They can and are 
willing to learn anywhere.  In any building, in that tent, or outside.  We just need 




1) They came into our land and broke into our homes and burned down schools.  
They essentially broke our town.  They came here and brought death.  They 
came here and broke the tings in our town.  They did not allow education.  They 
did not allow teaching or learning.  They did not allow basic school operations. 
2) ISCIs offer me the support I needed—the support I sought—to do what I wanted 
to do.  They were a vehicle for my own ambitions—for my personal goals.  The 
government offers the weapons and ammunition.  They offer the practical 
materials that I need to fight off the Taliban.  They offer the tools for me to do 
what I need to do. 
3) The Taliban brought fighting.  And they failed, also, to bring any constructive 
policies.  They did not nor could they build up anything or create any type of 
societal self-sufficiency.  They only break and destroy things.  And this is very 
easy for them—to destroy.  And that is what they are—breakers and destroyers 
only. 
4) I will fight all the time—for my entire life.  I am dedicated for all the years that I 
live on this earth. 




1) We do not want fighting.  And all they Taliban want is fighting.  That’s all they 
want.  That’s what they are—conflict.  That is what defines the Taliban.  The 
Taliban are fighting.  The Taliban are conflict.  Don’t you understand this?   
2) My wives and girls did not like the Taliban.  The Taliban disrespected them and 
bought dishonor on them, which is the same as brining dishonor on my and on 
my whole community.  They took and did what they want with them.  This 
makes me unhappy.  This is very disrespectful—to disrespect the women of my 
family.  You surely understand this. 
3) The Taliban would only bring fighting.  They could only mean conflict.  This is 
what the Taliban are: conflict. 
4) I am dedicated to fight and kill the Taliban—all of the Taliban—for my entire 
life or until they are literally completely run out of Afghanistan. 
5) My children are the same as me.  They will rebel against the Taliban until they 
are entirely gone.  They will fight with dedication, passion, and resolve until the 
Taliban is erased.  Until they are deleted from Afghanistan. 
6) The Taliban use the Quran.  And I use the Quran.  I do.  I pray five times a day.  
The Taliban pray five times a day.  But they also belong to Pakistan.  They get 
support from Pakistan.  They are a Pakistani sect. 
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1) Fighting.  That’s what they brought.  That’s what the Taliban are.  We cannot 
have this in our town.  We cannot allow this.  We did not cause this fighting.  
Instead, the Taliban came and brought it upon us.  They mean violence.  And 
they bring violence right into our very neighborhoods.   
2) They disgraced our families.  They defamed and disgraced my family.  I must 
defend our families and not let this happen again.  Never again can they come 
and do what they did. 
3) The entire town feels the same way I do.  Everyone here, everyone around you 
here, feels that the Taliban are nothing more than “fighting.”  They are fighting.  
And no one here wants this. 
4) I will fight as long as I still have the strength to fight.  I have the will to fight on 
as long as it takes to expel the Taliban from the country and defeat them.  So it 
is up to the strength and ability of my body to keep fighting. 
5) The children of the town want a future full of schools, education, freedom, and 
peace.  They are fully aware that the Taliban could never bring these things.  
Kids know that the Taliban would block any positive and constructive 
community efforts.  Thus, the Taliban, by definition, are the enemy of the 
children. 
6) The Taliban appear to follow the pillars of Islam.  But then they don’t act like 
Muslims.  And their religion is not the same as ours.  It is from Pakistani.  With 
roots and influences from Pakistan. 
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1) I want to defend Afghanistan and help the people of this country. 
2) I want to earn peace in this district.  In my district. 
3) Also the rest of the people here are like me.  They feel the same that I do and 
say the same things about the Taliban that I do. 
4) I will fight for all time.  Until there is reconstruction.  Until there is peace.  Until 
there is everything that this district needs. 
5) My children feel that education is very important.  They respect their fathers, 
mothers, and elders.  They will follow in step and wish to keep respecting those 




1) Now I am one of the unit commanders for the arbakai.  The Taliban murdered 
my father.  They murdered my brother.  The Taliban did this during Ramadan—
a time for holiness and introspection and family.  This is the lowest of the low.  
This is very bad.   
2) They killed my family right in the mosque.  Shame.  Shame on them. 
3) I join for the sake of the district.  I looked for a better way to fight the Taliban.  
And the ISCIs are a better way.  They are like me and give me the support I 
need to fight the Taliban. 
4) I do not like fighting.  I do not like war.  But this is necessary because I want 
freedom.  I seek freedom. 
5) My children think like me now.  My brother and father were killed.  And they 
know this.  They will want to enter the ISCIs.  They want a better life. 
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6) Maybe they are Muslims?  But they get support from Pakistan.  They conduct 
themselves by Pakistan rules. 
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1) The Taliban are the enemy.  They are the family’s enemy. 
2) The Taliban continue to be our enemy, so I need to fight them.  They do not stop 
yet. 
3) The Taliban burned schools and broke bridges.  I want to create and keep peace 
and create and keep security. 
4) For all time for the rest of my life.  I will fight until the Taliban are no longer 
here.  I will fight until we have security. 




1) I want to keep my country safe—to serve my country.  And to build my country 
in a positive way.  And the arbakai allow me to keep Marjah safe and 
Afghanistan safe—which in turn will allow people to implement positive 
policies. 
2) This is the reason that I join the ISCI—to better my country, to keep my country 
safe, and to allow us to grow as a country and as a society.  I have no other 
reason for you. 
3) I think that the people here feel the same as me.  They want a safe and secure 
Afghanistan.  They feel a need—a calling—to serve Afghanistan and to keep it 
safe from the Taliban.  And it is the Taliban that are trying to get in the way of 
our efforts.  It is the Taliban we have to defend against.  The Taliban is our 
enemy.  And safety and security is our most immediate goal. 
4) I will fight for as long as it takes.   All the time.  For my entire life if necessary.  
Every day if necessary.  Until Afghanistan is okay. 
5) My children want the schools.  They want education.  And they will grow up to 
help this country.  And the Taliban would and could never allow helpful positive 
education.  The Taliban would and could never allow our children to grow up in 
an education system—to be educated.  And this is very clear to eve the youngest 
of children.  So it is easy to understand why kids do not like and will always be 




1) Because the Taliban did not allow out children to attend school.  They did not 
want education.  They did not want anyone to become better or have better 
minds.  The Taliban came right into our very houses and took what they wanted.  
They invaded our homes.  They invaded our town and brought nothing but 
fighting and destruction.  They want nothing but fighting.  They are essentially 
bringers of fighting. 
2) I joined because of everything they can provide me in my fight against the 
Taliban.  This is clear.  You know this.  The arbakai give me the equipment to 
fight the Taliban.  This is why I came to them.  It is a personal mission of mine 
to rid Afghanistan of the Taliban.  And this the best means for me to accomplish 
this goal. 
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3) The Taliban are our enemy.  They are a foreign enemy.  They do not have their 
sources o origins from Afghanistan.  They do not like nor allow education.  
They are against peace.  They are the enemy of peace.  They only want and only 
bring conflict where they go.  The “Taliban” means destruction.  So I fight them.  
I have to fight them. 
4) I will fight them all the time until we have freedom.  All the hours in the day and 
all the years of my life it takes to destroy the Taliban.  To get rid of this foreign 
invading enemy. 
5) My children also deeply long for a future of freedom from tyranny of the 
Taliban. 
6) They are Muslims.  But they get support from Taliban.  They are against us 
having a future.  They are against peace.  They are the enemy of peace.  And 
they get support from Pakistan.  Pakistan is the enemy. 
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1) I want my children to have a good future.  I want them and me to have a good 
life.  I want freedom.   
2) I want peace.  I want the things that the Taliban are against.  I want the things 
that the Taliban do not want.   
3) The Taliban do not allow security.  They do not allow education.  They do not 
allow a good future nor do they allow peace.  So they are the enemy.  They are 
our enemy.  They are my enemy.  So I have to fight them. 
4) I will fight and be against the Taliban until we are free.  Until we have 
education.  Until we take everything back from them that they took from us. 
5) My children like education.  They believe school is good.  So they will also fight 




1) For a long time they are our enemy.  They are the enemy of Afghanistan.  They 
are my country’s enemy.  They are invaders and bring only death and 
destruction.  We did not choose them as an enemy.  They came to us as a clear 
danger. 
2) The ISCIs support me with weapons and ammunition and everything I need to 
fight.  They are a means to do what I want to do.  They allow me the tools to 
fight and kill Taliban. 
3) They are the enemy of all of us.  Everyone I Marjah would agree with me.  They 
would agree that the Taliban bring nothing but death and destruction.  They 
Taliban are invaders.  They would agree with me that they only bring death.  
They are the embodiment of conflict and everything that is can get in the way of 
a peaceful and productive society. 
4) I will fight until the day comes WHEN AFGHANISTAN IS CLEAN OF THE 
TALIBAN.  I WILL FIGHT UNTIL AFGHANISTAN IS CLEAN.  Clean of 
the Taliban completely. 
5) I am illiterate.  And my children are illiterate.  And my children, and I want to 
be educated.  We want education.  So the Taliban will be the enemy of us and 
the children in particular because the Taliban would never allow education.  
They want us and the children to be illiterate.  To not be educated and to not be 
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able to read.  The Taliban is the enemy of education, the enemy of improvement, 
and the enemy of children.  They are therefore the enemy of us all. 
6) They are Muslims.  But everything they do is not from our religious.  They do 
not act or operate religiously.  They get their education in Pakistan.  They 
receive support from Pakistan. 
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1) Because the Taliban know that we have projects and good works they are 
against us.  They are against any of our efforts to improve ourselves.  They don’t 
want construction.  They would not allow development of any kind.  They only 
want destruction and killing.  They fight us.  They came and fought where we 
live.  We did not ask for this.  They came to us and brought fighting. 
2) I fight because I want security and education.  It is that simple. 
3) They see the village is being productive.  And they do not like this.  So they 
bring fighting to our homes and to our fields.  And so we are all against their 
fighting.  We cannot allow this. 
4) All the time that the Taliban are here in our country I will fight them.  If they are 
breathing.  If they are operating.  If they are physically in Afghanistan, then I 
will fight them to the death.  This is how dedicated I am.  Truthfully. 
5) When they are older, my children, they will have education.  They will support 
and help the government.  They will support and help the military. 
6) They say they are Muslims.  So why do they fight us.  I do not understand this.  
Why would they come here and fight. 
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1) They are our enemy.  The Taliban are the enemy of Marjah, the enemy of 
Afghanistan, the enemy of our children, and the enemy of our way of life.  That 
is crystal clear.   
2) They are our enemy so I fight them.  So I need to fight them.  It is my duty to 
fight and kill Taliban to allow Afghanistan to become safe and secure. 
3) We all believe what I believe.  The rest of the town, the rest of Marjah, is the 
same as me.   
4) Actually this is clear.  The children want security.  They all want peace.  I am 
illiterate.  And I don’t want my children to be like me.  They want education.  
They want a good future.  They do not want fighting.  So they are against the 
Taliban and will always oppose the Taliban.  They hate and fear the Taliban.  
And as long as the Taliban will be again children fighting and growing and 
becoming educated and literate, they will support any movement against the 
Taliban. 
5) Until there is a good future.  I will fight everyday for as many years as necessary 
to ensure that we have a good future—safe and secure and free of even the 
slightest presence of Taliban. 
6) Every religion has different sects.  The Taliban are not from our sect. 
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1) The Taliban are the enemy.  They are the enemy of the family.  They do not do 
anything productive or improve society. 
2) Before I worked on the land.  But after the Taliban came, I was very happy to 
join the ALP to help my community. 
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3) The Taliban do not allow “good works.” 
4) For life. 
5) My children like education.  They want to go to school.  So therefore they will 
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